The Charlotte News
Saturday, December 13, 1941
Site Ed. Note: Today's page is largely comprised of cheerleading for increased production and for the Allied cause, a far cry from the page a week earlier. An eventful week had transpired: the attack, the declaration of war against Japan on Monday, the sinking by Japan of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, the declarations of war by Germany and Italy and counter-declarations.
In the previous two years, war had come to Poland, after Czechoslovakia for a year before that had been eaten away post-Munich, as Austria had been annexed for the "protection" of Germans in March, 1938, France had fallen in June, 1940 after the Low Countries and Scandinavia, Norway, Denmark, had fallen before it, after Finland had fallen to Russia in March after a three-month war, Britain had undergone the Blitz from September through May, 1941 until the bombing suddenly stopped so that the Wehrmacht could reposition itself in June on the eastern frontier of Germany and Poland along a 2,000-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and pounce June 22; in the meantime, Greece and Albania had fallen after the Fuehrer had come to the rescue of the faltering Mussolini; Indochina, with Vichy's permission in late July, had been given to Japan for occupation, after the July 2 Imperial conference determined the southern course of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, followed promptly by the slapping of a trade embargo on Japan by the U.S., freezing its assets and cutting off completely its silk for oil and scrap iron trade, leaving it financially isolated from the world and with only limited time to change the course or be forced to withdraw from China and Indochina for want of ability to proceed, and so, in response to its isolation, now at last the long-dreaded hour had come in which the United States was hurled full-tilt into the war, no longer just the Arsenal of Democracy proclaimed by Roosevelt in May in his National Emergency speech, but now the supplier of men as well as weaponry. The entire world was now at war; no hemisphere, no major country had escaped its devouring jaws, its weaving whimsy spinning the web of destiny.
As the chart on the page shows, 1.8 billion of the world's 2.1 billion people were now directly involved in the war. Of those, half a billion belonged to the Axis or were Axis-occupied, the remainder, the Allies. The Allies controlled 78% of the world's oil, 67% of the coal, and 63% of the iron ore. The Axis and Axis-occupied, only 3%, 29% and 18%, respectively. But, up for grabs, to change that balance markedly, was the 10% of the oil, 9% of the coal, and 15% of the iron ore in Russia, plus 3% of the oil in the Dutch East Indies. That was enough, combined with the bread basket of the Ukraine, to enable Hitler to get his forces through Turkey into the rich oil fields of Iran and Iraq and then to conquer the Mediterranean from the British? then to invade England and obtain its empire interests? then the world? The oil and other booty in the Dutch East Indies, plus control of the Burma Road supply route to China, all quickly beginning to fall to the Japanese under their adopted blitzkrig tactics learned so well from their master, would enable Japan quickly to cut off Allied supplies to China and conquer it per the plan, exploiting the other resources of the entire south Pacific, forever and forever, to the exclusion of the British and American interlopers to the Orient?
Despite the cheery optimism of the cheerleading this day, the world looked bleak for the Allies, as the U.S. was considered at least a year away from being on a competitive war footing with the Axis, converting itself from a peacetime economy which had been flourishing since 1939 after a decade of depression and, at best, strained economy. Now, once again, the citizenry was being asked to sacrifice, to tighten its belt, to give up, as "First Test" points out, even its prized automobile for the duration, even to send its men under 30 to offer their blood for the cause of renewed freedom from the clutches of this bile-spewing blasphemer in Europe and the fire-breathing dragon in the Orient, now blessed with the whale's eye of the sea enlisted to its cause.
The reality, stripped of the optimism, was that, a week after Pearl Harbor, the Allies faced an endless tunnel of darkness ahead. They were merely trying to cheer themselves in what they understood was a tenuous existence remaining as a free country. But at least now, contrasted with just a week earlier--then cheering so now seeming mundane a thing as settlement of the threatened railroad strike--, the country was united in its effort to defeat the imperialist, enslaving hordes for the preservation of democracy, or what could be salvaged of democracy in a world in which it was necessary to curtail for the nonce the freedom inherent in it to fight fascism and feudalism against devouring it whole once and for all.
"Cruel Clouds" tells more of weather, friendly to the Russians thus far in the early winter of 1941, but turned with darkly evil portent against Britain in the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to the Japanese on Wednesday. The clouds had parted only for a few minutes, the piece informs, as the ships sailed to take out the Japanese infantry landing on the Malay Peninsula. And as they parted to produce north wind clear, the shooting began by the Japanese against the thusly revealed fortresses of the sea, sending 840 to the bottom with their ships.
The magic employed by the "poet" back home with her enlistment of the wind of the Three Sisters had worked once again, just as it had in similar blitzes by their mentor and his like-minded poetasters in Berlin and Munich and Hamburg. The charm was firm and good.
But, as the Herblock today conveys, such invoking of the spirits of darkness to brand the mark of Cain on anyone who happened along to interfere with the thusly fated in achieving their manifest destiny as conveyed to them by the resistless prophecy of the weavers of fate, has its spun-backward quality to spin it once again to the ether from the nether and release in force the charm on its spellbinder--to the exit, stage left.
For the Sisters incessantly void the control over their destiny and their enchantments to apparent providence in the world below by anyone of mere mortal hands, reserving to their province their own power to trick and to sleight the hasty poetaster ensconced in the mere gossamer adornment of her inferior mortality. The sneaky little slipper-shoed poetaster, though living her long slippered life in comfort after the war, would yet endure her charm in Hell as she carried the deaths of millions on her contract with the demon to her earthly grave.
Continuing from yesterday the July through October, 1944 Army Pearl Harbor Committee report, we offer that below. The report underestimates the number of planes, 350, actually used in the attack, and only is able to estimate the number of carriers, from four to six, employed to bring them across the ocean. The remaining 100 planes not used in the attack were left to guard the Fleet in case of counter-assault.
The report tells of the problems of the lack of coordination between the Navy and the Army in Hawaii, the failure of Walter Short adequately to go beyond sociability with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch in making the two branches "friendly" as ordered by General Marshall in early 1941.
Emphasis on training new personnel in flying airplanes, especially the Flying Fortresses, took precedence over actual combat readiness in Hawaii as B-17's were being transferred regularly to the Philippines from the U.S., using Hawaii as a refueling stop. Hawaii was considered essentially a training depot both for the Navy and Army air defenses prior to December 7 by the commanders in charge, Kimmel and Short, and their subordinates.
As to reconnaissance, Kimmel sent out one carrier per week, as two generally stayed near home waters. The single carrier was responsible for long-range reconnaissance, covering an arc of 600 miles, but not the 1,800 miles assumed by General Short from the deployment of all three carriers at once in different tracks. Consequently, General Short, mainly concerned with sabotage on the island itself, kept his planes close, assuming that long-range reconnaissance would be handled by the Navy, using the planes he had, those not reserved for training or being cannibalized for parts to maintain the others, for short-range reconnaissance within 200 miles of Oahu, primarily in the southeast quadrant.
Fortuitously, on December 7, because the Fleet was in the Harbor for the first time in six weeks on a Sunday, there was no training exercise employing the air defenses to respond to a simulated attack by the Navy as the Fleet came in from sea.
The large problem, however, was summed up by General Marshall: "We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack."
The report finds in overall answer to why the attack was successful: "Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet. It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly with its conquest."
And further: "Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers [actually six] out of the total of eight available for its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.
"But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and [American Ambassador to Japan] Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves."
E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7, 1941
1. ARMY AIRCRAFT. On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the status of the island defenses was at the minimum.
As General Burgin testified:
"A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy.
"Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And were out just one week prior to December 7.
"General Frank: On Sunday?
"General Burgin: On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor." (R. 2603)
On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor exceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of commission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for a real mission were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number of Japanese
The Navy had no PBYs in the air that morning, although they usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is explained by General Burgin's testimony that while Sunday morning the antiaircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier- based planes from ship to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before December 7th, the Navy planes did not get into the air on this particular December 7th. (R. 2603) The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of material character that were out being the carriers ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON. The ENTERPRISE, with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 444-445); therefore there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning. (R. 540)
2. NAVAL LONG-DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE. The situation as to the long- distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period: Admiral DeLany testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out by the Navy on the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further testified, "There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a
continuous reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360-degree reconnaissance around the island. They realized the danger but there was nothing that could be done about it. (R. 1728)
Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force 9, said that on the morning of December 7th he had a total of 81 PBYs in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reconnaissance work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarines so that the fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent out three to six planes "to guard against submarine attack." He testified that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise attack was in the vicinity of Midway. (R. 1600) He testified as follows:
"General Frank: You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?
"Admiral Bellinger: We had had on specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two different sectors over the periods during the year." (R. 1601)
Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:
"General Russell: You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.
"Admiral Kimmel: That is correct." (R. 1805)
"General Grunert: Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on that morning?
"Admiral Bellinger: There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term 'distant reconnaissance'." (R. 1629-1630)
This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBYs available. The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel:
"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize." (R. 1811)
Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army was not in a functioning status. (R. 1622) He had 33 scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of December 7th, but they were not being used. (R. 1623) As witness testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBYs out each morning, but on Sunday morning, December 7th, they did not go out. (See General Rudolph's and Colonel Brook's testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-1234)
3. AIRCRAFT WARNING SYSTEM. The radar aircraft warning system had the information center completed and organized with five mobile radar stations which were operating. They had been in operation from four to seven o'clock each morning for training purposes but had not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in operation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually after the attack, so it can be assumed it was in operating condition. (R. 439-440-441) (See Lockard in other testimony.)
As General Short said:
"I think the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well,"
as of December 7, 1941. (R. 508) They had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete. (R. 509) The mobile sets were operating. (R. 510)
"General Frank: ... the AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct.?
"General Short: That is correct." (R. 512)
The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to General Short. He said, "it was actually operating daily." (R. 525) An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.
4. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES. As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the mobile guns was in position on the morning of December 7th. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty. As General Burgin said, "they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition... and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise." (R. 2608)
As General Burgin again testified:
"It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at
heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck." (R. 2607)
The two division were in their quarters so that it took them a number of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal difficulties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed.
The status of the antiaircraft was this: The mobile guns had to secure their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles from Fort Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed buns and the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber. He testified as follows:
"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)
On the morning of December 7th he had not gone into operation with the Navy as on previous Sundays. (R. 2603) This was due to the fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him. (R. 2603)
5. SUMMARY. Therefore, the situation on December 7th can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBYs were not out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with the fleet air arm; the naval carriers
with their planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the antisabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.
F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941.
1. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE. The details of the attack have been already adequately described. To have a competent understanding of the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should remember that the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources in the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew men indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information. The fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th and had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on in Pearl Harbor that was substantially complete.
It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy to glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about November 22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the attack took place.
For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26; and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire operation was worked out, based upon adequate and complete intelligence by the Japanese. It is difficult to understand this attack and its
perfection without first studying these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full information of our dispositions and defenses; we met the attack with absolutely no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere in this report. The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a profound effect politically upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which they intended to operate.
2. NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE ATTACKING FORCE. The strength of the attacking force has already been state in this report, based upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of carriers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encountered during this war. After they were finally disposed of during the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met.
Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert planning, which it had.
The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the detection by the U.S.S. ANTARES of a suspicious object in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m. This was found to be a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the U.S.S. WARD and a naval patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m. on December 7th. The WARD sent a report of this action to the Naval Base
watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning was issued base upon the report. This was one of the most important of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have done.
A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a.m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was a total altogether of five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was captured. The remaining nine crew members were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in rank. (R. 3038) These two-man submarine were launched from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.
While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect any submarines. On the morning of December 7th, the net was opened at 4:58 a.m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open until 8:40 a.m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. The net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a.m. It will be recalled that prior to December 7th one or more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing
Through the net when it was opened at 4. a.m. to permit the garbage scow to go through.
The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force numbered approximately 424. (R. 3048)
Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They consisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7:55 a.m. The attack was over by 11 a.m. On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up, wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both bombing and machine-gun strafing. This is true both of the Army and of the Navy. The PBYs of the Navy were substantially all destroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate. The landing strips were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some subsequent intention of the part of the Japanese to employ those landing strips.
Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected promptness.
As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came over the island as follows: One force came from the north directly across the island, over Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor, Bellows Field, and Pearl Harbor, and a third force came in from the south attacking Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their
attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon the hangars as well as upon the machine shops. All objectives were entered and carefully identified by legends placed upon the U.S. Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese.
It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care of every major contingency before, during and as result of the attack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam Field the legend indicated, "All concrete structures--or in the process of construction."
G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE UNEXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST.
1. ATTACK A SURPRISE. The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very serious concern. (R. 52) Yet he also testified:
"We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." (R. 9)
An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accurate. In race track parlance, it was a "long-shot" and an extraordinary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might have been greater than those to the United States in the event of success. It was a bold and considered venture.
Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet. It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly with its conquest.
Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the
execution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would be of incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.
It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so entrenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible.
Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of eight available for its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.
But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its considered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves.
This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has since then become well-known. It was our failure to take into consideration this extraordinary chance-
taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which misled us.
2. TIME ELEMENT - THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ALL ESTIMATES. This analysis is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the Chief of Staff down considered *at the time the attack was made* that any such attempt would be made.
This *time* element is important in understanding the state of mind of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military estimate of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was generally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate islands. In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval minds of oriental Japan.
As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the defense of Hawaii. They gamble upon having time fore preparation that did not exist.
3. EXPECTED TIME TO CONTINUE TRAINING. That assumption of time for preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the train-
ing of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced personnel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, although it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few unavailable, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject to the weakening process of a periodic turnover.
Let us look at the consequences of this. The navy was either training ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces. Those operations in the areas were not, as Short though, for the purpose of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to be used elsewhere.
The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's decision to adopt Alert No. 1.
"In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Island. We had only 6 flying fortresses in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively now and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on those. They were put on A-20s
for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over the Mandated Islands.
"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.
"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 285-286)
"... We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines." (R. 390)
And again he testified before the Roberts Commission:
"Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training rather than expecting something to happen at the time." (Roberts Record 1622) (See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)
General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by their desire to keep on training.
"General Frank: Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts?...
"General Martin: There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.
"General Frank: Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?
"General Martin: Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1." (R. 1864-1865)
Admiral Kimmel said:
"The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that
the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff." (R. 1764-1765)
It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an attack.
4. SHORT'S TRUST IN NAVY TO GIVE HIM TIMELY NOTICE. TIME ELEMENT AGAIN. General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His instruction from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i.e., the top rank of the Navy; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not substantiated. General Short testified:
"The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of February 7th, 1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else." (R. 355)
Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the
Navy which he was charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement:
"I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without and hesitancy an piece of information that he thought was of interest." (R. 363)
He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task force of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles. (R. 284, 384) Admiral Pye, commander of one of three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:
"The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days and about fourteen days in port." (R. 1036)
Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for reconnaissance. (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673) He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew it. (R. 1771- 1773); Cf. Short 359) The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on this point.
Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as to the movement of Japanese ships. (R. 291) He said that the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne planes, led him to the position that "it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject. It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity."
(R. 300-301) It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there would be no Japanese attack in early December. (R. 299-301)
He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew "where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the situation." (R. 303)
Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied upon complete official interchange which was not in practice.
An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were insufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly confesses this situation. (R. 375); General Short further points out that the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance" (r. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their routines. (R. 359-360, 475) Short could easily have learned that the task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794-1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they had their exercises. (R. 1040, 1757, 3041) Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value. (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that Admiral Bellinger has was a limited number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1589, 1810); that Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526,
1532, 1751) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for antisubmarine reconnaissance. (R. 1039-1040)
General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:
"I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without." (R. 1856)
General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces out influenced his decision, saying:
"...I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me;..." (R. 1873)
This was despite the fact, as he said:
"...we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about." (R. 1857)
As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own admission:
"General Frank: Another thing: Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?
"General Short: I don't believe that the purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me.
"General Frank: Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you?
"General Short: Yes, probably.
"General Grunert: Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?
"General Short: Oh, I think they did, definitely." (R. 409-410)
He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of December 7th of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it. (R. 364-365) By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the information about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early December 7th, he said this as to the Navy action:
"They did not connect it(the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with the general raid, they thought it was separate." (R. 365)
But the point is that Short should have been given this information and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had known of this submarine information it "might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had been handled differently." (R. 310) In this connection he said, "It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong..." (R. 311)
Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and the 30th of November. (R. 361) He said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, and never saw the message. That was the message that showed that the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th, and December 6th from
the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction of confidential documents.
"General Grunert: You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?
"General Short: No, sir." (R. 425)
He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise: "I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything they though had nay bearing on my job; that if they were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to me." (R. 358)
This situation was summed up as follows:
"General Frank: The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?
"General Short: Absolutely.
"General Frank: Do you feel that you were secure in that?
"General Short: I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had." (R. 358)
As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for reconnaissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they were or what they were doing, "except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about in a personal kind of way." (R. 359)
This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which resulted in that he neither got the information completely, accurately, nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officer dealing with equally trained
staff officers of the Navy so a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on personal visits and informal conferences instead of the definitenss of an established organization smoothly operating to an effective end.
H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?
1. REASON FOR ANALYSIS OF ACTION TAKEN AFTER 7 DECEMBER, 1941: The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu has been raised. General Short's energy was admirable and well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a consequence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first part of the examination has already been related in the previous portions of the report. We now propose to examine two questions: How effectively was Short able to use this very same materiel, personnel, and available facilities after the attack; and what did Washington do after the attacking in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done before?
2. HAWAII AND WASHINGTON ACTION: Upon learning of the attack General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (R. 1118) The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 December 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit to fire to take to beaches within one to two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after December 7 to defend Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and that increases in air strength and in engineers for
aviation purposes were granted. (R. 325) Harbor troops had ammunition "immediately at hand." The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot went into two underground rooms. Slit trenches were then dug. (R. 316- 317)
The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications. The troops on field fortifications. The slit trenches were not completed until December 8. (R. 321) The outlying islands were further garrisoned. (R. 332) Orders were issued in connection with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning service and old gas masks were exchanged for new. (R. 529-531) The Interceptor Command, inactive before December 7 and still in the training stage (R. 1825), was activated December 17. (R. 4136-4137) After December 7 "the Navy took us over body and soul...we did exactly as they ordered us to. We were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak" said General Rudolph. (R. 1223) Washington gave unity of command. Directives came from the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy. This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crafter and put into use in February 1941. (R. 1534)
Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army B-17s and Navy PBYs and "anything they had," even the B-18s. Navy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after December 7; many B-17s came out almost immediately. Additional PBYs were received and those damaged on December 7 were repaired.
If the planes that were available by Washington after December 7 had been available before December 7, distance reconnaissance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch. (R. 1532-1534) However, the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack.
The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after December 7. (R. 2064)
The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as follows. After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with the guns in the field. (R. 2605) The skeleton crews were replaced with full crews on the fixed coastal guns. (R. 2611) Only 40 per cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December 7, which was rectified after that date. (R. 2613) The whole command was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3 became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right at their guns. (R. 2639) The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7 and placed under the Interceptor Command. (R. 2644)
The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given. (R. 4133) After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Berquist said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and the Interceptor Command
cooperating before December 7, after December 7 "I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted." (R. 1205-1206) The AWS work moved much faster after December 7. (R. 1218) After December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, disappeared. (R. 1216-1217)
After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps. (R. 3913) The aircraft warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7 with three groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029)
Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the aircraft warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was unsatisfactory. (R. 2135) He found he was able to complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the crews on those projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work with. (R. 2149-2151)
The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 was the change in construction activities under the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.
A new field was begun a Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were built at Hickam Field; the field at Haliewa was expanded; construction of a new field at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifications. (R. 321) Authority was requested to
build ten airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands. "We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds." Barracks were built with WPA money. (R. 325) A pool of lumber was authorized for the Quartermaster. (R. 328)
All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs to get more work accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company. (R. 3737) A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a long time, due to the delay of plans from the Engineers. (R. 2542) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up. After December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the site, erected the tower in five days and the station operating.
On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field were incomplete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work began on a 24- hour-a-day basis. The second runway was completed in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base commander at Bellows Field. (R. 3020) After December 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at Bellows Field. When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practically wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75 feet apart. (R. 3014)
The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the situation by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from $50,000 before December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7. The Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending
all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman. (R. 3434, 3874) The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by Wyman when he went to the islands in the middle of 1904, was invited by him after December 7 to join Hawaiian Constructors. (R. 2405-2407)
Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, after December 7. (R. 838)
After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to overhaul material and receive supplies. (R. 1045)
We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous employment of facilities, materiel and personnel was made, and full support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which might have been done before December 7. The support from the mainland was vastly different after December 7 than before, and the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before December 7 G-2 did not submit to General Short any strategical estimates but after December 7 they submitted such a statement weekly. After December 7 the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his 200 agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have been done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December 7, 1941
List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 by persons in the Hawaiian Islands: Bloch, volume 13, pages 1653-34; Klatt, v 13, p 1465-66; Pye, v 9, p 1045; Phillips, v 10, p 1118; Murray, v 27, p 3080; Martin, v 17, p 1825, 1850, 1911; Lockard, v 9, p 1029; Bartlett, v 22, p 2510-11;
The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the exception of the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and the particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those defenses. Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated in Chapter V.
In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter No. IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter. In this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a balanced and complete picture of the principal events and actions taken which contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941.
Footnotes: (continued from preceding page) Midkiff, v 25, p 2805-07-14-40-41; Bergquist, v 10, p 1205-06-16-17-18; Rudolph, v 10, p 1223; Weddington, v 27, p 3020-13-14; Howard, v 17, p 1916; Pratt, v 18, p 1986; Locey, v 25, p 2790; King, v 23, p 2542-37-38; Fielder, v 26, p 2981; McKee, v 21, p 2405-07; Burgin, v 24, p 2603-04-07-09-11-13-14-15-39-44; Reybold, v. 6, p 580; Davidson, v. 36, p 4133-36-38-42; Powell, v. 32, p 3904-11- 13; Wyman, v 29, p 3435-36 - v 32, p 3874 (affidavit - v 29, p 3433,34; Perliter, v 30, p 3712; Benson, v 30, p 3737; Farthing, v 7, p 838; Tillman, v 19, p 2135-49-51; Short, v 4, p 314-15-16-17-19-20-21-22-25- 28-30-31-32-37 - v 5, p 500, 529-30-31-34-36.
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