There had been an increase as well of 20,000 men per month being drafted. But the Army at the same time was funneling large numbers of men who were specialists out of the draft into critical war industries to relieve shortages of manpower.

Tires and metals were in diminishing supply. Civilian regimens of retail stocks, including wool and cotton goods, cigarettes, fuel oil and coal, as well as paper, were also reduced.

France had refused cession to it of the Ruhr Valley, offered by Russia, on the basis that France deemed it safer to have the heavily industrialized German region held jointly with the British and other nations for mutual defense.

The piece gives praise to the leadership of General De Gaulle and France on its restraint.

Despite their having sold out labor in the process of their crooked endeavor, it would not be surprising, says the piece, were the union to take them back into its leadership fold. Mr. Bioff had been received back after his service of a sentence in 1940 for a 1922 conviction for pandering. The editorial placed no bets either way.

Plenty suggested a turn to the right: the conservative, big business appointments to the State Department, the similar appointments to the War and Navy Departments, the abandonment of Henry Wallace in the summer for the vice-presidential renomination, and the signing without veto of the Social Security bill freezing taxes at current rates of one percent.

But, too, there was ample evidence of a turn to the left: the announcement of the intention to broaden Social Security benefits, the statement of intention to provide sixty million new jobs after the war to accommodate returning veterans and displaced war workers, as well as his support of War Labor Board directives to industry and the Fair Employment Practices Committee's efforts at bringing about equality of pay and hiring practices between the races.

The only consistent trend, marking the President's entire tenure in office, concludes the editorial, was toward effecting policy which the country appeared to desire. When he had come to office, he was not stirring a movement but following one championed even by the staid United States Chamber of Commerce, which had in 1931 questioned the continued viability of unrestrained capitalism.

The Democrats, indicates Mr. Pearson, were not loathe in this vein, having renominated Thomas Jefferson in 1800 despite his loss in 1796, Henry Clay and William Jennings Bryan nominated three times each, and also former President Cleveland's subsequent re-election.

Of course, Mr. Dewey would buck the trend, being re-elected Governor of New York in 1946 and being renominated in 1948. Thereafter, he would serve a third term as Governor.

There would come, of course, Adlai Stevenson for the Democrats, and Richard Nixon for the Republicans, to complete the renominations thus far after losses. No other defeated Republican presidential nominee, until Senator John McCain was re-elected to his Senate seat from Arizona in 2010, and only Senator Stevenson, former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Senator George McGovern, and Senator John Kerry, for the Democrats, would subsequently win elections, in those four instances, Senate seats, one once held and the other three, incumbencies. None of the other defeated presidential nominees, except former Vice-President Walter Mondale, in the special election in Minnesota in 2002, after his loss to President Ronald Reagan in 1984, has ever subsequently run for political office.

Mr. Pearson next relates of a touchy colloquy between Representative Howard Smith of Virginia and Representative Mike Bradley of Pennsylvania. Mr. Bradley spoke in favor of the hike in Congressional clerk pay, to which Mr. Smith offered an amendment whereby employers could raise at will to 75 cents the hourly wage of workers. Mr. Bradley, knowing of Mr. Smith's opposition to the minimum wage and hour laws and to labor causes generally, challenged the sincerity of Mr. Smith's proposal.

Mr. Smith then called the Congressman a bleeding heart to which Mr Bradley replied that when his heart bled, it bled blood, whereas the hearts of some Congressmen, who would remain nameless, instead, when it came to considering the plight of labor, bled ice water.

It appeared likely to have been a cover to afford U.S. agreement on the Polish-Russian territorial compromise, to which Prime Minister Churchill had asserted Britain's acquiescence.

The British public was voicing a lack of support for the Government position with respect to Poland on the ground that Britain went to war initially to save Poland's territorial integrity against German aggression and because Britons had been impressed by the ardor with which the Polish troops and underground had fought during the war.

It appeared that the British were more disturbed by the pro-Russian pronouncement of Churchill than were Americans.

As Drew Pearson had pointed out, however, the reaction to the President's statement regarding the Charter had formed more the reality from perception than the fact as intended, Mr. Pearson stating that the President's remark came merely by way of explanation of how the Charter came to be constructed, from snippets passed back and forth between ships at the Newfoundland conference of August, 1941.

Ms. Thompson finds objectionable the points made by Stalin, that Poland should not be forced into accommodation of the Russians and inimicality toward the Germans, regardless of the emerging government in Germany after the war. The result would be a servile Poland, subject to the whim of Russia.

Furthermore, his reference to the refusal of permission in 1939 to cross the Polish frontier was in a specific case, prior to the Russo-German mutual non-aggression pact of August, whereby Britain and France, being solicitous of an alliance with Russia, had sought Soviet agreement to march through Poland in case of German attack on the country. Poland refused its compliance.

The solution also completely ignored the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of August through October in Washington and its determination that there would be a Security Council to referee such issues as whether Russia could, in a given circumstance, have justification to cross Polish territory to meet potential aggression of Germany or some other force in occupation of Germany.

Giving Poland German land east of the Oder and the consequent need for displacement of the German residents of the region also assured German hostility toward Poland. Likewise, the taking by France of the Rhineland would assure German hostility toward France.

She concludes with the ominous note that, one day, American and British forces would evacuate Europe, leaving in place on the Continent only one powerful army, that of Russia.

The Cold War, replete with its fueling mutual paranoia, was gradually beginning to take shape even before the end of World War II or the chartering of the United Nations Organization to attempt to make permanent the alliances forged during the war.