The Charlotte News

Saturday, October 16, 1937

SEVEN EDITORIALS

Site Ed. Note: The New York Times of October 16, 1962 reported, ironically, given what was transpiring, unbeknownst to the world outside of the highest levels of government, that former President Eisenhower, giving a talk in Hartford, Connecticut, bemoaned the Kennedy Administration’s "dreary" foreign policy record to date.

Reports appeared in the Times the day before indicating that Soviet officials proclaimed that if the Administration would loosen its policy on Berlin, the Soviets would effect a similar policy with respect to Cuba.

The President, having been briefed that morning by Defense Department officials on the near certainty that the reconnaissance photographs of the Sunday U-2 flight had discovered the presence of medium range ballistic missiles in western Cuba, ordered increased U-2 missions to determine with as much accuracy as possible that the missiles were in fact as believed, thus affording clear offensive capability. Two missions were planned for the following day with more, if necessary, to overcome cloudy weather, to enable full coverage of the island. Twenty such missions would be flown over the course of the following week.

Two meetings were scheduled on the crisis at the White House, one in the morning, one in the evening at 6:30.

In the morning meeting with the President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk began by indicating that he saw two avenues of action, the first aimed at eliminating the base at San Cristobal by military force, either involving a direct air strike only on the targeted base, or a more general attack to "eliminate the island".

The other approach would be a slower diplomatic one to build international support, first involving the Organization of American States in Latin America and a demand through that organization for inspection of the bases in Cuba, a demand which Rusk asserted would be refused, but would enable the building of credibility for a subsequent attack to eliminate the base. He also suggested working through an intermediary, perhaps Canada’s ambassador in Havana, to suggest to Castro that he was being sold out by the Soviets by the implementation of these bases, as they were being used for a trade over Berlin, referencing the Times story of the day before, and that since they could not be tolerated by the United States, the inevitability was that Cuba in the end would suffer gravely for the presence of the missiles. N.A.T.O. countries would also be alerted and their support in the matter would be sought.

These avenues of communication were considered necessary to open for other than purely political reasons, for if we were to strike Cuba, retaliatory strikes would almost assuredly follow somewhere, either in NATO countries or OAS countries, or both. Rusk also warned of possible attempts, after a strike, at destabilization of Latin American governments by Soviets or Cubans, even including possibly Mexico, thus stressing the need for advanced warning to shore up military preparations against attempted coups.

In addition, Rusk outlined the necessity of placing at readiness a substantial force of 150,000 military personnel in selective units, to reinforce troop strength in the Southeast and at Guantanamo.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended that if an air strike was going to occur, then it must occur before the missiles become operational, the date of which was then unknown, but which later that evening would be placed at about two weeks, with at least one missile possibly operational in a shorter time. The strike would have to aim not only at the missile installations themselves, but also the supporting airfields and aircraft, as well as hidden aircraft and nuclear storage facilities, thus encompassing a fairly broad area of the island. Invasion by ground forces could follow within seven days of the beginning of continuing daily air strikes.

General Maxwell Taylor, head of the Joint Chiefs since October 1, insisted that there should be first a pause to insure readiness of the military, maintenance of absolute secrecy to enable surprise, then after more aerial photography had established clearly the locations of all of the sites, a surprise air strike to take out all of the missiles and support facilities to the extent possible at one time, before they could be hidden underground. Following on that strike, and additional sorties for the following several days, there would be a naval blockade implemented to prevent the further introduction of nuclear weapons. Taylor was hesitant, however, to support the idea of invasion following the air strike.

The President, after listening to this advice, asked for the supposed reason for the introduction of these missiles to Cuba: was it because the Soviets were dissatisfied with the range and accuracy of their intercontinental ballistic missiles located within Soviet territory?

Taylor responded that it appeared to provide a supplemental base for short range missiles to strike the United States. Dean Rusk indicated that the hypothesis was that Khrushchev wanted to counterbalance our fifteen or so Jupiter missiles in Turkey at his back door with missiles at our back door. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy added that there were reports that Khrushchev believed, falsely, that the United States had nuclear missiles in Japan. There was also discussion that the posture thus taken might be to goad the United States to take what might appear to the rest of the world as an offensive action against Cuba, thus to enable political and diplomatic sympathy to the Soviet position.

The President expressed reservation over the effectiveness of a naval blockade, asking rhetorically whether then the missiles wouldn’t simply be brought in by submarine. McNamara responded that there would have to be a firm policy enunciated that repeated air strikes would interdict any attempt to introduce further missiles. He also reinforced his position that the air strike had to get the airfields and aircraft, as well as the missile sites, for there was fear of the ability of the MiG21 airplanes to penetrate coastal defenses of the United States, and that these airplanes were capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and even if not a threat in that area, would be carrying conventional bombs, that such would be an inevitable retaliatory response from a limited air strike which did not also target the airfields and planes.

Finally, McNamara indicated that there was some possibility that the missiles were a mere bluff, a bargaining tool, and that it was conceivable that no warheads were yet in place. Later in the evening meeting, speculation would arise from Robert Kennedy as to why Khruschev would entrust missiles in the hands of someone as unstable as Castro, and thus hypothesized that the Soviet Union continued to control the launch buttons.

Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury, recommended a quick strike, voicing concern that other courses would compromise the surprise element and would likely only encourage the Soviets toward escalation.

Rusk responded that the quick strike, however, had the problem of not consulting with or forewarning the OAS and NATO allies and thereby compromising their readiness vis à vis the Soviets for potential retaliation.

McNamara added that it would be no less risky politically and militarily to follow any air strike with a full invasion to eliminate the "whole problem".

The President asked how many people within the government would become aware of the presence of the missiles. Taylor responded that there would only be ten more senior commanders who he would brief that afternoon. McNamara, however, indicated that within a week, they should assume that high ranking members of Congress would have to be advised of the problem and that shortly thereafter, in all likelihood, the press would be alerted. Already, he explained, there was a departure from normal procedures of duplicating U-2 film for the Strategic Air Command, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and for C.I.A., and eventually such protocol changes would signal some imminent action and crisis.

Rusk and Bundy interjected, almost comically, that Senator Kenneth Keating (R-NY) had already announced the fact of the construction of the intermediate range missile sites from the floor of the Senate on October 10. (No one offered any firm explanation as to how he might have acquired such information before C.I.A., the Defense Department, or the U-2 aerial surveillance, or whether it was simply a lucky partisan guess—or whether a certain little birdie from California, intimate with the situation always in Cuba, initiator of the Bay of Pigs invasion plan back in 1959, had dropped the dime.) Taylor interjected that there was a Cuban refugee providing information on the site installations from the ground in Cuba, but expressed lack of knowledge as to whether this was the source who had informed Keating.

The President asked Vice-President Johnson for his thoughts and he indicated his agreement with McNamara, that the idea of either "taking out the base or talking about it" was "distressing", but that he favored taking it out. He counseled against consulting with our allies first, as he did not believe the O.A.S. had enough strength to matter in such a serious situation and that ultimately the surprise element would be lost by doing so.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy stated that there would be heavy political fallout from a general strike, including the airfields, as many Cubans would inevitably be killed, especially in and around Havana. He then laid out the potential scenario whereby the Soviets would bring in more missiles forcing our further bombing, and, from this activity, eventually, there would be retaliation on our bases, in Turkey, Berlin, Iran, or elsewhere.

After listening to the various suggestions, the President asserted that the policy would be first to take out the missile sites; second, to determine the best course of action available otherwise, whether to follow with a broader strike against the airfields and an invasion. And to determine then what steps to take to interdict further missiles. He ordered preparations begin at once toward readiness for the necessary steps for the elimination of the missiles. He planned another meeting for 6 o’clock to determine who would be let in on the planning, to what degree and when the planning would be made public, and to determine what further steps could and should be taken to resolve the matter diplomatically prior to an air strike.

The later meeting began with General Carter briefing the President on the high probability, based on size and weight of the missiles, that they were medium range, capable probably of an 1,100 mile strike radius. McNamara and Rusk concurred, but expressed reservation as to whether it was certain as yet that the range exceeded 600 miles. General Carter expressed that it was estimated that the missiles would be operational within two weeks, based on assumptions as to their current status; he cautioned, however, that one missile appeared to have been in Cuba since late August or early September, based on retrospective analysis of the size of Soviet shipping holds and buoyancy, and so that one could be operational "very much sooner".

There were three sites, each with four mobile field-type launchers, each with a probable back-up missile, meaning 16 to 24 missiles altogether. They could be prepped within six hours for launch and reloaded within six to eight hours. There was no hard evidence of nuclear storage facilities, though some indications of one such facility guarded by machine guns had been detected since February, similar to known nuclear storage facilities in the Soviet Union, but with distinctions also.

The various strategies were then reassessed. General Taylor indicated that the Joint Chiefs were not in favor of only a limited strike to take out the missile sites, that it would leave in place too much capability for air reprisal, and furthermore there was too much risk of not being able to achieve the objective, as the launchers could be moved under trees and hidden from view of the bombers. The Joint Chiefs favored a full attack with a follow-on invasion after about five days of continuous sorties to insure fully taking out all military capability on the island.

McNamara brought up an alternative plan, in between the limited and general strike, that of a general blockade as a first move to interdict all further Soviet incoming ships, while cautioning that such a move also risked reprisal. Later in the discussion, Robert Kennedy brought up the fact that blockade meant ultimately the possibility of sinking Soviet ships and submarines, with consequent potential escalation.

McNamara also counseled that the consequences of the air strike, even a limited one on only the bases, be more carefully examined before any firm decision was reached.

Dean Rusk suggested a diplomatic alternative by means of sending a note to Castro indicating that if he persisted in allowing these bases on Cuban soil, he risked destabilizing the security of the United States; the note would not contain any direct threat of reprisal but would clearly imply it.

President Kennedy again addressed the issue of why Khrushchev was risking war over implementing a missile base in Cuba. Did it alter the strategic balance? The consensus was that it did not because the ICBM’s within the Soviet Union were sufficient to target the United States and afford strategic nuclear balance. The general belief was that it provided a trump card, a bluffing vehicle, a psychological edge in the Cold War, and, as Undersecretary of State George Ball posited, some scenery for Khrushchev to employ in political theater before the U.N. on his planned trip in November, to use as leverage over Berlin.

A darkly humorous exchange, in hindsight, almost, but not quite, sounding of the war room in "Dr. Strangelove", occurred on this subject at one point:

JFK: That's right, but what is the advantage of that? It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBM’s in Turkey. Now that'd be goddamn dangerous, I would think.

Bundy[?]: Well, we did, Mr. President.

Ural Alexis Johnson[?]: We did it. We . . .

JFK: Yeah, but that was five years ago.

U.A. Johnson[?]: . . . did it in England ; that's why we were short.

JFK: What?

U.A. Johnson[?]: We gave England two when we were short of ICBM’s.

JFK: Yeah, but that's, uh . . .

U.A. Johnson[?]: [Testing?]

JFK: . . . that was during a different period then.

Again the consensus was that there was some object in mind to balance out the strategic location of missiles, for political and psychological, more than pragmatic, reasons, with those missiles of the United States in proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Robert Kennedy brought up the possibility that the threat of the missiles could be used to dictate our policy toward Latin America, that Castro or the Soviets could insist on a hands-off policy, even to the encouragement of communist states there, using the presence of the missiles as a gun to our head.

In the final analysis, the President indicated that, based on General Taylor’s outline of readiness capability for the military, keeping in mind the need for further reconnaissance flights by U-2, the limited strike and general strike plans would be placed in preparation so as to be executable by Saturday on 24-hours notice. The President indicated that the full-scale invasion plan would be considered as a contingency as well.

General Taylor asked that the President wait to initiate any orders until substantially more photographic evidence was in and examined, to determine more clearly the SAM sites, the missile launcher sites, and whether there was a nuclear storage facility. He indicated that the initial round of sorties would get most of the implacements, but that inevitably they could not get them all in the first 24 hours of operations, comprising anywhere from 700 to a thousand sorties. It would take five days to do so, before any invasion plans should be considered. A full-scale invasion would take about ten days to prepare.

He also stressed that the Joint Chiefs would prefer no military action at all rather than to take only the limited step of taking out the missile sites, without also the more generalized air strike against the aircraft facilities to prevent any retaliatory response initiated from Cuba.

The President also indicated that there would be some consideration given to providing a note to Khrushchev, or possibly some short warning to Castro, not to exceed 24 hours, but possibly even shorter, so as to take the moral high road in the matter, and at least give some chance, albeit recognized as slight, to effect a diplomatic solution. No decisions, however, would be made until the U-2 missions of the ensuing two days were complete and the photographs analyzed.

The President had made a statement at his September 13 press conference that no offensive capability would be tolerated on Cuba; he expressed some dismay now over the categorical nature of that statement and realized that it would appear hollow were the missiles to be allowed to remain, even if not in fact changing the strategic balance significantly. As Kennedy put it at the evening meeting, "You may say it doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away. Geography doesn't mean that much."

The final consensus of the day, suggested by McNamara and Bundy, was to consider for the following day’s meetings what the world would be like if the steps contemplated to remove the missiles were not undertaken; what it would be like if they were.

There was also discussion as to why the sites appeared without very much personnel guarding them. As McNamara indicated: "It's as if you could walk over the fields into those vans." That led to speculation that there were no nuclear warheads, yet anyway, on the island. The working assumption, however, was that there were, or there would be no commensurate build-up in arms and personnel and the delivery of these MRBM’s.

The official Soviet news agency, TASS, had issued a statement on September 11 indicating that the Soviet Union’s missile capability was such that it did not need to search out overseas locations for missile sites. This statement presented a puzzling query to the group as to why it was issued when at the same time the missiles were being shipped into Cuba.

The President raised the issue of whether he should seek from Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, during his scheduled meeting with him on Thursday morning, confirmation of this continued policy, as Gromyko had reaffirmed to Robert Kennedy in a meeting a few days earlier that the Soviet Union had no intention of placing offensive weapons in Cuba. (The President would do so, only to have Gromyko again reaffirm the lack of such intention by the Soviet Union. Whether this was a deliberate lie or whether Gromyko was merely without knowledge of the missiles was unclear.)

The President, it was decided, to avoid any undue attention, would not attend the subsequent day’s meetings and would meet with the group, soon to be dubbed EXCOMM, (not ECOMCOM), for "Executive Committee", again on Thursday morning, after more photo reconnaissance work had been completed by U-2.

So, returning to 1937, here are the pieces for the day. And, speaking of U-2, Hardin-Simmons University in 1937 was not the only college ever to have a mascot with the moniker indicated; at the University of North Carolina, one of the fraternities did also, also spelled thusly, circa 1962--believe it or not.

Good night and good luck.

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