The Charlotte News
Tuesday, September 2, 1958
THREE EDITORIALS
Site Ed. Note: The front page reports from Taipei, Formosa, that the Chinese Nationalists had claimed that their warships had sunk 11 Communist Chinese torpedo boats and probably a 12th early this date as the Communists had sought to break up a convoy to embattled Quemoy Island. It was the largest naval action reported in the 11 days since the Communists had stepped up their attack on the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Earlier, the Nationalists had announced that their artillery on Quemoy had fired throughout Sunday night, sinking three Communist gunboats and eight motorized junks in a flotilla near Amoy, the Communist island port blockaded by the Nationalist islands. Despite the naval success claimed by the Nationalists, the torpedo boat attack had forced a troop carrier to return to the Pescadores Islands without unloading 370 troops who had been destined for Quemoy, with only 30 of the reinforcements having made it to shore. During and after the naval engagement, the Communist shore batteries had pounded Quemoy with renewed fury. Between midnight and early afternoon, nearly 2,800 shells had hit the island according to the Defense Ministry, and a 100-shell barrage had been fired on tiny Tatan islet, 2.5 miles south of Amoy. The combined artillery and sea attack had occurred following the quietest day in the Formosa Strait since the Communists had begun their heavy attack on August 23.
In Reykjavik, Iceland, British fishermen and Icelandic Coast Guardsmen battled hand-to-hand aboard a British trawler in the no fishing zone off Iceland's east coast this date. An official statement, broadcast by the Government-owned radio station, gave the Icelandic people a graphic account of the fight, saying that a rough battle had ensued when an Icelandic gunboat crew attempted to seize a British trawler, whereupon a British frigate had steamed to the trawler's side and removed the Icelanders. Six Icelanders had gone aboard the trawler unarmed, but had been met by British trawlermen armed with cudgels. The Icelanders had overpowered the trawlermen and resistance had ceased. When the Coast Guardsmen were seeking to take the trawler into port, the frigate had sailed into the fray and placed men aboard the trawler, capturing the Icelanders. The incident had occurred 300 miles from Reykjavik and was the first reported violent contact in the nearly two-day old fishing dispute between Iceland and Britain. The British Embassy in Iceland had said that the frigate was awaiting specific instructions as to what to do with the captured Icelandic Coast Guardsmen. The previous day, Iceland had extended its fishing limit from 4 to 12 miles, the subject of the controversy with Britain, which had caused Iceland to threaten withdrawal from NATO. Royal Navy Headquarters in London reported that no violence had occurred in the incident and the Admiralty said that frigates guarding the fleet of more than 60 trawlers had radioed that two Icelandic gunboats had slipped by them under cover of fog and its personnel had boarded the trawler.
In Little Rock, Ark., it was reported that Governor Orval Faubus had decided to sign the legislation passed by the Legislature during its special session the previous week declaring postponement of the opening of schools in Little Rock until September 15, thereby temporarily easing tensions, after the Supreme Court the prior Thursday had set September 8 as a deadline for the School Board to file its petition for writ of certiorari, September 10 for filing briefs from both sides, and September 11 for determination whether to grant the petition and, if so, oral argument on the merits of the case, appealing the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the Federal District Court decision to delay for 2 1/2 years further integration at Central High School in Little Rock. The School Board had voted the previous night 5 to 1 for the delay of the opening of school in a show of good faith vis-à-vis the Court. Whether black students would be admitted on September 15 apparently would depend on what the Court would decide after the oral argument. The Governor had said that he would close the 2,000-pupil high school "if necessary for the peace of the community", should court-ordered integration be resumed, authority for which had also been given to him as an option by the Legislature. The Little Rock School superintendent, Virgil Blossom, said that the decision to postpone the opening day by a week had been made on the recommendation of one of the Board's lawyers, who had pointed out that the complex problems caused by the desegregation decisions could only be solved by "the exercise of the utmost patience and good faith…"
In Alexandria, Va., the legality of the amended version of Virginia's Pupil Placement Act would possibly be tested in Federal Court during a hearing on a motion to order Arlington County to admit 30 black pupils into its white schools.
At Gulfport, Miss., a black minister, the Reverend Clennan King, planned to enroll his six-year old daughter in an all-white school. The mayor of the town said that city officials would handle the case without other aid, that race relations were excellent and that no one in the city of either race wanted integration. In an apparently related incident, a black-faced effigy had been found hanging from a flagpole on the Federal building in downtown Gulfport, removed immediately. Neither the mayor nor the police chief wanted to discuss that matter.
The New York Board of Education's Commission on Integration had issued a report in which it said there could be no such thing as "separate but equal" schools. The report stated: "Whether school segregation is the effect of law and custom, as it is in the South, or has its roots in residential segregation, as in New York City, its defects are inherent and incurable."
In Capetown, South Africa, Hendrik Verwoerd, the chief architect and executive of South Africa's policy of white supremacy and segregation, Apartheid, had become the nation's Prime Minister this date, succeeding the late Johannes Strijdom.
In Paris, it was reported that the Government had intensified its campaign against Algerian terrorism in France this date with warnings for North Africans to remain off the streets between 9:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m.
In Adelaide, Australia, it was reported that Britain would make its first attempt to launch a missile into outer space on Thursday, provided the weather and last-minute checks would allow it. It was set to be the first live firing of the Saunders-Roe weapon, "Black Knight".
In Toronto, it was reported that 65 persons had been killed in accidents during Canada's three-day Labor Day weekend, below the previous year's total of 83, with poor weather curtailing traffic in many parts of the country having been cited as the primary reason for the lower number.
In Columbus, O., it was reported that Dr. Samuel Sheppard, who had been convicted in December, 1954 of the second-degree murder of his wife, would begin another round this date in his three-year appellate battle to seek freedom.
Emery Wister of The News reports that James Arness, of the television show "Gunsmoke", was visiting Charlotte this date. He said that he expected Marshal Matt Dillon to get into a lot of trouble in the ensuing year, that he had been shot a couple of times previously and would get it again. Mr. Arness had been busy during the morning signing autographs and shaking hands at the Charlotte Airport just before leaving for California, having attended the Darlington 500 automobile race the previous day and then having flown to Charlotte the previous night, making a quick appearance on the "Arthur Smith Show" at Sears, Roebuck & Co. during the morning before leaving for the airport. He said that he was not tired of playing Mr. Dillon, indicating: "The way the show is going now it wouldn't be right to leave it. As a matter of fact, I couldn't leave it. As long as we have these great stories, being Matt Dillon is worthwhile. When we run out of stories, that's when we're in trouble." There had been a report from Hollywood a year or so earlier that he was tired of playing the role and was looking for other parts, but he said that he had been misquoted, that what he had said was that he was unhappy with his contract and wanted a new deal, but was enjoying playing the role. He said he remained unhappy with his contract. It is no wonder that he is being shot at a lot, pointing his gun at photographers, just as does Paladin. Sooner or later, Chester is going to get drunk and kill Matt, and that will be that. Then they'll hang Chester for sure, and Doc Adams will marry Miss Kitty in the final episode to make of her an honest woman.
On the editorial page, Marquis Childs indicates that with Quemoy and Matsu threatened with attack and possibly invasion by the Communist Chinese, the President was confronted with an unhappy choice, growing out of past compromises within the Administration. By a resolution adopted by Congress on January 29, 1955, the President would have to determine when an attack of the offshore islands still held by the Nationalists threatened the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. If he found that Formosa was threatened, then he could, on his own initiative, order U.S. armed forces to participate in defense of the islands. The language of the resolution, as learned by Mr. Childs from a source participating in the making of policy at the time, had not been that originally desired by Secretary of State Dulles. He and Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson, in charge of the Far East, had wanted a definite and clear-cut statement that the U.S. would be jointly responsible with Nationalist China for the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, arguing that it would place the Communists on notice that an attack on the islands would immediately involve U.S. armed forces.
But the President had been reluctant to make such a firm commitment, having in mind the conflict which had raged only a few months earlier regarding the defense of the Tachen Islands, another offshore group on which Chiang Kai-shek had deployed part of his forces. In that controversy, some of the President's principal advisers believed that the U.S. ought join Chiang in repulsing the kind of attack which appeared to be preliminary to a direct assault. Among them had been Admiral Arthur Radford, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Secretary Dulles. On the opposite side, according to reports, were the other Joint Chiefs, conspicuously General Matthew Ridgway.
The President had finally ruled against any joint defense of the Tachens. Chiang was advised to evacuate those islands which were difficult to supply. Having had to resolve that conflict within his Administration, the President was in no mood to make a firm commitment on the islands still held by Chiang's forces. When, therefore, Mr. Dulles had gone to the White House with his proposal for a Congressional resolution which would put the U.S. on record for the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, the President proposed the compromise, giving him the right to decide when an attack warranted the use of American forces.
The language of the resolution, finally adopted by a vote of 85 to 3 in the Senate, had given the President the authority to take such measures as he might see fit to secure Formosa and the Pescadores against attack, "to include the security and protection of such related positions and territories now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required, or appropriate in securing the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." The President, in his message asking Congress for a resolution on Formosa, had said that it would "clarify present policy" rather than establish a "new policy".
But following adoption of the resolution, which had been rushed through the Senate under the admonition of the late Senator Walter George of Georgia, who said that any debate suggesting doubt would endanger peace in the Pacific, there had been much criticism. By leaving the status of Quemoy and Matsu open, it had been charged, the Communists were encouraged to believe that they could attack without involving the U.S., with that criticism having increased since the Communists had stepped up their latest barrage against the islands.
Two years following the Formosa resolution, Secretary Dulles had gone to the President with another proposal, on that occasion seeking a declaration which became known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine" for the Middle East. As passed by Congress, the resolution had provided that "if the President determines the necessity", the U.S. would use armed forces to assist any nation requesting aid against attack from a Communist-dominated country. Mr. Childs indicates that as events in the Middle East had proved, the threat there was not direct Communist aggression.
Now, in the Far East, because of the compromise the President had insisted on, he now had to determine whether an armed attack justified the use of American planes and warships.
Walter Lippmann indicates that the previous week, regarding the two big questions of integration and the islands off the shore of mainland China, the President had followed the same fundamental line of conduct, that he would not make clear in advance what he believed and what he intended to do.
Regarding the Communist Chinese threatening the island of Quemoy, where Chiang had most unwisely locked up a considerable part of his Army, the tactic of the Administration had been to keep everyone guessing about what the U.S. would do in case of an invasion.
Regarding integration, the President not only refused to say what he believed but cast doubt upon whether he agreed with the line taken by the Department of Justice and his own Attorney General, William Rogers.
Mr. Lippmann regards it as the use of mystification as a tactic, a deliberate decision regarding critical issues to keep everybody guessing. But in all probability, the President's tactics were not deliberate and not the result of a decision, but rather from a habit derived from his military experience. At his press conference on Wednesday, the President had been asked by Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post whether the fact that Chiang had so many troops on Quemoy would affect his judgment about what he was committed to do in Formosa, to which the President had replied, "You simply cannot make military decisions until after the event reaches you."
Mr. Lippmann suggests that the conception of the character of a military commander went a long way in explaining why there was no U.S. policy regarding the offshore islands and why there was no clarity regarding what the Administration would do in the integration cases. Based on the President's indication that military decisions were only made when the event reached him, he would send paratroopers back to Little Rock or send the Marines to Lebanon or the Seventh Fleet to Quemoy only when the event occurred prompting reaction. He suggests that waiting for events to reach the commander before taking a decision was not an inspired conception of military leadership. "In diplomacy and in politics it is a tactic which, except in rare circumstances and among very astute and sophisticated men, is almost always mischievous." None knew that better than Secretary Dulles, who had repeatedly said that he was in favor of not leaving the country's adversaries in any doubt about the Government's intentions. It had been a central principle of the security pacts which Mr. Dulles had signed, intended, as he had often explained, to prevent miscalculation and misunderstanding by the other side.
But regarding Quemoy and the offshore islands, the U.S. had followed the opposite policy and by doing so had put off having to decide whether to advise Chiang to withdraw his troops from an untenable position and whether to commit U.S. forces in the defense of that untenable position. It had meant that the U.S. had gambled that there would be uncertainty about what it meant to do to deter the Communist Chinese from doing anything. Regardless of the outcome, Mr. Lippmann finds it an unsound practice and beneath the dignity of the power of the U.S., which should not bluff or play tricks.
He also finds it a very bad practice in terms of integration. In a speech the prior Wednesday by Attorney General Rogers to a meeting of the Los Angeles Bar Association, he had made an attempt to make clear much of what the President had fogged up, regarding the crucial question of what the Federal Government would do about the defiance of the Southern state governments. Mr. Rogers had to resort to exhortation and pious platitudes, admonishing the states to accept Federal law without equivocation, though not explaining how the Administration proposed to begin to deal with the Southern resistance. He could not say what the Administration's policy was on the crucial issue, for there was no policy of the President, only the tactic of "not making decisions until after the event reaches you."
As we have fallen behind, there will be no further notes regarding the front page or editorial page this date, as the notes will be sporadic until we catch up.
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