In domestic politics, for instance, the advertising man was replacing the backroom methods of choosing political leaders. The local leader, entailing favors, pledges and personal obligations, was dying out, in favor of a system of mass suggestion. Mass circulation was replacing the old political machine. The new system tended to make large corruptions easier while shrinking small personal corruptions, with corruption of the truth being uppermost under this new system.

The Democratic Party, which had presided over the greatest period of prosperity which the country had known, had suddenly, as a result of that prosperity, lost its strength with one of its traditional bases of support, as millions of laborers had acquired savings and moved into the suburbs, purchased their own homes, and become as concerned with taxes as with wages, thus identifying themselves with the middle-class, a socio-economic change which had occurred also in England since the war. The Democrats had lost much of their Northern big-city base within the immigrant groups, chiefly the Irish and Italians, because through time they had been economically and psychologically absorbed into the society, no longer having a sense of special identity with special needs for protection. The Democrats had suffered losses within organized labor in part because labor had become so big and strong that its members no longer felt insecure. In addition, the traditional roots of the Democratic Party in the South had been torn out, in large part because of the new, rapid growth of a business middle-class out of the advent of Southern industrialization, repeating the social experience of Midwestern cities 30 years earlier, "instinctively seeking its allegiance in conservatism, feeling a practical kinship with like-minded persons in distant states."

The Republican Party, historically linked with isolationism, had, to a great extent, won its showdown with the isolationists within the party, placing its leadership in the hands of the President, a professional soldier who had risen to fame during a Democratic regime and had become the military architect of NATO, repugnant to many Republicans. During 1952, he had won the nomination, against the old guard of the party who had bitterly contested him. Yet, after winning the Presidency, he had given them repeated concessions, until they enjoyed great power again within the party. He had provided his considerable prestige behind virtually every Republican candidate, and yet had failed to establish more than a bare majority of Republicans in each house of Congress. He had won the Presidency by a majority of six million votes, but the House members of the party had won a total vote less than the Democrats, though in the minority. The Republicans, usually running strongest in the Midwest and among Midwestern farmers, had encountered their first serious trouble with that group.

Within the previous few days in Chicago, Adlai Stevenson, who had suffered such a crushing defeat that he should be normally forgotten, just as Alf Landon had been in 1937 after his defeat to FDR in 1936, the worst in the history of presidential politics, was now quite active and respected. Yet, Governor Stevenson, who received almost as much daily mail as the President and received hundreds of speaking invitations, had become a great world figure in every corner of the free world, even eclipsing the President.

Mr. Sevareid indicates that he could not derive meaning from those inconsistencies and that anyone who could and thereby predict the future, would be clairvoyant.

Insofar as the Government was concerned, the house-cleaning aspect remained consistent and logical, but beyond that, contradictions were arising. The President had made it clear that he did not wish to be a strong chief executive but rather would halt the trend of executive government. Yet, millions of Americans wanted him to exert a strong hand in developing a new domestic and foreign policy, while he tended to behave more as a chairman of a board, compromising conflicts and ideas among the executives. The Republican Party had achieved its majority only through his coattails, such that his every whim could become party rule. But he was taking the view that party matters should be left to others, in contradiction to the experience of the previous 50 years, during which the only successful Presidents had been those who directed their political party.

In the President's relations with Congress, he had proceeded on the assumption that party unity was the most important thing, ignoring the historic truth that to push through policies required developing party coalitions in Congress.

He had conceived himself to be the President of all citizens, but had filled the Government posts nearly exclusively with men from large business, in contrast to the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, which tended toward labor, intellectuals, business and persons from other walks of life. Mr. Sevareid believes that in 1952, the people had grown tired of partisanship and hoped that President Eisenhower would provide national unity, but thus far, there was less bipartisanship within his Administration in the conduct of foreign policy, despite the Republicans having complained that the Truman Administration had left them out of the policy-making process.

He suggests that the approach might prove successful, but, nevertheless, it was contrary to expectations and defied experience.

The new Administration was more aggressive in dealing with world Communism than the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations had been, perceived by many as being too soft on Communism. Yet, in response to public yearning for an end to the stalemated Korean War, the Administration had signed a truce which the Truman Administration probably would not have accepted, for it being too beneficial to the Communists. The new Administration believed that foreign policy had previously been too ad hoc, without consistency over the long-run. Yet, there was a great amount of ad hoc diplomacy going on regarding the establishment of the groundwork for the forthcoming Korean peace conference, with hardly any confidence in Washington that it would succeed in establishing a unified Korea, its ostensible goal. The new Administration had argued during the campaign that containment of Communist imperialism was insufficient, that there should be an aggressive move toward helping the satellites eliminate their Soviet masters. But recently, Secretary of State Dulles, the chief exponent of that argument in 1952, had publicly assured the Russians that the U.S. was not going to export revolts and rebellions. The Administration was reducing the pressure of previous containment operations, while reducing most direct economic aid. Except in Indo-China, the rate of military aid to foreign allies also had been cut back. In some areas, the Point Four technical assistance program, which, by improving living conditions, reduced the temptation toward Communism, was also being diminished. The U.S. attempt to keep Western trade away from Communist areas was also giving way and the progress toward reducing U.S. tariff restrictions appeared for the present stultified.

The pattern of U.S. policy toward Europe during the prior six years was beginning to dissolve as the pattern of European political movement and its mental climate was beginning to change. The pattern of Soviet policy toward Europe had already changed considerably, and the big powers and their associates were looking for a new set of relationships.

Britain was no longer on the verge of bankruptcy, thanks in large part to American generosity, but yet was rife with an anti-American mood. The Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries were doing well, as previously, and remaining cool, as previously. France exhibited a large degree of anti-American sentiment, and, though it was fiercely democratic in tradition, was on the verge of failure in the conduct of a democratic government. While being the West's most vital military bastion in Europe, it was militarily feeble. Germany, traditionally undemocratic, was running perhaps the most enthusiastic democracy on the Continent. While an ancient enemy of the U.S., it was perhaps more pro-American at present than any other European country, rapidly replacing France as the U.S. chief ally in Europe. While it had been the most devastated of the European countries during the war, it was now thriving more than any of the other war-torn nations. Italy, which had a stable democratic government since 1946, was now suffering parliamentary chaos. Yugoslavia, which had been an exponent of Communism and hate, was now nearly the toughest and strongest Western military ally on the Continent. In addition, the satellite countries, while under the grip of the Soviets, were beginning to show signs of rebellion.

Mr. Sevareid indicates that Western Europe, as a whole, was much stronger economically and militarily, but was politically and psychologically tired from the strain of eight years of enforced measures since the war. While U.S. military intervention had saved the region during the war, and economic intervention had saved it since the war, there was an increasing impatience with America, harboring suspicions regarding its leadership which caused the U.S. to be viewed with nearly the suspicion associated with Russia. There was a tendency therefore to cast a plague on both houses.

He asserts that the same state of affairs probably would have resulted even if Republicans had not been elected in 1952 and even if Stalin had not died, and even if Senator McCarthy had never entered the scene. He suggests that it might not have occurred so quickly, but the point would have been reached.

The Richmond News Leader presents an editorial regarding the Chicago Democratic meeting, suggesting that Socrates had spoken to "Adlitus" and "Trumanides", two young men attending the event, and determined that the meeting had involved knocking the Republicans and the Administration, that the Democrats had insisted that they had been the President's salvation for preserving his program against Republican opposition, as set forth in the new Democratic magazine, Democratic Digest. But Socrates had wondered why, if the Republicans, as the Democrats had contended at the meeting, were bringing the country to ruin and that no person who contributed to that ruin was to be trusted with high office, the Democrats had helped the Administration achieve its program, a statement to which Trumanides took exception for leading Adlitus into a trap which did not exist, as he had meant to say that the Democrats had helped the Administration only with the good things while opposing the evil things. Socrates then wondered whether the Republicans had therefore done some good things, to which Adlitus responded that it was too early in the morning for that sort of discussion, and suggested humor. Socrates, however, wanted to discuss deficit financing, as he said he detected some inconsistency in their views.