Regardless of amount, a substantial increase was required in teacher pay.

But according to the Raleigh News & Observer, peanuts were the most popular treat in the North Carolina Legislature, offered up by Speaker Pearsall and received by visitors with delight. Yet, it concludes, peanuts could instill a powerful thirst for drink.

The term "juke box" had derived from the sociological guinea pig families, the Jukes and the Kallikaks, the former having been followed generationally for their criminal tendencies, disease and poverty. Sixty percent of those traced showed degeneracy and had cost society an estimated 1.3 million dollars during a period of 75 years.

So, it concludes, it was probably better for the manufacturers of the box not to call attention to the origins of its label and let sleeping dogs lie.

The previous February, the President had asked General Marshall to become Secretary, keeping the matter from Secretary Byrnes by sending it through the War Department, until someone there showed the message to Mr. Byrnes some weeks later. Mr. Byrnes then offered his resignation on April 16. General Marshall had indicated his lack of desire at the time to head the State Department and, therefore, Mr. Truman decided to relent, during which period relations between Mr. Byrnes and the President considerably improved.

The President's desire to have the General head State, however, had never changed in the interim. General Marshall possessed a charm which the President admired, had always been candid and never sought to cover up mistakes. He respected the civilian authority of the Commander-in-Chief and had gone out of his way to impress Mr. Truman with all military plans before implementing them. The President also felt sorry for the General when he was cited by the Army Board of Inquiry for some of the blame for unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor and believed that he should have been the overall commander for the Normandy invasion instead of General Eisenhower, Winston Churchill having nixed General Marshall for the role.

When the President sent General Marshall as his personal emissary to China the previous year, he had done so as his friend. The President had related a year earlier that he went to General Marshall early in the war as a Senator and offered his services in the Army, but the General had wisely turned him down.

General Marshall had markedly differed with Winston Churchill over war strategy, reluctantly agreeing to invade Italy, but refusing to go through the Balkans into Yugoslavia and Greece instead of through France, the snow-covered mountains in the former countries posing a death trap and the Aegean and Mediterranean full of enemy submarines. Mr. Churchill had sought to stymie the Russian movement into the Balkans while General Marshall was concerned only with immediate military victory, not future political advantage.

The General had bristled at the Quebec Conference of 1942 in which Mr. Churchill insisted on appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten as the commander of the forces in the India and Burma theater. The British announced the matter to the press, however, before word could be sent to Chiang, annoying the General and prompting him to charge the British with bad faith on the part of the British Army, confronting the British chief of staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, with the charge.

On Monday, Mr. Pearson would look at General Marshall's background with Russia.

Undersecretaries Dean Acheson and Will Clayton had proved invaluable, the former having served as Acting Secretary while Mr. Byrnes was away in Paris and New York at the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings, and had more knowledge of running the Department than any previous undersecretary. Mr. Clayton had initiated negotiations for improving world trade relations.

General Marshall, by contrast, had never relied so much on a personal staff during his tenure as chief of staff of the Army, but he had a remarkable capacity for assessing personnel.

Foreigners complained of a lack of continuity in the country's conduct of foreign affairs, Mr. Stetinnius having become Secretary in November, 1944 and remaining only until the following late June before being succeeded by Mr. Byrnes. If the Byrnes team were to be changed, then the progress made in the previous months might be lost. If it stayed intact, then General Marshall could maintain the ground gained.

There had been members of the Kuomintang never interested in peace, while the previous February, some of the Communists had worked genuinely toward rapprochement. The General rejected the notion, as employed in Greece, that the way to fight the left was to move further right.

Editorialists had already begun to entertain the viewpoint that the answer to unity might lie in the liberals in China. Thus was evidenced the development of the new American center. But it would have to be more open to change than in the former support of restoration of King George in Greece and the Kuomintang in China as exponents of democracy.

Ambassador to Brazil George Messersmith had recalled that right after the American gunboat Panay was sunk by the Japanese on the Yangtze River in China in December, 1937, General Marshall had met with Secretary of State Hull and been singularly impressive in the meeting, calling for exercise of statesmanship on the issue. He was regarded as having a thorough understanding of diplomacy and non-military consequences of international actions and crises.

Mr. Truman conceived the President's role to be that prescribed by the Constitution, a policy maker, while the Secretary of State simply implemented that policy. General Marshall would more likely fit well this conception than had Secretary Byrnes.

The President insisted on government by civilians. But General Marshall, the first professional soldier to occupy the position of Secretary of State, was distinct from most high-ranking military men and was not a graduate of West Point. The fact that the Senate had acted immediately and unanimously in confirming the General underscored the high esteem in which he was held for these qualities of diplomacy.

The General faced the problem of getting along with a Republican Congress which had in mind achieving victory in 1948, and so might face political issues which Secretary Byrnes had avoided.

That General Marshall had dealt during the war with both Stalin and Churchill and was respected in both Moscow and London as a man who could not be bluffed or driven, would provide him with an initial formidable stance in assuming the role of Secretary of State.