

THE CHARLOTTE NEWS

J. M. L. ROBINSON, Publisher
J. E. DOWD, General Manager
B. S. GRIFFITH, Executive Editor
C. A. McKNIGHT, Editor

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1952

UP WAGES, UP STEEL, UP PRICES

AS WE SEE IT, the steel dispute will probably have these several results: Adoption of most of the Wage Stabilization Board's recommendations. Including the union shop, in future steel contracts, and a substantial increase in steel prices. In other words, the wage hike will be passed on to the steel company, which will pass it on to its vast industrial market, which will pass it on to you.

Further, we believe John Q. Public will see what is happening and his cries of anguish will be reflected in Congress, where there will be a big effort to wipe out, or at least diminish, controls.

One event held likely to occur by many observers is another round of wage and price increases. Certainly the WSB's action will encourage more increases, but not to the extent feared. Actually, the steelworkers will just catch up with other industries. If the wage and fringe benefits recommended by the WSB are incorporated in contracts, in the automobile, rubber and electrical industries, unions already have all the benefits urged for the steel workers, or have long-term contracts which won't soon be up for renegotiation. John L. Lewis' mine-workers already make more than the steelworkers will make if the WSB wage recommendations are adopted, and are ahead of most other industries, including the steelworkers, in the matter of fringe benefits.

Average hourly wages in all manufacturing industries rose slightly eight months last year. In steel, however, they did not rise at all. Thus the WSB recommendation for increased benefits can and should be viewed as the tail end of the last wage spiral, not as an advance for further increases in other industries.

The union shop issue is another matter. It is significant because it has now been

recommended by an official Federal Board—the WSB. Although the board's recommendations are of course not binding, the fact that an official Government board has recommended the union shop should give labor, not only in the steel industry, a powerful lever in forcing union shop clauses in subsequent contracts.

If the WSB had been less generous to the steelworkers in its recommendations, the increased worker benefits could probably have been absorbed by management without further price increases. In the opinion of OFS, But now it seems likely that contracts will be concluded along the general lines recommended by WSB, that management will be allowed a substantial price increase to take care of the generous provisions for labor. Thus the line against inflation won't be held. It will be denied again at the expense of the public.

And, in addition, the possibility of a strike April 8 still looms large. If it occurs, Union & Co. will be the only persons to profit there. We trust that this point will be the least in the minds of all parties to the present negotiations.

THIS STUMPS US

THERE'S a neat little incongruity in the anti-Eisenhower propaganda that has us stumped. Maybe some of Taft's people here can explain it.

From one side, you hear the now-familiar complaint that no one knows what Eisenhower stands for.

From the other side comes the warning that Eisenhower is just another Fair Deal neo-meow, whatever that may be.

How do they know he's another Fair Dealer when they don't know what he stands for?

SPEAK UP, MR. CHAIRMAN

SENATOR Democratic Party Chairman Everett Jordan has not proved his case in the continuing row over the appointment of court elections boards in North Carolina.

Mr. Jordan charges that the State Board of Elections ignored the recommendations of 60 citizens' Democratic executive committees and shipped over either the first or second name on the lists submitted to choose the third man. He hints dabbled that Governor Scott had been responsible to do with it, an allegation that Board Chairman Charles Britt stoutly denies.

As we understand the law, the State Board has full leeway in choosing court election boards members from the lists handed in by the various parties. The law does not require the Board to name the first man, or the second, or both. On the contrary, there is the broad implication that the State Board should select its own independent committee of the third man may be better qualified.

So far, Mr. Jordan has not proved that the Board acted unwisely. He has not even convinced that he has only said that the Board acted unwisely and dropped the unsupported hint that there may be some money-business somewhere.

He ought to document his case. Until he does so, there will remain the suspicion of the public mind that the Board acted unwisely for a subsequent battle to the state convention and the North Carolina delegation to the national convention.

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GOOD IDEA

SO SENATOR McCARNEY has filed a \$2 million damage suit against Senator Benton. Good. Now if Senator Benton files a counter-suit against the Senator from Wisconsin, McCarney will be in the court one of the few places it hasn't been and where it belongs.

Then, if the Buden-Lattimore dispute gets before a jury maybe the public will get the full story, and be able to evaluate their conflicting testimony. We can't expect much unbiased information on that score from Senator McCarran and his injudicious Judiciary Committee, which has heard the two men but merely layered the ground for a subsequent battle to the state convention and the North Carolina delegation to the national convention.

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WE'RE ON COURSE IN THE ATLANTIC

ONE OF THE small-country statesmen whose stature has risen during the past few years is Lester Pearson, Canadian Prime Minister. He has been one of NATO's most vigorous champions, the choice of his colleagues to head important Atlantic Pact committees. Speaking to his colleagues in Ottawa the other day, he made a point of needs attention on this side of the 40th Parallel.

Pearson noted Communist attempts to wean Western Germany away from the Atlantic countries. But "far more important" he termed the need to isolate the Soviet Union (of Atlantic countries) from the United States. He continued:

"I think we all felt before we went to Lisbon that there was a very real danger of the European Defense Community developing into a state existing outside NATO itself, and when it was set up, and I think most of us felt that it would be disastrous for the rest of the world to have even to achieve such a desirable objective as a European army."

There he touched on what seems to be a weak point in the thinking of many Americans—particularly Congressmen. They lack the vision of the European Plan and European Army, the formation of this new European Defense Community. They favor formation of a United States of Europe. They also oppose the achievement of NATO's goals, unlike their predecessors in the Atlantic Organization, includes the United States. They agree with General Gruenther, who has just testified in Washington that "From factual experience the only way collective security is a working, accepted principle."

Yet, when speaking of our commitments in Europe, many of these same Congressmen express longing for the day when Europe will be independent of the U. S., which can then withdraw to its own shores.

Such wording seems to be, in the first place, wishful thinking. Let us fully realize that anti-democratic forces are here for a

U.S. Arms

Output For NATO Lags

By THE ALSOFS

WASHINGTON

IT IS TIME to say bluntly that neither General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, nor his deputy, Gen. Alfred Gruenther, who is now testifying on Capitol Hill, can say in public. It is, in fact, a joint effort that there has been a downright disgraceful failure to deliver weapons and war great to Great Britain's command in anything like the quantity promised.

Figures are apt to be dull, but they are not too easily without such provocation. The slow rate of and directly affect the security of the United States. Since the aggression in Korea about \$10 billion has been appropriated to strengthen Western Europe against renewed aggression, the bulk of this money has been absorbed by management without further price increases. In the opinion of OFS, But now it seems likely that contracts will be concluded along the general lines recommended by WSB, that management will be allowed a substantial price increase to take care of the generous provisions for labor. Thus the line against inflation won't be held. It will be denied again at the expense of the public.

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This is having a deeply dangerous effect throughout the Western Alliance. As Winston Churchill told the British Parliament recently, British rearmament has been delayed for at least a year because, although "there is no question of reproach on either side," Great Britain "has received aid in keeping with our defense burden undertaken by the late Prime Minister." The effort to get NATO partners is even more serious than on the British, who produce the great bulk of the Western armament. And the current estimate is that when the next fiscal year ends on June 30, 1953, there will still be an unmet need of well over \$3 billion.

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