Wednesday, August 1, 1945

The Charlotte News

Wednesday, August 1, 1945

FOUR EDITORIALS

Site Ed. Note: The front page reports that a record raid of 800 B-29's had bombed Japan, dropping 6,000 tons of incendiary bombs, thought to be the largest tonnage ever carried in a single mission, hitting four cities from the previous list of the leaflet-warned: Mito, Hachioji, Nagaoka, and Toyama on Honshu, plus petroleum installations at Kawasaki near Tokyo. This raid was the last planned by Maj. General Curtis LeMay as commander of the 20th Air Force before becoming chief of staff to General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Pacific strategic Air Forces. It had been eight months since the first B-29 raid on Tokyo, November 24, 1944.

Combined carrier and land-based plane attacks on Japan had sunk or damaged 1,546 ships and small craft during July, had destroyed more than 1,300 planes also during the month. The Third Fleet carrier planes had accounted for destruction or severe damage to 1,035 vessels and 1,278 planes, most on the ground, during three weeks of action. The Fleet sunk or heavily damaged 99 warships. Land-based planes sunk another 85 vessels, primarily freighters and cargo ships. The Far East Air Forces took out 250 ships and small craft.

Lt. General Barney Giles, deputy commander of the Army Air Forces, promised that there would be 8,000-ton bombing raids by complements of 1,200 B-29's very soon.

Tokyo radio described the citizens of the capital huddling in underground shelters, many of these denizens of the subterranean world having been seriously injured from the bombing topside.

"Hold that line, Mother," was the battle cry for the Japanese front line soldiers.

A magician, after the night of bombing and fires in Tokyo, had attempted to lift the spirits of the survivors by performing tricks, producing a half dozen eggs from the air.

It did no good: The observers of the trick begged for the eggs. The magician then had to explain that they were not edible.

Chinese forces were fighting still in Kwangsi Province, as Japanese withdrawal from Kweilin appeared to have slowed. The Chinese had occupied Punglo, 55 miles southeast of Kweilin. In Hunan Province, the Chinese inflicted casualties southeast of Sinning. And in Kiangsi Province, the Chinese faced 20,000 enemy troops fighting to withdraw toward Nanchang from the southern portion of the province.

The Big Three Conference at Potsdam, begun July 16, officially ended this night. President Truman was scheduled to fly to London the following day to meet with King George VI and have lunch at around noon aboard the Renown, then sail aboard the Augusta from Plymouth back home.

The final statement from the conference would not be released, however, until Friday.

The President's personal notes each day on the conference may be read at the Truman Library.

The President summarizes his first meeting with Stalin on July 17: "I can deal with Stalin. He is honest—but smart as hell."

On July 18, he met with Winston Churchill, told him "Manhattan" had been a success on July 16, and decided to tell Stalin about it. Based on a telegram to Stalin from Hirohito asking for peace, he believed that the Japanese would "fold up" before Russia was set to come into the war, assurances of their entry on August 15 having been given by Stalin. The President was certain of capitulation "when Manhattan appears over their homeland." He remarked that he had invited Stalin to come to the United States and would send the battleship Missouri to transport him if he would; the Russian Premier had said that he would like to do so, that he was grossly misunderstood in the U.S., as President Truman was in Russia. Mr. Truman then confided to his notes that he did not intend to stay in Potsdam all summer listening to speeches, that he would return home to the Senate if he wished to do that.

On July 20, the President wrote that he was informed of the terrible conditions in Germany, with sewers blocked and basements used for toilets. He was assured that the Germans were sullen and sour, that American occupation forces would not treat them rough enough, that the Soviets treated them too kindly and too rough. All in all, Germany was a "hell of a mess". He had attended the raising of the American flag over the American sector of Berlin, the same flag which had flown over the White House on December 7, 1941. "Uncle Joe" had appeared this day "drawn and tired" while Mr. Churchill appeared "lost".

On July 25, the President wrote that he had met in the morning with Lord Mountbatten and General Marshall. "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark. Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling—to put it mildly." After describing the detail of the blast, he states that the bomb was to be used between that time and August 10. He had directed Secretary of War Stimson to use it so that it would affect soldiers and military targets, not women and children. Despite the Japanese being "savages", he said, he would not allow such a terrible weapon to be used on Tokyo. He also remarks that it was good that neither the Nazis nor the Soviets had discovered the atomic bomb. It was, he concluded, the most terrible thing ever discovered, but could be made the most useful.

On July 30, he notes Stalin's cold keeping him from conference meetings on Sunday and Monday. The President had sent a note of consolation to Winston Churchill regarding the adverse election results, announced the previous Thursday, July 26. He speculates that if Stalin were to die suddenly, it would mean the end of the original Big Three leaders, causing him to wonder, in that event, what would happen in Russia and Central Europe. He ponders whether there was any Russian who could replace Stalin and maintain peace and solidarity in Russia. He had observed no one who so impressed among the Russians at the conference. He notes that the conference was at an impasse on division of Polish territory, the Russians wanting the eastern section to the Curzon Line of 1939, with Poland getting a chunk of Germany in return; as well as on the issue of reparations from Germany, the Russians wanting half. Poland and Russia had agreed on the territorial division, but British and American approval of the agreement had not been sought. The President did not like the situation. The U.S. was not desirous of reparations, he had assured, only insisting that the German war industry be completely dismantled. European nations could divide reparations as they pleased. He expressed that the only hope of good to come from the war was restored prosperity in Europe and an active trade re-established. But: "It is a sick situation at best."

Admiral William Leahy, chief of staff of the Navy, sent a letter to the tribunal in Paris trying Marshal Petain for treason, saying that he had always believed Petain to have been acting in the best interests of France. Admiral Leahy, who had been U.S. Ambassador to Vichy until the Germans took over the previously unoccupied portions of France in November, 1942, in the wake of the Allied invasion of North Africa, stated that Marshal Petain had at times, at Admiral's Leahy's recommendations, undertaken action against the Nazis and for the Allies. The only times he had refused the Admiral's advice was when he thought it would result in additional oppression of the French people by the Nazis. The Admiral, however, did assert that he believed that had Marshal Petain resisted the Nazi will on those occasions, it would have resulted, in the long-run, in advantage for the French people, regardless of short-term hardship.

Pierre Laval, having been turned over to the Allies by Spain, surrendered to American authorities at Innsbruck in Austria and then was handed over to the French. Contrary to the image which had been portrayed in the press of Laval having been living the high life in his prison cell inside a castle in Spain, U.S. authorities described him as disheveled and appearing as a "tired old man".

The Army announced that a secret pier at Caven Point in Jersey City, N.J., had been the primary shipping point for munitions during the war, the point from which over two million tons of bombs and ammunition had departed. During its operation, the port had suffered only one serious fire, aboard the El Estero on April 24, 1943. The ship was towed from its berth before it could cause redundant explosions. All military personnel entering the port during its time of operation had been searched for any type of device which could cause a fire, including matches and lighters. Such objects were surrendered at the entrance.

Henceforth, other Atlantic ports would handle munitions. The port, built in October, 1941, had re-opened for civilian traffic.

The Office of Price Administration announced that civilians would be able during August to purchase more butter than previously anticipated.

Still don't know whether it was the best though.

In the wake of the overwhelming Labor Party victory announced the previous Thursday, Professor Harold Laski, Labor's national executive committee chairman, proclaimed it "the era of the common man in Britain". He stated that it beckoned "the arrival of the people in power", in an election with as much social and economic significance as the emergence of the middle class in England in the 1830's. The little man would now receive "all the progressive change" he required.

On the editorial page, "Take It Away" comments on the revolving courtroom door for runners in the local butter 'n' eggs lottery racket. The police vice squad was kept busy catching the lower ranks who placed the bets, usually for pennies. They were routinely fined and the fines were paid by the syndicate lawyer, putting the runners back on the street in no time.

Recently, a judge in Charlotte had handed out six-month sentences to two runners, who would not reveal their employer. But the following day, he had suspended the sentences.

It seemed the police, for all their zeal practiced on the small fries, could not catch the bigshots.

As the numbers racket was relatively harmless as crime went, it seemed a waste of manpower to enforce it so rigorously for such meager returns, but was nevertheless emblematic of a criminal code which was far more strict than its enforcement.

"The Small Voice" discusses the outspoken Herbert Evatt, Foreign Minister of Australia, who had led the charge for the smaller nations at the San Francisco Conference, held between April 25 and June 26.

He had continued to lash out at power politics of the Big Three when he had returned home, taking on the Potsdam ultimatum to Japan of the previous Thursday, refusing to agree to it as too lenient and because Australia had not been consulted on its terms. As a Pacific neighbor to Japan, Australia, he had said, was properly concerned about any tenderness to be demonstrated toward Japan. Nothing would be acceptable but complete destruction of Japanese imperialism and the capability to engage in it.

"The Air Is Ours" notes that it was Air Force Day, the 38th anniversary of the founding of the Air Forces. It suggests that since Pearl Harbor, every day, all 1,334 of them, had been Air Force Day.

In 1938, the Air Forces had but 38,000 men and 1,600 planes. It had only 176 combat planes in the area between Hawaii and the Philippines following the debacle at Pearl Harbor.

The exact number of planes and men of the Air Force for this time remained secret, but it was no secret that it was twice as large as the air forces of any two nations put together.

The Army Transport Command had 85,000 officers and men, recently shining in its efforts to bring the soldiers from Europe back home. It had flown 125,000 stateside in just the previous two and a half months.

Ventures the piece, the accomplishment of the United States in four years was the result of President Roosevelt's bold perspective. He had set the goal, and every soldier, every mechanic, every airman, had a role in the enormous ensuing effort.

"In Two Wars" comments on the discovery by the British of the records of German army casualties during the war, found in the home of General Hermann Reinecke, propaganda chief for the German Army. The British thought the figures reliable.

Prior to December 1, 1944, the Germans, according to the figures found, had suffered fewer casualties than had the Germans and Austria-Hungarians during World War I, a shorter war. They had suffered nearly three million killed in the earlier war, versus 1,911,300 in World War II. Missing and prisoners amounted to 3,352,800 in the prior war and 2,153,138 in the current war. Of the 1.9 million killed, 1.4 million had died on the Russian front. Between June 6 and November 30, 1944, the Germans had suffered 54,000 killed and 338,000 missing or captured on the Western Front.

As indicated, most accounts following the war, including Soviet accounts during the war for the Eastern Front alone, placed German killed in the multi-millions, and so these figures, coming as they had from a notoriously unreliable source within the Nazi propaganda apparatus, were not likely accurate.

The excerpt from the Congressional Record has Representative Joe Ervin of North Carolina remarking on the fact that Presidents had to attend to a myriad of menial tasks during an average day. During President Roosevelt's last day of life, for instance, he had been signing appointments of postmasters.

The President, he informs, had to fix the fees charged by fortune tellers in the Panama Canal Zone.

Having to attend to such routine placed a daily strain on the President and Mr. Ervin favored a bill to enable the President to delegate such tasks to any officer of the Government capable of carrying them out.

Drew Pearson offers example of the bravery of the OSS officers abroad. About a year earlier, Hungarian Army leaders had sent a message to the Allies that they wished to make a deal to avoid being vanquished by the Nazis, then threatening to overrun Hungary. Three OSS officers then parachuted into Hungary to discuss the proposed peace. But they were too late, as the Nazis were just outside Budapest, threatening to overrun the city, which occurred two days later. The three OSS men were taken prisoner and efforts were made to try to get them to talk. They remained firm in silence. They were placed in solitary until a Red Cross worker was able to get them transferred.

Mr. Pearson next turns to former Vice-President Henry Wallace and his tenure thus far since March as Secretary of Commerce, during which, contrary to expectations, he had done little to revitalize the Department. He had discovered that there was an energetic younger set of employees below the crusty outer surface, employees who had never had an opportunity to shine under former Secretary Jesse Jones. Mr. Wallace had given them promotions and was surrounding himself with top people. An example was the Civil Aeronautics Administration which Mr. Wallace had transformed into a public service oriented agency.

Many people had wondered why FDR, Churchill, and Stalin had picked San Francisco for the United Nations Conference. San Franciscans had wondered the same thing. The reason, reports Mr. Pearson, was superstition and a dream.

During the summer of 1943, Edward Stettinius, then Assistant Secretary of State, was staying in San Francisco when Secretary of State Cordell Hull had phoned to tell him that he had been picked to succeed Sumner Welles as Undersecretary. Mr. Stettinius thus regarded San Francisco as lucky.

During the Yalta Conference in February, Mr. Stettinius had a dream about the San Francisco phone call. Before going to bed, he had listened to Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin discussing the meeting place for the Charter Conference. So, the next morning, he had suggested to FDR during breakfast that San Francisco was the proper locale.

Mr. Churchill subsequently agreed, as did Premier Stalin.

Hurt by the snub, as always, Angelinos mocked, "Nobody ever heard of Yalta either until they held a conference there."

Well, whether, that fateful morning in February, President Roosevelt was dining on his favorite breakfast staple or something else, such as caviar, is not reported by Mr. Pearson, as it certainly ought be.

For those who accept the mystical side of things, one might dub Mr. Stettinius's dream as the Mid-Winter Night's Dream—which, while not lending in any way to the Cold War simply because the conference was held in San Francisco, despite Mark Twain's adage anent a summer in San Francisco being the coldest Winter he ever spent, the Cold War nevertheless might be said to have derived from this transitional period in history just after the end of the war in Europe, and had its staging ground in the last harsh months of the war as the Eastern and Western Fronts bloodily converged on Berlin.

And so Mid-Winter Night's Dream seems wholly apropos.

Perhaps, President Roosevelt dined that morning on a leg of lamb, or at least was wearing a woollen sweater, replete with monogram.

We don't know.

Mr. Pearson wraps up his column with "Capital Chaff", reporting that Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin had, before Pearl Harbor, urged the importance of scientific research in the field of military preparedness. On June 9, 1941, he had favored the establishment of a Navy, War Department, and State Department defense laboratory. The German inventions of rockets, long-range artillery, and electric mines underscored the Senator's perspicacity.

He also comments on Doris Duke's airplane joyrides around the Mediterranean at the behest of Army Air Force General Barney Giles and Lt. Col. John Breckenridge, and on the reintroduction, by Senator George Aiken of Vermont, of the bill to create the St. Lawrence Seaway, one of FDR's pet projects.

Marquis Childs, appearing as himself again after wearing a Samuel Grafton disguise yesterday—no doubt to undertake undercover work of an intrepid Washington columnist—considers a trip to the Pacific by 200 members of the House and Senate to be a waste of taxpayer money, taking precious attention from the commanders fighting the war. The delegation which had gone to Europe to see first-hand the damage in the aftermath of the war had been justified. But the present trip, along with another trip to Europe, were mere duplication.

Junketing by various committees was routine, as a means to provide Congress taxpayer-paid vacations. Sometimes, the trips made sense; many times not.

Representative John Cochran had refused to go on another junket to Europe, warning that unwarranted meddling in Europe could be dangerous.

Samuel Grafton expresses the difficulties in trying to effect peace terms with Japan. The Allies were willing to leave Hirohito in power along with the industrialist clique, but, nevertheless, the peace could not be negotiated. He posits that it was nigh impossible to effect such an arrangement out of modern warfare, despite both sides being amenable to the terms.

The Zaibatsu, the industrialists, were desirable in post-war Japan insofar as they could afford peaceful industry, but the war-making machinery would have to be dismantled, the Gumbatsu, the military clique, would have to be disbanded, a problematic goal because of the enormous unemployment which would result from the collapse of the war industry in Japan.

But if Japan were run as a police state, the Zaibatsu might be able to survive, even under such dire economic circumstances. Yet, the Allies were insisting on free speech and press in post-war Japan and that would prove anathema to the Zaibatsu. Thus, the only reason the industrialists would choose to prolong the war to the bitter end would be their awareness that, under the rules to be imposed by the victors, they could not survive.

It was difficult to save part of the regime which had helped to bring on the war. The Allies had found that out in Algeria in late 1942 when it tried to use Admiral Jean Darlan as an intermediate ally to bring reluctant French into the Allied camp. Admiral Darlan had wound up assassinated on Christmas Eve. The British Conservative Party had attempted to save remnants of fascism in Greece and Italy, but it had resulted in its thorough defeat in the late election.

Even as Americans talked of preserving Hirohito, the bombing raids daily convinced the Japanese that their Emperor was a failure, had no genuine "divine wind" to summon upon the Allies, not even a typhoon to wash them back into the sea. Americans offered Japanese business a democratic government while the Zaibatsu had turned to militarism to provide excuse to suppress democracy at home.

A letter writer celebrates The News as his favorite daily. He especially enjoyed the columns of Dr. George Crane and gave praise to the series of Tom Jimison published in January and February, 1942, anent the problems and horrors of the state mental hospital at Morganton.

As we have previously mentioned, Mr. Jimison would pass away in just over a month.

Another letter writer, a Spanish-American War veteran, finds "yellow" an editorial of July 24, "First Obligation", contending that its author was provincial, had never been outside the county, had no idea of the plight of the American soldier. He says that he and his fellow volunteers in the fin de siecle conflict in Cuba had put the United States on the military map, enabling millionaires to make greater fortunes.

But the editorial complained of veterans of that war and World War I raiding the Treasury for benefits. He reiterates that the author was yellow.

He dared the editors not to publish his letter, vowing otherwise to send it to the Charlotte Observer.

In the Pacific, between Guam and Leyte, the still surviving men of the Indianapolis who had been set adrift in the ocean on Sunday night just after midnight when the ship was blown asunder and sunk in twelve minutes by two torpedoes from a Japanese submarine, were slowly giving up their last shreds of hope of rescue after three torturous days in the sun without fresh water, without food, and surrounded by sharks. The next morning, however, following their fourth night on the ocean, a plane flew overhead. It was not a mirage.

The bomb, Little Boy, which the Indianapolis had delivered to Tinian, was also not a mirage. It had been assembled during the five days since its delivery on the 26th and was ready for deployment as of the previous day. On July 25, a week earlier, General Groves, military head of the Manhattan Project, had provided to General Spaatz the authorization for its use:

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff.

It went on to say that release of information on use of the bombs was reserved to the President and Secretary of War Stimson and that the authorization had come by way of Secretary Stimson and General Marshall.

A telex was sent from Tinian to General Groves on July 31 reporting that the bomb was ready, that a mission had been successfully completed as a practice run dropping a dummy version of the bomb, and thus indicating that the mission could be flown as early as this day, weather permitting. Although running counter to the language of the original directive, that the bomb could be dropped "after about August 3", General Groves did not seek to counter the determination to drop the bomb as soon as weather permitted after its readiness on July 31.

A typhoon off Japan, however, one not summoned by the Emperor, intervened to delay the drop. That also was not a mirage.

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