The Charlotte News

Friday, November 28, 1941

FIVE EDITORIALS

Site Ed. Note: Says "Japan's Choice": "For our part, all of us must face the fact that barring an entirely unforeseen miracle, we shall be at war with Japan by Christmas." The questions, of course, still remained as to how, precisely when, and in what location the precipitant event would occur, even if the prevailing opinion appeared now to be one of fatalistic acceptance of the fact of war.

One would naturally think in hindsight that Pearl Harbor was the natural target, especially to any astute editor at The News who had read thoroughly Cash's pieces through time. But, as we explored yesterday at length, the general military thinking, at least in Washington, was that the odds of that being carried off with success were so extravagantly remote as to be considered only in passing. Perhaps, with the military brass in North Carolina at the time, The News was chary about potentially tipping the apple cart with regard to the remaining possibilities of diplomatic solution by openly speculating about where the war might originate. Even Cash had opined eleven months earlier that the 4,000 mile expanse of ocean was so formidable as not to warrant the maintenance in Hawaii of more than half the U.S. Fleet. And, of course, as far as the government was concerned, the danger lay in the known southern moving Task Force, and thus that was where the concentration would take place. Pearl Harbor appeared safe and secure.

Raymond Clapper provides a nice synopsis of the overall issue of supply of oil and other commodities necessary for war to Japan, Vichy North Africa, and Spain under the ruling order of Fascist Francisco Franco, and how that supply, rather than having the effect of urging open trade and consequent reduction of oppression and aggression toward empire building, had merely served to nurture war against the interests of the United States and its allies, now, with the supply cut off since July to Japan, the latter threatening war with the United States. In other words, maintaining the supply served these countries well to wage war; cutting off the supply caused them to bite the hand which fed them. The analogy comes to mind of the drug addict in need of his dope, in this case oil.

We again find today an intersection between J. B. O'Meara, this time in the form of a definition of religion in response to his letter of November 24, and a line from Robert Southey. We don't think much of the offered definition of religion, for it is far too narrow a concept and far too subjective a notion to suggest that religion is a set of laws governing God relations to man, and man's relations to man. Even if changing the author's concept to one broader than law, moral precepts, the definition is still far too narrow; for religion embraces more than law and moral precept. Law and precept, both toward God and man, are provided by society in the form of informally sanctioned expectations of behaviors and statutory limitations of behavior, but that does neither make society a religion, nor the converse.

We suppose that the closest universal definition which we might offer would be that religion is a system of beliefs, and practices based on those beliefs, premised on the worship and acceptance by faith of the divine providence and infallibility of a system of deification and the pronouncements divinely shown and written out in narrative form by religious prophets emblematic of that providential teaching and wisdom, whether ascribing the deific qualities to one or more beings which are presumed beyond the full scope and understanding of man, often, though not always, accompanied by an intermediary, an earthly messenger, whose purpose is to guide man in his relations with this deity, e.g., Jesus, Muhammad, Buddha, etc. But at the heart of religious belief is just that, that it is a subjective belief system, founded on particular philosophical assumptions about the nature of the universe and man's role in it, not necessarily premised on wildly non-cohering beliefs, that man's existence is owing to a willy-nilly confabulation of insensate beings, though it may be that, but rather usually based on genuine, if subjective, observation in nature, an attempt to establish universal rules deduced from empirically obtained knowledge, even if the perceptions through time leading to the deduced rule are inevitably skewed by subjective interpretation of the experience, the rules intended to adhere man to necessary injunctions and interdictions of his behavior to enable rudimentary adaptation to nature to insure his survival in it.

Attempts to limit that definition either to moral precepts or to an understanding of existence, in our estimate, not only miss the mark of defining religion, but so narrowly limit its purpose as virtually to insure fanaticism in its practice when so viewed. For to believe that inherent in the definition of religion and central to its purpose is a rigid moral code, then obviously variance in the least from that code, or even counseling that one may interpret the rules differently from the designated community adjudicator thereof or from the written code itself, based on change of times, custom, and circumstances, leads more than likely to the road of violence over religion, certainly to oppression, the extent of which is directly proportional to the rigidity presumed necessary for maintenance of the rules deemed thusly inherent to the system. Likewise, to presume that centrality of purpose to religion is in explanation of existence will lead to the same fanaticism, that is that if one's whole reason for being is explained by a set of religious beliefs, then to encounter anyone attempting to confute any part of the belief system is to encounter someone denying the proselyte's very reason for existence, warranting either oppression or violence to eradicate the unbeliever or his or her contrary assertion of belief.

If religion is that for which we fight, then we must know at least what it is. Likewise, country.

This day, as Japanese spies continued to keep watch on the ships coming and going in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Halsey led a Task Force comprised of the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers to the west toward Midway. Another task force put to sea also, consisting of three battleships and several smaller vessels. The Enterprise, Halsey ordered after it was at sea, was operating under war conditions: torpedoes were armed with warheads, airplanes armed with bombs, and standing orders given to sink any enemy submarine, shoot down any unidentified aircraft.

Further confusing Army Lt. General Short in Hawaii regarding any need for extra air reconnaissance or ground precautions against air attack, two messages came this date from Army headquarters in Washington, specifically warning in the first one that "[c]ritical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities" and to take "all additional measures necessary...against sabotage...subversive propaganda...and espionage". A virtually identical message went to Maj. General Frederick Martin, commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, at Fort Shafter. These messages, originating from Maj. General Hap Arnold and Adjutant General Emory Adams, thus confirmed Short's interpretation of the previous day's message on General Marshall's letterhead that intelligence in Washington suggested concern only with sabotage, not attack, even if the previous day's message had been worded differently, describing expected "hostile action" and not per se mentioning sabotage. Thus, the limited and crucially fatal remedial measures thought necessary by Short were not only now based on interpretation but confirmed by the actual words set forth in the directive. And, except with perfect hindsight, who could have blamed him for so thinking? Long-range reconnaissance is covered by the Naval Task Force at sea; short-range reconnaissance to the south of the island is covered; radar operators will be in place during the hours thought most critical for air approach, the three hours before dawn; airplanes are bunched together, unfueled and without ammunition, to protect against sabotage. All was square.

This day in Tokyo, Togo, head of the Foreign Ministry, asked for the first time to know the time of attack in Hawaii so that he would be able to understand the limits of diplomacy; he was informed of the date. Although Togo sought permission to inform Nomura and Kurusu in Washington of the plan, he was informed that the attack would remain secret to avoid risk inadvertently of tipping Hull or Roosevelt.

Seas were unseasonably calm for the "Operation Hawaii" Task Force, enabling easy refueling. All was proceeding on schedule, blessed, no doubt, by the gods of war.

"Her husband 's to Aleppo gone, master o' the Tiger:
But in a sieve I'll thither sail,
And, like a rat without a tail,
I'll do, I'll do, and I'll do."

****

"They went to sea in a sieve, they did;
In a sieve they went to sea;
In spite of all their friends could say."

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