The Charlotte News

Monday, August 9, 1954


Site Ed. Note: The front page reports that Senators sifting charges against Senator McCarthy this date had indicated that they would drop some counts and draft rules to prevent their hearings from going far afield, with Senators Arthur Watkins of Utah and Edwin Johnson of Colorado, chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the six-man special committee appointed the previous week to hear the censure resolution sponsored by Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont, having stated that it was obvious that some of the 46 specific allegations leveled at the Senator had to be eliminated. Neither Senator would specify which charges he had in mind, but a third member of the committee, who declined to be identified, singled out an accusation that Senator McCarthy had not given services of "comparable value" by preparing a short pamphlet on prefabricated housing in return for a $10,000 fee paid to him by Lustron Corp., a prefabricated housing firm. A number of the 46 accusations, some of which had been added by Senators J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Wayne Morse of Oregon, overlapped, under the general contention of the Flanders resolution that Senator McCarthy's behavior had tended to bring the Senate into disrepute. The charges included improper treatment of committee witnesses and unlawfully obtaining secret documents from Government personnel. One of three Democratic members of the special committee, who had also declined to be named, said that he would propose a rule of relevancy for testimony, designed to curb any "bulldozer tactics" which might occur, that the chairman should have the right to cut off witnesses attempting to go beyond the scope of the charges as defined by the committee, saying also that he favored public hearings, with radio and television barred. The committee had already voted unanimously to bar television and radio, to avoid a "vaudeville show" atmosphere which had sometimes pervaded the Army-McCarthy hearings of April through June. The committee might start weeding out the charges this date. Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana, not a member of the committee, had stated, in a weekend radio address, that if any moral wrong had been involved in the $10,000 Lustron fee, the voters of Wisconsin had already absolved Senator McCarthy of blame by re-electing him in 1952. He also said that he did not believe the Senate could censure Senator McCarthy for an "unwarranted attack" on General Marshall in a June 14, 1951 Senate speech, assailing the General for his policy while Secretary of State in 1947-48 and for his advice to President Truman after being a special envoy to China in 1946, regarding Communist China, referring to the General as a "traitor". Senator Ellender said that he had abhorred the remarks, as he had always had great respect for General Marshall, but that Senator McCarthy had been exercising a constitutional privilege to criticize a former Government official, that the statements were no worse than things which had been said in the Senate about Presidents and others in the past.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee, in an interview with U.S. News & World Report published this date, said that South Korea was "crying" for atomic weapons from the U.S. to help it drive the Communists from North Korea. He said that Britain and France were not anti-Communist nations, that they were afraid of the Soviets and that large numbers of Britons had joined Communism, as had many French, with the notable exception of General Charles de Gaulle, that the U.S. was restraining him and Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China from fighting the Communist Chinese by withholding support. He said, as he had told a joint session of Congress two weeks earlier, that he wanted the U.S. to provide air and naval support, adding, however, that he also wanted assistance in doubling the 650,000-man South Korean Army. He said that the Army had been prepared to move against the Communists in the North ever since the Armistice had been signed in late July, 1953, but that when they were ready to move up, they had discovered that their gasoline drums were locked, either by the U.N., the U.S., or someone, that whoever it was had begun to ration the ammunition to an amount sufficient for three days of use. He also said that the Nationalists on Formosa were willing to go to the mainland and start fighting, but that the U.S. would not allow it. He believed that the attitude of the U.S. was that whenever the Communists wanted to come in and take over, South Korea had to let them do it.

In Chicago, a Federal judge ordered the release from custody of Roger "The Terrible" Touhy, 55, convicted of kidnaping and Prohibition era offenses, previously sentenced to 199 years in Stateville Prison, ruling on habeas corpus that the defendant had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The Government would appeal the ruling, but meanwhile the court provided an appellate bond, which the defendant's family had raised. He had been convicted of the July 1, 1933 kidnaping of John Factor, for which he was sentenced to 99 years in 1934, and then was sentenced to 199 years for his part in an escape from prison in 1942. He and his brother Tommy had headed up a gang which operated from South Carolina to California, and whose gang activity reputedly included murder, mail and bank robbery, in addition to kidnaping. A $130,000 mail truck robbery in Charlotte during the early 1930's had been attributed to members of his gang. Mr. Touhy had sought to overturn his 1934 conviction on the basis that it was obtained through perjured testimony. As previously indicated, FBI special agent Guy Banister, at the time in charge of the Chicago office, had been involved, along with director J. Edgar Hoover, on the scene, at the time of the recapture in Chicago in late 1942 of Mr. Touhy after his earlier escape. Mr. Banister, following his retirement from the FBI in 1954, moved to New Orleans, operated a private detective agency and, during the 1960's, occupied an office on Camp Street, in the same building listed as the headquarters of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" on fliers being distributed by Lee Harvey Oswald on the streets outside the office in August, 1963, when the latter was arrested for becoming involved in a fracas with ostensibly anti-Castro Cubans. In 1967, New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison contended that Mr. Banister had employed Mr. Oswald or had some association with him, based on witness statements of workers in the office who had seen Mr. Oswald periodically during the summer of 1963 hanging around the office, and implicitly suggested a role of Mr. Banister, involved in apparent gunrunning activities with anti-Castro Cubans planning to try to oust Fidel Castro from power, in the assassination of President Kennedy, which occurred in Dallas about three months after the arrest of Mr. Oswald in New Orleans. Whether, of course, given the subsequent history, anybody involved in that seemingly minor fracas in August, 1963 or anybody involved with the Camp Street offices, including Mr. Banister, was really who they claimed to be on the surface, or were part of a reticulation of right-wing nuts bent on circumventing the avowed policy of the U.S. Government against invasion of Cuba, made as part of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, remains questionable.

In Phenix City, Ala., members of a hand-picked grand jury met in secret session this date to try to determine who had assassinated State Attorney General-nominate A. L. Patterson the previous June 18 and to determine the factors which led to his murder in an alley outside his law office. About 125 witnesses had been served with nearly 3,000 subpoenas to provide evidence to help rid Russell County of criminal elements, involved in prostitution and gambling operations, catering to nearby Fort Benning, Ga., soldiers. Mr. Patterson had vowed to clean up the illicit operations, and it was believed that his death had been a direct response to that campaign pledge, his killing having occurred a few days after his Democratic nomination, assuring him victory in November in the one-party state. The grand jury meeting came after a purge had revised the county's legal organization, tainted by suspicion of receiving orders from racketeers. Governor Gordon Persons had declared martial law in the county and had barred key county court officers from taking part in the investigation.

In New York, former Representative Vito Marcantonio, 51, in the middle of a comeback effort after being defeated for re-election by a Republican-Democratic-Liberal party coalition in 1950, was found dead on the street after having collapsed during a heavy rain, walking alone at the time not far from his office on Park Place, near City Hall Park in lower Manhattan, a doctor on the scene indicating that death had come from a heart ailment. He had been currently running under the independent Good Neighbor Party in the coming November elections. He had represented an East Harlem district for 14 years in Congress and had headed, until the previous November, the American Labor Party, which had sponsored in New York former Vice-President Henry Wallace in his independent Progressive Party campaign for the presidency in 1948. At age 18, he had organized and led a Harlem tenants' strike, doing so well that the late Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, then seeking a seat in Congress, had enlisted his help. Mr. Marcantonio's first position as a lawyer had been in Mayor LaGuardia's office, later becoming the Mayor's secretary, and then becoming an assistant U.S. Attorney in 1930 and 1931, winning his first Congressional term in 1934 as a Republican, representing Mr. LaGuardia's old Harlem district. He had become practically the symbol of New York left-wing politics while in Congress.

The Agriculture Department forecast that the year's Government-controlled cotton crop would be 12.6 million bales of 500-pounds gross weight, compared to 16.46 million bales produced the previous year, with the 10-year average through 1952 being 12.44 million bales. The Department had sought, through control, to limit the crop to about 12 million bales, with officials estimating that there was a reserve of about 9.65 million bales on hand on August 1 from previous crops, much of that held by Government consignment through price-support programs.

On Terceira Island, in the Azores, it was reported that a Colombian Constellation airliner had crashed and burned early this date killing all 21 passengers and its crew of nine, with one American listed among the crew and two passengers believed to be Americans. The airliner had been en route from Hamburg to Bogota and had been unable to make its schedule landing at the main international airport at Santa Maria in the Azores because of thick fog, had landed instead on the airfield on Terceira Island, taken off again for Bermuda, a minute or two later crashing into the hills about two and a half miles north of the airfield, bursting into flames.

In Callandar, Ontario, Emilie Dionne, one of the famous quintuplets, who had died after an epileptic seizure at age 20 the prior Friday, was buried this date not far from the home where the quintuplets had grown up. Hundreds attended the funeral, including the other four surviving sisters. She had died at a hostel run by Catholic nuns, and her sister Marie, who had given up temporarily her hope of becoming a nun, had wept uncontrollably.

In Tokyo, a 36-year old man had gone berserk the previous day, strangled his wife, hacked his four children to death with a knife, set the family home on fire and died in the blaze, according to police.

In Victoria, British Columbia, Florence Chadwick, who had crossed the English Channel in record time in 1951, and then swum the other way across the following year, becoming the first woman to cross in both directions, had failed in her attempt to swim across the strait of Juan de Fuca this date and was taken from the water, chilled and slightly ill, after approximately five hours of battling difficult riptides and currents, having swum only seven miles toward the goal, 18.5 miles from the inception point. She had been offered $7,500 by a paint company and the Victoria Times to make the attempt, and would have received another $2,500 if successful.

For those who have not yet learned to read, as part of our continuing service to the illiterate, a photograph appears on the page of a giant spider web, with an arachnid climbing amid its gossamer strands, threatening at any moment to menace Charlotte Town and all its inhabitants. We saw it many times back then, the omnipresent blue smoke-ensconced halo engulfing it being said to keep the spiders at bay.

On the editorial page, "A Two-Headed Monster for Planning" indicates that Charlotte Mayor Philip Van Every had stated his complete support of planning, but believed in one board for the city and one for the county, that the expenses between them could be prorated.

The piece thinks that approach would only invite trouble, that preparation for future growth of the metropolitan area could not be separated into two tasks, but required cooperative planning. It indicates that the question would be before a joint conference of the City Council and the County Commission soon, and that action could not be delayed indefinitely, that if officials indulged in jealousy or distrust, created artificial boundaries within the community, and could not look beyond the present year's budget, they would kill the joint planning program, that only vision and clear thinking could make that common enterprise successful.

"Why 'Foreign Aid' Is So Important" indicates that in a military offensive, one had to muster enough strength to overpower the enemy, or skirt the main lines and establish a position in a sector which the enemy did not control, whereas in a defensive war, when the enemy placed a division in a vital sector, the proper counter was to bring up enough troops and equipment to prevent a breakthrough.

While the world presently was technically at peace, the war continued daily between the Communist and free worlds, and the basic strategy remained the same, the difference in the Cold War being that military weapons were not used but merely accumulated and held in reserve in case the weapons presently used, ideas, machines and technical assistance to neutral nations, did not finally decide the outcome. In that war, the U.S. was not on the offensive, it postulates, in fact was also not adhering to sound defensive principles.

It finds the situation in Afghanistan to be illustrative of the point, where the Russians had offered, and the Afghans appeared inclined to accept, a quarter of a billion dollar program of technical assistance. In response, the U.S. foreign aid bill provided 59 million dollars less in economic aid for the Near East, Africa and India than did the Russian offer only for Afghanistan. More than three billion dollars of the 3.438 billion dollars in foreign aid proposed by the President provided for military assistance, with only a few hundred million earmarked for economic and technical assistance. That amount had been cut drastically by Congress, and a joint conference committee had agreed to restore enough funds to bring the total to a figure just over three billion, only after the President had made a very strong statement on behalf of foreign aid at his press conference the prior Wednesday, saying that he believed there was a lack of comprehension of what the people on the other side of the Iron Curtain were doing.

The piece regards that statement as true, exampled by the fact that although Southern Congressmen had usually supported foreign aid expenditures, only three of the North Carolina delegation had voted for the foreign aid bill in 1954. Senator Alton Lennon had gone so far as to say that all non-military aid ought be abolished, and newly appointed Senator Sam Ervin had voted against the foreign aid bill, as had South Carolina Senators Olin Johnston and Burnet Maybank.

It indicates that it was admittedly difficult to become enthusiastic about what appeared at first glance to be a "giveaway program", but that actually the equipment, technicians, personnel and ideas which the U.S. sent to the present battlegrounds in Asia and Africa constituted freedom forces, dangerously outnumbered by larger such forces of the Communists, who saw more clearly than did Americans the value of non-military aid.

"Are They Biting in the River Styx?" finds that it was clear why Izaak Walton had so often used the adjective "gallant" when describing fishermen, finding an example in a news story from Fort Mill, S.C., explaining how two boys, one 14 and the other 15, had caught a giant 26 1/2 pound carp with their bare hands, and another item from the British Medical Journal telling how a man had risked death from heart attack rather than lose the fighting salmon he had hooked in a river in Scotland, providing some further detail on both incidents.

It suggests that the dedicated fisherman was the most valiant, relentless and audacious sportsman alive, completely "fearless in the face of personal peril", willing to brave the River Styx if he thought the big ones were biting there, that the compleat fisherman got that way in much the same manner that a sixth century youth attained knighthood, from certain ordeals which a novice had to face before acceptance into the "brotherhood". Hazards included mosquitoes, water moccasins and snapping turtles, and possibly the nearly impossible task of catching a carp with one's bare hands, with the survivors becoming the true fishermen, "men with bulldog courage, resolution and tenacity." They could lick their weight, it asserts, in barracuda.

Whatever you say… But one could tell such fish stories about any sport, some of which are considerably more dangerous and harrowing in fact than wading around in a little river or creek, dressed in little rubber booties and short pants, trying to catch a minnow or two with a worm or special Spanish fly. As we have said previously, though we admit to having scant experience at the craft, we don't dig it, find it rather boring, and hardly consider it a "sport", even if Mr. Walton's work is instructive on the general zen of any such craft or hobby. But fishing is no more a sport than is, say, carpentry or auto mechanics. One does not go into a football game, for instance, trying to land the competition permanently on their backs and out of breath to the point of death, and then cook them and eat them, or, for the really big all-star prizes, have their carcasses stuffed and mounted on the wall. That would be considered very poor sportsmanship, even in boxing.

A piece from the Chicago Daily Tribune, titled "Ezcuze It, Please", indicates, in mistyped words, that the writer was trying to write the piece with a badly mangled pair of hands and, in consequence, was not hitting the keys very well, the result of a session with the power lawnmower, trying to get it started with its rope-pull, repeatedly without success. It wonders why, with all the American ingenuity at work, no one could invent a power lawnmower which would start on the first pull and "nit mangle your hands and reduce you to cusd words, such as q£e½ ut all."

Charles Collingwood, from a CBS news broadcast, regards Christian Dior's latest Paris fashions, saying that his frontal attack was progressing well in the battle between his designs and the female figure. He concludes that, for a reporter accustomed to the "chaste pages of political analysis and foreign policy studies", the discussion became a little clinical for a family program, as the way the fashion people talked left nothing very sacred, such as when a female fashion buyer for Nieman-Marcus in Dallas said that women were tired of having their bust come before they did, that "The propeller look has been on its way out for the past few seasons." He finds that the president of Henri Bendel, Inc., a "temple of fashion", had expressed the matter perhaps best when he said that it was all good for business, that trends could not become stagnant. "So," says Mr. Collingwood, "the fifth column is stirring up the trends, and, if the past is any guide, the fellow travelers will take the cue."

Drew Pearson tells of Governor Allan Shivers of Texas having stubbed his toe again, after the controversy regarding a $1,000 per month fee given to his campaign manager to maintain in business a bankrupt insurance company and the disclosure that his son had been attending a non-segregated school while the Governor had been openly critical of the May 17 Brown v. Board of Education decision, it having now developed that his wife and mother-in-law had been profiting from State printing contracts, which he proceeds to describe in detail.

A questionnaire was being circulated to certain select officials of the Federal Housing Administration, one of the most searching such questionnaires ever sent to Government employees, and one which might be salutary in its effect were it sent to all employees, but smacked of political discrimination when sent only to a select few. About two years earlier, the Justice Department had brought in a man from New York to investigate Government corruption, only to have him clash with then-Attorney General Howard McGrath when he wanted every member of the Cabinet and every Government official to fill out a questionnaire showing bank deposits, cash transfers, spousal deposits, all gifts received, etc. Mr. McGrath had balked at having the questionnaire mailed, fired the responsible individual, and in the fracas which followed, President Truman had fired Attorney General McGrath. The questionnaire was never mailed. The present questionnaire was being sent out, asking for a statement of what jewels, furs, and life insurance the employee and the employee's spouse had when they had entered Government service and how much they had at the end of 1953, delving into business associations, law partners, and whether the employee's name was on a private business at a time when employed by the Government, plus any investments made by the employee, the employee's spouse or members of the employee's family.

Joseph & Stewart Alsop tell of a debate ongoing recently in the National Security Council regarding whether the U.S., alone or as a member of SEATO, to be formed in September, should guarantee against attack the kingdom of Cambodia, a debate stimulated by polite conversation between the U.S. charge d'affairs in Cambodia, Robert McClintock, and the King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, who had summoned Mr. McClintock to the palace in Phnom Penh. The King wanted to know whether the plans for SEATO would entail a U.S.-backed guarantee of Cambodia's frontiers, to which Mr. McClintock politely refused to make commitment either way, cabling Washington for an answer, which Washington did not have.

The same question had been raised at the recently concluded Geneva peace conference, regarding Korea and Indo-China, by the Cambodian representative, with Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, the U.S. representative at the time in Geneva, also having not provided an answer to the question, which had never been seriously considered by the State Department. Now that the question had reached the NSC, Joint Chiefs chairman Admiral Arthur Radford had taken a strong stand against giving Cambodia such a guarantee, appearing somewhat odd, as Admiral Radford had been the Administration's strongest advocate for intervention to save Indo-China.

The Alsops suggest that it was not hard to figure out his reasoning, however, as Cambodia, one of the three Associated States of Indo-China, was a French colonial possession until recently, had no army of any consequence and was supplied through Saigon in what was now, since the truce, South Vietnam. If Saigon were to fall under Communist control, which the Alsops believe the truce terms virtually assured, Cambodia could not be easily defended, and Admiral Radford likely reasoned that, with the loss under the truce of North Vietnam, there was not much use in taking great risks to save little Cambodia.

The State Department disputed the latter view, admitting that no local defense of Cambodia was possible in case of direct attack, but that it might still be protected in the same manner which indefensible West Berlin was protected, through a Western guarantee of its political integrity.

The issue remained undecided, and Mr. McClintock had been recalled to provide a first-hand report on the matter. But the central issue remained as to why there should be great risks taken to defend such a small country as Cambodia. The Alsops posit that the best answer was probably that provided by the President at his April 7 press conference, when he had said that if one had "a row of dominoes set up", and one was knocked over, it would be "a certainty that the last one will go very quickly, too." His point had been that the loss of Indo-China would start a disintegration in Southeast Asia which would have the most profound influence on the free world. Since that press conference, North Vietnam had been lost to the Communists under the Geneva truce agreement, and, the Alsops suggest, it was likely that it would be followed by South Vietnam and probably Laos, with Cambodia next in line. Cambodia surrounded Siam, Thailand, like a long curving hand, and already "the far-sighted Communists had completed preparation to give the Siamese domino the necessary added push."

They indicate that as soon as the Geneva conference had ended, the Chinese Communists had put on Peking radio a former wartime Siamese premier, who called on his fellow Siamese to overthrow the "reactionary" Siamese Government, calling it a "tool of American imperialism". Opinion was divided on Siam, as to whether that was merely psychological warfare or a preview to an eventual Communist Chinese attack.

Burma would be the next domino in line, and there were apparently reliable reports out of Burma that Communist guerrilla bases were being established on the border with China, easily supplied from China on the same pattern which had worked so well with Indo-China.

They conclude, therefore, that with one domino down, the Southeast Asian dominoes were beginning to tumble, just as the President predicted, that if all of them would not fall very quickly, a line would have to be drawn somewhere in Asia, and there appeared to be no better place to draw it than along the borders of Cambodia; but, they warn, this time, if such a caveat against incursion were provided to the Communists, the U.S. would have to mean it and stick to it, whatever the risk.

It might be noted that, while the Alsops had on several occasions, for about five years or more, previously referred to the idea of a "domino theory" in Southeast Asia, this marks the first time that they had actually used the analogy by name, as provided by the President at his April 7 press conference. The analogy would come to represent the shorthand rationale for U.S. involvement directly in Vietnam, starting with military advisers in 1958, and continuing through and beyond the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August, 1964, in the wake of two patrol boat attacks on American warships, the U.S.S. Maddox and U.S.S. Turner Joy, the second of which, on August 4, turned out not to be an actual attack, though unknown to both the President and the Congress at that time, the result of a misinterpreted radar screen on one of the ships by the radar operator, but both incidents, nevertheless, leading eventually to the start of the build-up of U.S. troops in early 1965 in the Vietnam War, the August 7, 1964 resolution having given the President the authority to do so when national security interests required in accord with SEATO member states. Everyone who followed the news at all at that time was aware of the phrase "domino theory", even if one were a child, but the actual basis for it remained murky not only to children, who were expected to fight in that war one day, adolescents, who were on the precipice of fighting in that war one day, but also to most of the late adolescents and older who were actually drafted to become the soldiers in that war.

Fault whomever you wish for not communicating the matter more clearly, the press, the Administration, members of Congress, but the great unpopularity of that war, not from its inception, but certainly by around mid-1967 and increasingly thereafter, might be laid, at least in part, to a failure to communicate with clarity the reason why, if the dominoes did fall, the loss of Southeast Asia to the Communist world was considered so critical to the security of the United States. There was plentiful discussion of particular operations of the war, albeit, in terms of the overall conflict, becoming confused and enmeshed in a morass of never-heard before and never-heard again Oriental names of obscure places in an obscure foreign field of battle, and the rationale for those particular operations in terms of military strategy of the moment, appearing to change mercurially from season to season, but not the overriding reason, beyond the simplistic phrase "domino theory", beyond commitments under SEATO, for U.S. participation in the war, itself.

Those who understood the basis for the Pacific War in World War II understood, to some extent, the rationale, perhaps, but times and military capabilities had changed markedly in the postwar world, with sea power, which was so important to success in World War II, no longer having the dominance vis-à-vis nuclear warheads attached to intercontinental ballistic missiles, not rendering the Navy obsolete, but certainly of less critical importance than it had been earlier. And by understanding the basis for the Pacific War, we do not mean to limit it to the obvious fact of an attack by a foreign power on Pearl Harbor, American territorial soil. But the overriding practical reasons for reaction, beyond the more emotional, prideful ones, had to do with Japanese Empire interests, their so-called Co-Prosperity Sphere, being extended throughout Asia and thereby limiting Western access to the tin, tungsten, manganese, chrome, nickel, mercury, rubber and other basic commodities necessary for a thriving industrial economy, the automobile industry, the steel industry, the associated coal and coke industry, etc., as well as providing stepping-stones through progressive island-hopping to afford bases from which potentially to launch air attacks on the Western continental United States. The value to the U.S. and the Western world generally of these commodities had been the reason why the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines at the end of the brief Spanish-American war at the turn-of-the-century had been so important in the age of dollar diplomacy and empire interests, especially important to the island nations, such as Britain and Japan, with France, Spain, and the Netherlands involved in competition with the British Empire interests, in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

While we do not profess that the "domino theory" was never explained by anyone with clarity, it was certainly not stressed with sufficient repetition and incisive precision such that any person could readily understand the reason for it, apart from the concrete representation of dominoes falling in succession, a nice picture in need of its basic raison d'etre. The real question was, why, if the dominoes fell, there was such a great issue in the loss of the dominoes involved. One could readily understand the crucial importance at the time of the Middle East and its oil to oil-dependent modern societies, but not as readily Southeast Asia and its importance to the free world and its economic sustenance, and, with particularity, the reason why the rice paddies of Vietnam were so strategically important to the free world. The reason for assuring the independence of South Vietnam was both geographical, to protect against the other dominoes falling, however circular that reasoning begins to appear without further rationale regarding the dominoes, themselves, and as a source of rice, a chief component of the diet of the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and the Japanese. The fear, as articulated in the mid-1950's, was that the Communist Party in Japan, if losing its export-import trade capability with South Vietnam, might take over in the midst of resulting starvation and then stimulate trade with Communist China as the saving grace. The complexities of the rationale make it difficult to explain in short, easily understandable lessons. Thus, came the simple "domino theory" as the most usually presented catchphrase for the rationale, incomplete as it was.

Of course, the domino theory proved itself, in the end, after the fall of Saigon and South Vietnam to the Communists in spring, 1975, more than two years after the Paris Peace Accords ending formal U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, not to be a viable theory, as it had been based on the World War II model for Asia. Nevertheless, that is not to say that those who promulgated the theory were doing so with disingenuousness, as no one knew whether the domino theory would prevail or not, and the passage of 20 years of time, including eight years of active U.S. involvement in the war, plus interim developments in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, having its antecedents in the Formosa standoff with Communist China in 1958, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty of 1972, the talks for which had begun during the Johnson Administration, in 1967, at Glassboro, N.J., had served to cool any ardor for hot war and had chilled the Soviets in their steady postwar quest for expansion of the Communist socio-economic system. Thus, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and U.S. participation in those wars, along with the other Cold War developments, can never be said to have been in vain, even if the Vietnam War, ostensibly, was "lost", ultimately, to the Communists under Ho Chi Minh, with many at the time, following the 1953 Armistice in Korea and predicted failure of the 1954 Geneva conference to reunify Korea by providing for supervised, all-Korean elections, having also concluded that, essentially, the Korean War had been not been won and thus, for all intents and purposes, was lost, as promising future war from the Communists, as well as having freed up Communist Chinese supplies for use in support of the Vietminh in the final year of the Indo-China war with the French. As with the American Revolution, the Communist guerrillas fighting in the Vietnam War and the Indo-China War before it, were fighting for home and country, in a strictly patriotic sense, to push out the "imperialist invader", even if some of their own leaders had originally invited in the "imperialists", initially the French, though not the Japanese during World War II, the basic premise for such invited imperialism in essentially peasant subsistence economies being the notion of lifting all boats in basic standard of living as the economy, with the infusion of foreign money, increases—as often as not, however, subverted through political graft and corruption in the ruling regime of the moment, with the result of destabilizing internal coup and counter-coup, often with foreign "imperialist" influence, starting the cycle anew.

It is a very difficult thing to defeat any army, especially a guerrilla army not confined to the traditional rules of warfare, fighting on its home soil. General Washington, Ho Chi Minh's role model, had no respect for Christmas, for instance, when he attacked the Hessians in 1776. History, when studied closely, is a great deal more complicated than merely catchphrases and slogans.

The Congressional Quarterly asks whether U.S. security regulations were frustrating American scientists, indicating that the Federation of American Scientists was deeply concerned about the need to revise present Government policies in handling scientific personnel. A member of the FAS executive committee said that a committee on loyalty and security was presently drawing up legal wording aimed at changing what it had called "a rather desperate" situation in security policies.

FAS was a 1,300-member national organization of scientists and engineers organized in 1946, designed to give scientists a more active political role in the atomic age. Their chief target for suggested revision was the President's executive order of April 27, 1953, in which he had established present security regulations for Government employment. The FAS had developed some guiding principles through its executive committee, designed to change the interpretations made by the Atomic Energy Commission in lifting the security clearance of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, not because he was shown to be disloyal, but because he had flirted during the 1930's with the American Communist Party, out of concern about Hitler and his anti-Semitism in Europe, where some of Dr. Oppenheimer's relatives lived, finding ultimately that it would be better for the AEC if Dr. Oppenheimer were no longer permitted to have a security clearance providing him access to atomic secrets. Dr. Oppenheimer was a member of the FAS advisory panel.

Among the principles the FAS had developed were that security clearances should be granted unless investigation showed the person unable to meet necessary requirements, that "security risk" should be explicitly defined, that guilt by association should not be a guiding principle, that moral consideration should be taken into account in addition to technical considerations, and that dissent should not be a valid ground for becoming a security risk. It also believed that clearance procedures should be confined to the minimum area of vital military secrets and that unnecessary frustrations and delays caused by over-classification restrictions should be avoided.

In 1947, FAS had also lobbied for legislation to revise the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, but its secretary indicated that the Federation concentrated on dissemination of information rather than lobbying.

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