

## An Expert Speaks Victory Through Air Power

Continued from Page One

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In presenting the bare facts without pretensions, I am fully conscious of my responsibility to recognize that the implications are serious. But I regard them as too vital for the safety of America to be passed over in silence or hypocrisically in double-talk.

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It is not a question of blaming individuals or crying over mistakes. It is a question of getting at the causes of past blunders and shortcomings in order to remove them.

The widespread popular illusion persists that the world was caught unawares and startled out of its wits by the great size and terrific effectiveness of Nazi Germany's air forces.

This provides a comforting alibi for the swift and humiliating defeat at Hitler's hands; it also furnishes a convenient excuse for American backwardness. But it happens to be largely untrue.

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Moreover, the magnificent development of American commercial aviation stands as conclusive proof that it was not a paucity of creative or manufacturing genius which accounted for our lagging position.

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## Red Cross Calling For Volunteers

Need Women & Girls To Sew Garments and Knit Sweaters

Still behind on its huge war production quota, the Mecklenburg County Red Cross chapter today sent out a plea for more volunteer workers to sew the garments and knit the sweaters for United Nations fighting men and civilians. The production job has suffered badly all summer from a paucity of volunteers and the expected pick-up in interest has failed to follow the approach of Fall.

### 30 MACHINES IDLE

The urgency of the need was vividly illustrated this morning when every one of the more than 30 sewing machines at headquarters was standing idle—while in the store rooms huge piles of cloth, already cut out and assembled and awaiting the stitch, towered toward the ceiling.

"Our new quota will be coming in soon, and we are extremely anxious to finish up the old job. We need volunteers to sew at headquarters and elsewhere to take out wool for knitting at home," Mrs. Jean G. Austin, executive secretary, said today.

Mrs. Austin said the mid-Summer let-down was only natural during hot weather, gave credit to The News for arousing enthusiasm several weeks ago with a factual story showing the need for workers. "But our volunteers have dropped

off again, and we must get them back on their feet. Some have fallen down slightly. This work is a vital part of the nation's war work, and it must go ahead. We hope that cooler weather will bring the volunteers in," Mrs. Austin said.

**EVEN HIS WIFE**

While William Kelly, American inventor of the "Bessmer" steel-making process, was seeking to prove he could make steel by using a blast of cool air to make molten iron hotter, his wife, like his friends, thought him crazy and had a doctor examine him.

**LUNCHEON 40c**

Piccadilly Grill

1416 East Morehead BEER ON DRAFT

**Bakery Special!**

JELLY ROLLS

12c each

At All

**BIG STAR STORES**

Say, "I saw it in The News." Thank you.

Did John L. Sullivan Fight With Stomach Ulcer Pains?

The famous heavyweight champion, who was noted as a fighter as he did it, he suffered from a stomach ulcer. During his career, after eating, he had indigestion, gas pains, and other conditions. He died in 1900. Get a 35c box of Ulcer Tablets from your druggist. First dose must be taken on empty stomach. No return for us and get DOUBLE YOUR MONEY BACK.

**ARMSTRONG BROADLOOM LINOLEUM**

Sold by expert—selected and stock kept—other conditions. Floor for less at

**JOHNSTON'S**

120 WEST TRADE ST.

Open Evenings Until 9

**MECKLENBURG FURNITURE SHOP**

5 Miles North on Concord Blvd.



That airplane carried two machine guns and 300 pounds of bombs over a range of 1,000 miles. This is a pitiful small utilization of the plane's possibilities.