The Charlotte News
Monday, October 18, 1937
FIVE EDITORIALS
Site Ed. Note: This day, October 18, 1962, the President held a pre-scheduled meeting with Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, at the White House.
In 1988, WGBH, PBS affiliate for Boston, interviewed Andrei Gromyko. Part of the interview dealt with the missile crisis and the meeting with the President, October 18:
On that day in October acting on the instructions of the Soviet leadership, I spoke to President Kennedy in the White House. Naturally, we discussed Cuba.
I raised the question of Cuba on my own initiative and explained the Soviet position to the President. "I would draw your attention," I said, "to the dangerous developments caused by the American attitude towards Cuba."
The President listened attentively.
"For a long time," I continued, "America has been conducting an unrestrained campaign against Cuba. It is attempting to cut off Cuba's trade with other countries. It threatens Cuba with aggression. Such a policy could lead to grave consequences, which we believe, no nation--including America--wants."
Kennedy replied that the present regime in Cuba did not suit the United States. If there were a different government there, the United States' attitude would be different. I noticed that this was said sharply.
"But," I said "on what basis does the American leadership assume that the Cubans ought to order their internal affairs, not according to their own judgment, but as Washington thinks fit? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people. Neither the USA nor any other power has any right to interfere in its internal affairs. Statements that we hear from the President and other spokesmen to the effect that Cuba allegedly threatens the security of the USA are unfounded. It is enough just to compare the size and resources of the two countries--a giant and a midget--for the groundlessness of the accusations against Cuba to become obvious."
Then I emphasized the fact that the Cuban leadership, and Fidel Castro personally, had on many occasions announced to the whole world that Cuba had no intention of imposing its system on anyone else, that they are firmly against any interference by states in each other's internal affairs. It seeks to resolve all points of contention with the United States by means of negotiation. Those declarations, as is known, are reinforced by deeds. Those who call for aggression against Cuba claim that they do not find the Cuban government's statement sufficient. But this may be said of everything, this way every aggression may be justified. Any aggressive action, against any country. It is enough but to say, "we do not agree to this." When the United States takes hostile action against Cuba, and at the same time also against the states which maintain good relations with it, respect its independence and assist it in its hour of need, the Soviet Union will not assume the role of a bystander. This was said.
Yes, Kennedy asserted that the US administration had no plans to attack Cuba, and that the Soviet Union could assume that no threat to Cuba existed on the part of the United States.
At this time, he made an important admission: the Bay of Pigs action was a mistake. He, as President, stated that he was restraining those circles that supported an invasion. That he was restraining those circles. While he himself seeks not to allow actions that might lead to war.
[Reflecting ahead in the crisis timeline to the following week--], the Cuban question became really serious. Nevertheless, Kennedy further interpreted events as if the situation was aggravated by the actions of the Soviet Union, which supplied Cuba with offensive weapons. Then the President read out an official statement--he just held it up and read it out--on the Cuban question, justifying the U.S. decision to impose a blockade around Cuba.
I had to say again, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet Union was calling on the U.S. Government, and the President personally, not to allow any steps incompatible with the interests of peace, with the principles of the U.N. Charter.
In the course of our discussions Kennedy, despite allegations which circulated in the West, never raised the question of presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba; I repeat, he never mentioned it; thus, I didn't have to give a direct reply as to whether there were such weapons in Cuba or not.
At the same time, I explained to the President that Soviet help was aimed exclusively at strengthening its defense capability and the development of a peaceful economy in this country. The training of Cubans in the use of arms intended for defense by Soviet specialists could not be evaluated as a threat to anybody. The Soviet Union responded to Cuba's request for help because the request was aimed at eliminating the danger hanging over the country.
At the conclusion of our meeting I said: "Mr. President, allow me to express the hope that the United States is now fully aware of the position of the Soviet Union as regards Cuba and of our evaluation of US actions towards this country."
The discussion with Kennedy of the Cuban question was full--how can I put it more exactly--full of sharp turns, zigzags, if I may say so. He was clearly nervous, though outwardly he tried not to betray it. He made contradictory statements. Threats towards Cuba were followed by assertions that Washington didn't have any plans for an assault on Cuba. This last statement, that Washington didn't have any invasion plans, this last statement is certainly significant, and was assessed as such then by me and by the Soviet leadership after my report.
Common sense prevailed with the head of the White House. It shows that behind the appearance of a man who slightly lost his balance was a statesman of outstanding intellect. I would like to say this explicitly. He was a man of outstanding intellect and character.
Our discussion was a long one; I only render the gist of what was said by each side on the most critical question, that of Cuba. Otherwise I would go on too long.
This was probably the most difficult meeting that I ever experienced in all my 48 years of meeting presidents of the United States in various circumstances. Maybe not such a long period of time!
The interview plainly implies that Gromyko knew precisely what he was saying when he denied the presence of or intent to place offensive weapons in Cuba; he appears merely to have been using hollow nomenclature based on the present subjective intent of the Soviet Union.
But, plainly, missiles capable of striking the United States, whether at 90 miles or 2,200 miles, were offensive weapons by their very nature, not intended merely for defense. Moreover, as had been discussed at the meeting on Tuesday, there was really no strategic need for them other than as a tool to wrench concessions over Berlin and as a means of bartering with the United States to obtain withdrawal of missiles in Turkey and elsewhere outside its territory.
The official White House memorandum contemporaneously summarizing the meeting essentially confirms that which Gromyko stated in 1988.
The President assured that the United States was not contemplating any blockade of Soviet ships to Cuba or any invasion, that the only blockade was the prevention of ships coming from Cuba to the United States to transport cargo.
The memo concluded this way:
The President said that in order to be clear on this Cuban problem he wanted to state the following: The U.S. had no intention of invading Cuba. Introduction last July of intensive armanents had complicated the situation and created grave danger. His own actions had been to prevent, unless U.S. security was endangered, anything from being done that might provoke the danger of war. The President then read a portion of his September 4 statement on Cuba and stated that this had been U.S. position and policy on this question. He noted that the Attorney General had discussed the Cuban situation with Ambassador Dobrynin so that the latter must be aware of what it was. The President again recalled his Indianapolis speech of last Sunday and said that we were basing our present attitude on facts as they had been described by Mr. Gromyko; our presumption was that the armaments supplied by U.S.S.R. were defensive.
The exchanges in this meeting were obviously both chilly and orgulous on both sides, neither being candid with the other, as candor could not be afforded at this point by the United States and candor would not be tolerated by the Soviets.
For the Soviets apparently had hidden candor from themselves in the offing, just as with the pronouncement in 1961 that the Berlin Wall was a defensive barrier to the West.
After all, it was goddamned dangerous to do what they did.
Just as it would have been for the United States to move ships into the Mediterranean and begin to offload Titan or Atlas missiles to supplement or replace the 15 obsolete Jupiter missiles in Turkey shortly after the Bay of Pigs or the second Berlin blockade, for instance, even if the gesture would have been hollow with the redundancy of Polaris missiles onboard nuclear submarines plying the seas in quite sufficient numbers.
Subsequently on the 18th, the President met again with his advisors and was told of the new surveillance showing the IRBM installation in Guanajay. The discussion focused on two of the alternatives previously considered, air strike, limited or full, or blockade. Again the positive and negative potential consequences of each such action were discussed, and again no firm decision was reached.
The President stressed that the matter must be accomplished in such a way as to minimize the possibility of nuclear exchange.
That position naturally favored blockade as an initial measure, though it had the drawback of notifying the Soviets and the world at large of the fact that the United States was fully aware of the problem, hence taking away any possibility of surprise attack; it also had the risk of escalating the matter as the Soviets had warned that blockade was viewed by them as an act of war.
The air strike, however, almost surely would provoke a retaliatory response against NATO, as Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State under President Truman, advised; though he favored the risk and believed it to be far superior to the blockade, which he also believed could have equally problematic results.
President Kennedy believed that the air strike, because of the inevitability of killing perhaps several hundred Soviet troops guarding the missile sites, as estimated by Robert McNamara, would inevitably provoke a response, and that response would likely be in Berlin.
The advisors indicated that the potential for the Soviet Union over-running Berlin with conventional ground troops was real.
And such a move by the Soviets, the President indicated, would therefore likely lead to nuclear exchange. But without any action, there would be a gradual deterioration of matters such that when Khrushchev would visit the U.N. in November he might then begin making demands regarding Berlin.
There was also caution from the advisors that a blockade would be illegal under international law without a formal declaration of war, and would be an aggressive act against "everybody, including our allies". The President was dismissive of this point, however, indicating that under the circumstances and the powers granted by Congressional resolution, he did not believe the world community would have any objection to the United States taking such a stand against the introduction of further arms to Cuba when the whole of western Europe and the United States were placed at risk of nuclear war by the continued presence there of the missiles. A declaration of war should only be made in the event of the need for an invasion. The first step should be to implement a blockade while simultaneously warning Khrushchev that if the "war" continues, the United States would invade and take out the missiles. Efforts would be made first to obtain the consent of the O.A.S. before implementing the blockade.
The Congressional resolution, passed October 3, declared that the United States would be "determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States."
McGeorge Bundy voiced the opinion that the matter should be considered further on Friday, especially as to the air strike and its being conducive to surprise, as there was still adequate time before a decision needed to be made.
George Ball counseled that it was of greatest importance, in terms of maintaining world opinion, to act only after some warning to the Soviets, or we would run the risk of being perceived, after sneak attack, as were the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. The President agreed with this analysis and indicated that at least some form of notice, 24-hours minimum, should be provided. That matter was also tabled for further consideration.
The group would meet again on Friday without the President, who would maintain his schedule. This time the group would caucus as two sub-groups, those favoring air strike, and those favoring blockade, and then would join again to discuss the varying merits and risks of each approach.
So, in the balance would be the weighing of the surprise factor, plus the assurance of elimination of the missiles before they became operational, versus the attempt at statesmanship afforded by the slower, but less volatile, method of blockade, to make clear to the Soviet Union that the policy of zero-tolerance of foreign offensive missiles in this hemisphere was firm.
In a dictaphone briefing for himself at the end of the day, the President summarized the meeting with the thought that the consensus of opinion had shifted away from an air strike toward implementation of an immediate blockade starting Sunday, and that he did not wish to indicate a declaration of war in doing so. He pointed out that Dean Acheson had favored the limited air strike, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett and McGeorge Bundy had favored no action at all so as not to appear to provoke a reaction by the Soviets which could result in the loss of Berlin. But, the overriding opinion was that the failure to take any action would cause the country to be divided, our allies to be left without protection, and that in a few months, after the missiles became operational, the same course by the Soviets would be followed anyway with respect to Berlin, and with a stronger hand to play.
Thus, as matters were put to bed on Thursday, the favored course of action by the President was clearly that of blockade rather than air strike.
The New York Times carried a piece on October 18 stating that the U.S.S.R. had successfully launched from the Pacific an ICBM with a 7,500 mile range, one which hit, according to Soviet sources, within proximity of its intended target.
Here, the pieces, replete with uses for scrap iron, bare feet, surprises, and all, from The News of October 18, 1937. ...Ah, but could he kick the football 90 miles? How about across Mamala Bay?
Framed Edition
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