The Charlotte News
Monday, July 17, 1950
THREE EDITORIALS
Site Ed. Note: The front page reports that three North Korean infantry divisions, heavily supported by artillery, albeit with few tanks, approached Taejon after having crossed the Kum River in force on Sunday, forcing the American defense positions to abandon the airfield three miles north of Taejon, until the prior week, the provisional capital after the fall of Seoul to the invading forces. The town was now reported to be virtually deserted though still in American hands, with its abandonment imminent. General MacArthur's headquarters said that Americans were withdrawing from the Kongju-Taejon-Nonsan triangle, 200 miles south of the Kum River, to more easily defended positions in the rugged territory below that area. General MacArthur said that while the North Koreans were advancing, they were paying a high price in losses at the same time American losses were "not excessive". Only two tanks had crossed the Kum and both had been destroyed.
The Northeastern enemy positions attacking the South Korean forces had, according to headquarters, suffered their worst setback thus far in the war, with American artillery firing heavily north of Yongduk, 85 miles above the key supply port of Pusan. In the west, however, where the enemy outnumbered American forces 15 to 1, the Americans had to retreat six miles from the Kum River. The 24th Division had held up the initial enemy crossings on Saturday for 48 hours, allowing southern forces time to gather men and supplies for assuming the offensive from rearward positions. Two units of the 24th had taken up defensive positions north and west of Taejon.
Two Yak fighters were shot down by the U.S. Air Force, which flew more than 200 sorties in support of the U.N. ground troops, destroying more than 28 tanks, 32 trucks and 14 railway boxcars. B-29's also struck at targets in North Korea.
William R. Moore reports from an unnamed U.S. command post in South Korea that a wounded colonel, just returned from the battle front, had said his men had put up a good fight along the Kum River line on Sunday. They had, the colonel said, held their lines tight and continued shooting despite the enemy artillery fire. They had needed one more battalion, he said, to hold the line. The early Sunday attack across the Kum had resulted in the North Korean troops not killed having holed up behind enemy artillery. The American front was dropped back to previously prepared positions. The colonel, with orders to hold until nightfall, had found that his supply lines had been cut off by enemy fire. He observed that the enemy had stopped firing when the American forces fired back, and he was then hit in the leg. He believed the enemy had come upon his men from both flanks across the river. A lot of troops had come at them and a lot had been killed. An orderly approached and told the colonel that he was to be evacuated back to the U.S. and the colonel protested that he would fix that and rejoin the fight soon.
The President would send to Congress on Wednesday a message on the Korean war and deliver a radio broadcast to the nation that night at 9:30. Neither had yet been completed. Press secretary Charles G. Ross continued to describe the fighting in Korea as a "police action", as the President had been describing it. There was no preliminary indication of what the President would say regarding domestic controls and mobilization.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., saying that the "national existence" was at stake, urged mobilization of manpower and industry and acceleration of rearming of Western Europe, that the Korean invasion could be followed by Soviet-backed efforts to seize the Ruhr in Germany and to take Japan, and that the result could be world war.
Senator Styles Bridges said that the Congress would give the armed forces any needed increase in funds, but cautioned that they would have to use it better than some of the funding in the past.
Foreign correspondent for the New
York Herald Tribune Marguerite Higgins
Meanwhile, on Saturday, A.P. correspondent Tom Lambert and U.P. reporter Peter Kalischer had been given permission by General MacArthur to return to the front after having their permission revoked the previous Friday because of reports being filed by them which supposedly gave "aid and comfort" to the enemy, such as one by Mr. Lambert quoting a U.S. soldier saying the war was "damned useless".
The State Department received the
reply from Stalin regarding the proposal by Prime Minister Nehru of
India that it mediate the Korean crisis between the U.S. and Russia.
The terms of the reply were not disclosed but it was reported that
Russia wanted seating of Communist China
Maj. General Lewis Hershey, head of Selective Service, raised the possibility of a second draft call in August to supplement the first one of 20,000 to be filled by the end of September. He also said that if conditions in Korea continued to worsen there would be need for tighter restrictions on the draft, which thus far exempted men with dependents as well as veterans with 90 days or more of war service.
The House killed a proposed constitutional amendment, originally put forward by Senator Lodge and passed by the Senate, to abolish the winner-take-all formula followed in the states with respect to the electoral college and require allocation of electoral votes proportional to the popular vote.
Coffee prices rose four to five cents per pound at A&P, to 74 cents for Eight O'Clock, 76 cents for Red Circle, and 77 cents cents for Bokar, the el primo brand. A&P attributed the hike to adverse crop conditions and not the war.
The American Woolen Co., the world's largest manufacturer of woolen goods, raised its price of wool sharply in a range from 12.5 to 17.5 cents per yard on all of its worsted goods for men's and women's clothing, the second such rise in two months. It said the increases were necessitated by the rise in the cost of raw wool. The result, it said, would be a rise of $2 in the retail cost of woolen clothing.
On the editorial page, "Week of Decision" tells of the reported conference during the weekend of the President with the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force after their return from Korea and Japan meeting with General MacArthur and visiting the front. They had reportedly said that they believed the forces could hold and eventually push the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel.
There was a growing belief that with the news the previous day that the North Koreans had crossed the Kum River defense line, the last line of defense above Taejon, the President would Federalize the National Guard and activate the reservists, as recommended by Senator Lyndon Johnson the previous week.
This date, with the North moving tanks across the Kum and driving toward Taejon, the news was no better, as the outnumbered 24th Division had been thrown back six miles. The South Korean forces had two victories in the northeast sector but this news was only of slight relief.
U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie's call for more than token contributions of men and materiel from the 53 member nations who had supported the resolution to stop the Korean action had thus far gotten no response from the key members who had the most available men and supplies to provide.
The President, according to some members of Congress, would ask for four to six billion dollars more in appropriations to supply the war. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois pegged the eventual figure to which Congress would agree at five billion. The President would also likely call for more manpower beyond the initial call of 20,000 to be filled by local draft boards by September 30. But those would not be ready for combat duty for months while there was present need for reinforcements.
It suggests that the nation awaited anxiously word of what was needed from it to aid the young soldiers fighting in the war against Communism.
"Tar Heels in Congress" tells of the Congressional Quarterly showing a large difference in the voting patterns between Senators Clyde Hoey and Frank Graham. Senator Graham had compiled a 92 percent party loyalty record in the first six months of the year while Senator Hoey had only a 76 percent loyalty rating.
It provides a table showing each member of the North Carolina Congressional delegation by their percentage of party unity voting in 1949 and through the first half of 1950, the percentage of time they had voted with the party majority on roll call votes. It then proceeds to make observations about individual Congressmen, concluding that the delegation was mainly conservative, voting often against controversial Fair Deal measures, even if not so conservative as members of Congress from other Southern states.
"An Example for Tar Heelia?" regards a piece on the page anent the recent reorganization of New Hampshire's State Government, and suggests that North Carolina might benefit from a similar program for its lack of uniformity after years of growth. The piece agrees with the article's conclusions and proposes a Hoover Commission for North Carolina to study how to make the State Government more efficient.
A piece from the Raleigh News & Observer, titled "A Little Far", tells of the State Utilities Commission having brought suit to prevent a private car driver from picking up friends along a franchised bus route in Morganton. The piece finds little sense in the move as it could be applied to anyone who might pick up a friend along the route of the bus.
Some time earlier a suit was brought by cosmetologists in the state to prevent a woman from helping a friend wash her hair. If the trend were to continue, it foresees the time when the coal and oil companies might seek to bar neighbors from allowing friends to keep warm by their fires in winter.
Dr. John F. Sly, writing in Investor's Reader, as indicated above, tells of the reorganization plan for the New Hampshire State Government, where Governor Sherman Adams, future chief of staff to President Eisenhower, had initiated the program to promote greater efficiency. He had been successful in the program after a comprehensive report had been produced based on a study supported by voluntary citizen participation, with a commission expenditure of only $15,000.
Dr. Sly tells how the Governor had produced a basis of support for the program, along with the particular changes produced, and concludes that the changes thus effected took on special significance for having developed within a New England climate of traditional reluctance to change.
Drew Pearson tells of America's food bins being full, with plenty of butter, corn and wheat in cold storage. Meat and sugar would probably eventually have to be rationed but livestock production stood at an all-time high and the sugar shipping lanes from Hawaii and Cuba would be more easily kept open than in World War II.
The latest action by the President in approving the merger of Pan Am with American Overseas Airlines, reversing the contra decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board, was not the first such favoritism shown Pan Am. In October, 1948, when the President needed campaign funds, Louis Johnson, then finance chairman of the campaign, had successfully prevailed on his friends at Pan Am for contributions. In consequence, the President provided Pan Am with a route from Seattle to Honolulu, even though the CAB had found that the dearth of traffic barely justified giving a route to Northwest Airlines.
The Army could not get the reserve officers needed for Korea because the Army was punishing reservists who signed up for active duty by demoting them in rank to the position which they held when last on active duty. The law required that if the Army called them to active duty, they would have to be taken at their present reserve rank. So they were reluctant to volunteer. He notes that the Navy accepted reservist volunteers at their current rank.
One of the first acts of the Russians with respect to North Korea after the war and during occupation was to establish a "Siberia" for political prisoners on Sakhalin, being transformed to a military base. Some 50,000 Koreans had been deported to Sakhalin since June 25 when the North Koreans forces began the attack on the South.
For those permitted to remain in North Korea, the work schedules had been increased without commensurate increase in pay, despite the constitution promising an eight-hour work day. The Soviet propaganda press described this extra work as loyal party effort contributed on a voluntary basis. Workers were required to buy Government bonds based on the number of family members receiving food. The Government taxed almost 25 percent of everything harvested by the farmers, with compulsory quotas fixed on certain produce, resulting in severe punishment for those not meeting the quotas or paying the taxes, despite not being blameworthy for a bad harvest.
Joseph & Stewart Alsop tell of Russia being expected to take advantage of the commitment of American forces in Korea and soon attack another soft spot. Four conditions suggested that fulfillment of the expectation was not imminent. Thus far, the Soviets had resisted the temptation of committing their planes in Korea, while supplying their best heavy tanks and artillery. The Soviets in Moscow had hinted to the British Ambassador there that the crisis in Korea could be resolved if the U.S. would recognize Communist China. Third, there were no signs of special preparation for war in the Soviet Union or the satellites. Finally, there had been universal expression of surprise and dismay among European Communist leaders at the American response to Korea, and the indications were that the Kremlin had not alerted them to prepare for general war.
But, they caution, the Kremlin had not expected the American military response to the attack on South Korea and so had not considered what they might do with American forces depleted elsewhere. Thus, the temptation to strike elsewhere might eventually overtake the Kremlin planners, despite the superiority of the U.S. in its stockpile of atomic weapons and strategic bombers.
Informed observers believed that such a Soviet strike elsewhere would occur unless the existing deterrent forces were quickly reinforced, and that the only way to accomplish such status would be through total mobilization of manpower and industry. The Alsops conclude that if the country did not so mobilize, all hope to avoid a general war with the Soviet Union would be lost.
Robert C. Ruark finds that there was something a little ridiculous about the U.S. being at war with North Korea and taking its lumps in the process, comparable to Joe Louis having trouble with a bantamweight boxer. He regarded it as a conventional war rather than a "police action". To have it go on too long would not be of help to the U.S. in terms of inspiring confidence across the world in the country's strength.
Half of the "barroom diplomacy", he finds, recommended early use of the atom bomb quickly to end the war. But, he cautions, that would not work in North Korea for its principal targets being so small, comparable to shooting a duck with a cannon, and would only inspire counter-propaganda from the Communist world.
There was little doubt that eventually the U.S. would be able to chase the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, but the fight would be long and hard, akin to the jungle fighting in the Pacific war.
The wisest observers, he relates, believed that Korea was a first step by the Communists in a strategy of depletion of the U.S., to exhaust its manpower, materiel, and finances, a series of wars partially financed and directed by the Soviets using the manpower of other nations to fight them.
"We finish in Korea and it starts again in Indo-China. We wrap it up there and it busts loose in Iran. And so on."
Then would come, he could not be sufficiently informed to forecast, Osama Bin Laden and his CIA-trained freedom fighters in Afghanistan, occupying the Soviets in their decade-long, bogged-down war starting in 1980, and Saddam Hussein fighting Iran during the same period. And the rest, as they say...
He believes that the plan was thus for world war III, that small war after small war would transpire until everyone grew weary of them and then would come the major sneak punch by the instigators, using their stockpile of atomic weapons, by then grown large during the series of small engagements.
No one with whom he had spoken had a pat solution for Korea, beset by topography which was almost indefensible. The war could not be won in a hurry. Driving the Communist forces back would prove a point but little else. The winner would take nothing and merely open up the possibility of other small fights against fighters "with chip on shoulder".
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