The Charlotte News

Monday, December 29, 1941

FOUR EDITORIALS

Site Ed. Note: Today's front page and its continuation page were full of more bad news from the Philippines and Singapore. The editorial page echoed that bad news. An article on page two reckons with the Japanese war plan in the Pacific.

The little squib on the front page indicating that the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va. was shut temporarily, having been the home for two weeks of Italian and German nationals, is interesting for the fact that this hotel developed an underground appendage between 1959 and 1962, as the most precipitant part of the nuclear age came into being. It was here to which evacuation would take place of all persons necessary to sustain operation of Congress in the event of nuclear attack, into which was reposited the communications systems, emergency housing and business facilities necessary to carry on as the fallout levels diminished outside over the course of a few weeks, a few decades? Just how realistic this concept was versus merely a showpiece to nurture a sense of security among government personnel with sufficient clearance to be aware of it is highly debatable. It took longer to reach from Washington than the time for an average inbound MRBM to strike. Today, the underground facility is no longer operational or secret.

Just what happened to the 150 German and Italian nationals staying there in December, 1941 is not known.

Whether any one of them was Herr Doktor Fremdbliebe is also not known. But it is highly possible. And, indeed, he may still be there with the others awaiting their Fuehrer's and Duce's final call to arms for the coup de foudre blitz through the West Virginia hillside.

The Declaration of War on Germany, incidentally, as signed by FDR on December 11 at 3:05 p.m. follows. 'Twas 3 o'clock, as Senator Tom Connally of Texas duly imparted precisely to the President via his pocket watch, as depicted on the December 25 picture page, whether that particular one having been for Italy or Germany being not entirely clear, the Declaration against Italy having been signed at 3:06.

Below are excerpts from Exhibits 142, 142A, and 142B of the Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, 1946, regarding the winds code. They are noteworthy, among other things, for the confusing intercept received December 5 indicating "North Wind Cloudy" indicative of termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia, but then followed by the ambiguous, "Tomorrow north wind and later from south," repeated three times. When received by intelligence, it was considered so inconsistent with the pre-arranged signals for destruction of diplomatic codes as to be insignificant, perhaps an actual weather report.

But was it? Was it the cloaked implementing code by way of the "south", indicative of "east wind rain", as we have previously explored? That flies in the face of our theory that the November 19 communication of the codes was itself the implementing message. But, we offer it for further analysis. It may have been a red herring; it may have been an ordinary weather broadcast. The implementing message was supposed to be repeated either twice or five times during the news broadcast, not three times.

The follow-up with the Japanese after the war, with the indicated circulars shown to them, (as mentioned in the last document below before Exhibit 142A), proved negative. No one could recall transmitting an implementing message in the winds code prior to the attack. No one disputes that messages were broadcast re British-Japanese relations after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But, this was five years later, just months after the ignominious surrender, relations were still sensitive between the Allies and Japan, and all codes had been burned in Japan prior to the surrender. Thus, what was the likelihood of genuine cooperation?

The results of the investigation on whether the winds implementing code was ever broadcast were inconclusive, but it was determined that there was probably no such communication prior to the attack, and that, in any event, it was inconsequential, as the decision to destroy Japanese diplomatic codes was communicated via regular channels of communication and intercepted promptly by U.S. intelligence. Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii was aware of this information prior to December 7.

As we have consistently questioned, however, was the conclusion that "east wind rain" was never used to implement the code correct, and, regardless, was the use of this code in the first instance inconsequential insofar as relating pertinent information not only concerning the order to destroy codes but, far more important, the particular location, and even the date and time of the attack?

We add, too, to the analysis the notion that the manner of the attack, by air, could also have been interpreted from the phrase as well, not just by the obvious notion of wind and rain, but also by the subliminal reference to Daniel, the idea of the stealth of the lion and its pounce. But for that to be clear, one would have to understand the south reference and the significance of Jonah tan Daniel. Jonah alone is not enough.

We stress again that, while such things might be figured out after the fact, with time short, with nerves frayed, the likelihood of ONI or G-2 turning such a combination safe and unlocking the code for such information before the fact was quite remote. That apparent, it would have provided the perfect face-saving device by which to seek to avoid the prospect of world remonstrance for surprise--after, that is, the Japanese had won the war. A surrendered country subjected to the former enemy would not perceive such explanations conducive to lenient treatment--essentially a mockery of the attacked country's religious beliefs and that of the West in general. And so...

Top Secret                                                      Secret

                                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
                                     Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.
Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4 194l, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.
Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.
Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

[SEAL]                                                     T. J. SLOWIE
                                                            Secretary


Top Secret 3(a) DOCUMENT No. 1 GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

3306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

                                                                    3(b)
Secret

 DOCUMENT No. 2 

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT December 4, 1941.

                                                                    3(c)
                                                                  Secret

 DOCUMENT No. 3 

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

                                                                    3(d)
                                                                  Secret

                               DOCUMENT No. 4 

English                                Romaji

This is in the middle of the news but  Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga
today, specially at this point I will  honjitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki 
give the weather forecast:             yoho wo moshiage masu

WEST WIND, CLEAR                        NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR                        NISHI NO KAZE HARE

This is in the middle of the news but   Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga
today, at this point specially I will   kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki 
give the weather forecast:              yoho wo moshiage masu

WEST WIND, CLEAR                        NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR                        NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

                                                                    4(a)
                                                         WAR DEPARTMENT,
           Washington, D. C., Room 4D761, the Pentagon, 3 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell

Pursuant to your request the War Department directed General MacArthur's Headquarters to make inquiries in Japan concerning the Winds Code.

Attached are unparaphrased copies of the cables exchanged between the War Department and General MacArthur.

                                                       HARMON DUNCOMBE,
                                                      Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Incl.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3307

                                                                    4(c)

                                                    DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
                                           Washington, December 6, 1945.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In compliance with your request of December 3, 1945,

I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague and Canberra inquiring about the "winds" message.

My letter of yesterday advised you of the answers we have received from London and the Hague.

     Sincerely yours,
                                                  /s/ Herbert S. Marks,
                                                  /t/ HERBERT S. MARKS,
                                       Assistant to the Under Secretary

Enclosure:
      Paraphrased cable.
   The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel,
      Joint Committee on the Investigation
         of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
            Congress of the United States.

                                                       30 OCTOBER 1945.

GSB 168
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

On 19 Nov 1941 Japanese Foreign Office advised its representatives abroad that in case diplomatic relations with United States, Great Britain or Russia were about to be severed a certain signal in form of false weather report would be broadcast in news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Signal was to be "Higashi No Kaze Ame" (east wind rain) in case of break between Japan and United States, "Kitano Kaze Kumori" (north wind cloudy) in case of break between Japan and Russia and "Nishi No Kaze Hare" (west wind clear) in case of break between Japan and Great Britain. Congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack has requested that Japanese records and authorities be examined to ascertain whether any signal implementing this or any similar code was in fact transmitted on or prior to 7 Dec and if so exact time and manner of transmittal. Inconclusive evidence available here suggests such signal may have been transmitted on or about 4 Dec. Request that all reasonable steps be taken to obtains such information and that this request and resulting information receive no publicity.

 
                                                      3 NOVEMBER 1945.
BSG 187
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

GSB 168 dated 31 Oct investigation has been initiated and results thereof will be communicated at the earliest practicable date. Progress in work of this kind is of necessity somewhat slow. However, every effort will be made to expedite it. Necessary steps have been taken to avoid publicity.

 
GSB 180                                               6 NOVEMBER 1941.
From: War Department.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.
    Supplementing GSB 168 there follows full Japanese text of two 
    circulars from Tokyo Foreign Office dated 19 Nov 1941:
Circular 2353. Kanchoo fugoo atsukai kokusai jigyoo no hippaku no kekka itsu saiaku no jitai ni tachi itaru kamo hakararezaru tokoro kakaru baii wagahoo to aitekoku tono tsuushin wa tadachi ni teishi serarubeki wo motte wagahoo no gaikoo kankei kiken ni hinsuru baai ni wa waga kaigai

3308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

hoosoo no kakochi muke nihohoo news no chuukan oyobi saigo ni oite tenki yohoo to shite. 1. Nichibei kankei no base ni wa "higashi no kaze ame". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kite no kaze kumori". 3. Nichiei kankei no baai ("tai" shinehuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu ("nishi no kaze hare". 02 do zutsu kurikaeshi hoosoo seshimeru koto to sew wo motte migi ni yori angoo, shorui too tekitoo shobun aritashi. Nao migi wa gen ni gokuhi atsukai to seraretashi.
Circular 2354: Gokuhi. Wagahoo no gaikoo kankai kiken ni hinsen to suru baai ni wa ippah joohoo hoosoo no bootoo oyobi matsubi ni: 1. Nichibei kankei hippaku no baud ni wa "higashi". 2. Nichiso kankei no base niwa "kita". 3. Nichei kankei ("tai" shin chuu "maree" Netherlands E I. kooryoku oboe fukmllu (no baai mi wa "nishi". Narugo 05 do ate soonyuu subeki ni tsuki goryooehi aritashi.

Both messages sent in ____________________[1] Believe broadcasts mentioned for signaling in circular 2353 were voice broadcasts and those in 2354 were Morse code.

[1] Code designation omitted.

 
BSG 196                                             13 NOVEMBER 1945.
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To: War Department.

Reference message 1 November requiring search of Jap records and interrogation of authorities to ascertain whether an implementing signal to circulars 2353 and 2354 (see GSB 180) Tokyo Foreign Office 19 November 1941 was ever transmitted. Investigation discloses that all pertinent records were burned prior to emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945. Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal. It would help the investigation if pertinent authorities could be confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354. This has not been done before in order to avoid disclosing to the Japanese the fact that we had this info. Investigation will be continued but without much prospect of success unless appropriate authorities can be confronted with circulars mentioned.

EXHIBIT NO. 142A

DEC. 5, 1941.

MR. STERLING: At 7:45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW3 2130G

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (the above was repeated three times)

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then:

I WILL NOW GIVE YOU THE WEATHER REPORT (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation--evidently cutoff in Tokyo).

Remarks by Carter; They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

Foned [sic] Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton: Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland-concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

EXHIBIT NO. 142B

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

NOTE: The above is the translation furnished the President and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, one code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

NOTE: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

"Relations between Japan and _______ are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger) England, United States."

NOTE: See JD #6985.

JD-1: 7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

 

Original 
Tokyo Circular #2494
                                                             7 Dec 41.
SF DE JAH
621 S Tokyo 19 7 850S JG
Koshi, PANAMA

Urgent 92494 Koyanagi rijiyori seirinotugoo arunituki Hattori Minami 
kinenbunko seturitu kikino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritass stop-Togo

                                                              1208 S JP
S 387/7 850S GR23                                             7630

Obese ovals rpwno rfnmo rtjmo rwfmo gnome.

JD-1: 7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)


Distribution 
Tokyo Circular #2494                                               5652
                                                            S 7 DEC. 41
SF DE JAH
622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JO KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEW YORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
628 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT

Same text and sign as our NR5651)

                                                                1220 JP
JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

3322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 Distribution

Tokyo Circular #2494                                              5653
                                                           S 7 DEC 41.
SF DE JAH
627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SAN FRANCISCO
628 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE
629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
630 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA
631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CALIF

(Same test and sign as our NR565)

                                                               1243 JP
                                                               7630

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

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