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The Charlotte News
Monday, September 15, 1958
THREE EDITORIALS
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Site Ed. Note: The front page reports from the U.N. in New York that Secretary of State Dulles had set up strategy conferences this date for the 13th U.N. General Assembly, which he said might be the most important in years. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was also in New York, preparing for the session, which would begin the following day. He and Mr. Dulles were expected to clash in the debate beginning Thursday regarding such issues as the crisis in the Formosa Strait, the struggle between Communist and Nationalist Chinese. Mr. Dulles was scheduled to speak the following day. He had said upon his arrival: "There will be vital problems of consolidating peace which are brought to the fore by the Soviet backing of Chinese Communist aggression." He had mentioned as other subjects, disarmament, economic development and parts of the President's Middle Eastern program, which could not be set forth at the emergency session which had occurred between August 8 and 21. Before he had departed Washington, Mr. Dulles had said that he would not be surprised if the Russians sought to get the Assembly to put on its agenda alleged U.S. aggression in the Formosa Strait, where the U.S. was pledged by a 1955 treaty to defend the Nationalists on Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Mr. Gromyko had made no statement when he arrived with a 14-member delegation, but in a recent letter to the President, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had asked whether the U.N. ought not forbid any country to send its air or naval fleets to the Far East or elsewhere "for the purpose of blackmail." Assistant Secretary of State Francis Wilcox had told a New York audience at the American Association for the United Nations: "Each member of the United Nations obviously has a strong interest in the situation in the Taiwan Strait areas since Communist activities there are fraught with danger to all of us and to world peace." He also said that he hoped that the General Assembly would make a beginning toward establishing a standby U.N. force ready to meet quickly "a wide range of situations." The President's August 13 speech on the Middle East had called for creation of such a force and Mr. Wilcox said that the first step ought be a "permanent staff in the United Nations Secretariat to act as a planning center."
In Taipei, Formosa, the Chinese Nationalists, heartened by their first success at piercing the Communist artillery curtain around Quemoy, had assembled another convoy this date to supply the besieged island fortress, where 100,000 Nationalist Army personnel were garrisoned. The Nationalists announced that the first sizable amounts of supplies in a week had gotten through to Quemoy the previous day by sea and air, with U.S. escorts. U.S. and Nationalist spokesmen had announced that U.S. Air Force planes had flown protective cover. Nationalist transports also parachuted supplies to the island complex for the first time since the Communists had tightened their blockade early in the month. Newsmen were barred from visiting the Pescadores, Matsu and Quemoy, a hint that some major operation might be in the offing as a new sea convoy was forming at the Pescadores Island supply base 30 miles from Formosa and 70 miles from Quemoy. The previous day, the successful convoy had been directed by U.S. amphibious experts, who apparently showed the Nationalists some new techniques. As usual, escort ships from the U.S. 7th Fleet had stopped at the three-mile international limit and remained offshore. U.S. jets covering the operation were believed under similar orders. The supply ship which had gotten through was an old World War II LST, a much larger vessel than the LSM's which had failed on four convoys the previous week. The LST could carry about 1,200 tons of cargo, compared with 350 on the LSM.
In Washington, Russian trade chief Anastas Mikoyan had renewed the Soviet Union's offer to work out a trade agreement with the U.S., and even to sell the country some military equipment.
In Beirut, Lebanon, two more U.S. Marine battalions were departing the country and returning home, most of the men to be aboard ship this date.
In London, it was reported that a British judge had cracked down on racial rioting this date in the Notting Hill section of the city by sending nine youths to jail for four years each for attacks on black citizens.
In Newport, R.I., it was reported that the President would hold his first formal political conference this date since the Republicans had been trounced in the Maine elections a week earlier.
In Paris, it was reported that
Algerian assassins had sought to kill the French Information
Minister, Jacques Soustelle
In Little Rock, Ark., it was reported that a few spectators had gathered near Central High School this date at the time when it normally would have opened for classes for the fall term. Police radio cars circled the grounds. Automobiles carrying both whites and blacks cruised slowly in front of the school, but there were no disturbances. The school remained closed on orders of Governor Orval Faubus. A group of white girls, in gymnasium uniforms, had gone into the school, telling reporters that they were not going to attend classes, that they were drum majorettes practicing for appearances at the football games. Special armed guards, employed by the School Board, were on duty at the school. U.S. marshals, also in cars, appeared occasionally but stayed in their cars. State troopers, also armed, were on duty at the official residence of the Governor. A reporter who passed through the gate and approached the mansion had been ordered to leave. The areas around the city's other three senior high schools had been quiet. The regional director of the NAACP, Mrs. L. C. Bates, had said previously that she did not intend to bring seven black pupils to Central High in the formality of trying to enroll them, those pupils having attended the high school the previous year and having been ordered to be admitted to the school by the Supreme Court in its decision of the prior Friday, affirming the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision reversing the District Court's order to delay by 2 1/2 years further integration of the school, resulting in the Governor's order, pursuant to new powers provided by the special session recently of the Legislature, to close the school. Reports persisted this date that the Department of Justice was preparing some legal action against the Governor, but the Department's spokesman had refused to reveal how it planned to employ the small army of U.S. marshals it had in Little Rock.
In Richmond, Va., the closed Warren County High School symbolized this date the intensity of Virginia's battle to prevent integration of the public schools. Under the state's anti-integration laws, Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., had taken control of the county's only high school, which previously had been all-white. A District Court judge had ordered 22 black pupils to be admitted to the high school the prior week and the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had refused to impose a stay of that order, resulting in the Governor closing the school under the state's laws forbidding integration. Residents of the county, in northwest Virginia, were silent and calm as they prepared for the impact of a closed high school. A group of clergymen in the county had urged reopening of the high school in a statement adopted by 13 of the 14 members of the local ministerial association, expressing the belief in "the vital necessity" of keeping the public schools open, the statement also indicating that the ministers could not countenance the use of Christian churches as private schools to evade desegregation. In Charlottesville, where a District Court judge had ordered the admission of two black pupils to its only white high school and ten black students to one of its white elementary schools, the school board would seek the following day to obtain a stay of the ruling from the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore, Simon Sobeloff. In Norfolk, the school board, under pressure of a Federal Court order to desegregate the public schools, had announced the intention to enroll 17 black students in white schools.
Perry Morgan, on leave as Associate Editor of The News while studying as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard, reports that on the night of July 23, 1957, the Charlotte City School Board had been accused of "an outrage and a crime" for having assigned five black students to previously all-white schools. The speaker, a leader of the segregationist "Patriots of North Carolina, Inc.," had received some cheers from the audience while from the Board, there had been no response. By that night, more than three years following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Board had made up its mind, after consulting lawyers, teachers, parents and its own knowledge of the community and its own conscience, to seek to deal with the facts and develop a solution. The Board had proposed a policy and what would follow would be up to the people, that policy having been, first, that the public schools had to be preserved, and, second, that the law of the land had to be respected. The Board would thus demonstrate its good faith to the law by assigning to all-white schools five black applicants who, had they been white, would have been so assigned without question. Long before that point, requests from the NAACP that the Board undertake to bring about general integration of white and black students had been rejected. Rather than a positive order for integration, the Supreme Court decision, in the view of the Board, had been a ban against refusing to assign black applicants to a particular school based on race or color. Thus, the Board would keep faith with that view of the decision, the view of the late Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John J. Parker, and would stay out of court. To a large extent, keeping out of court and keeping the schools open might mean the same thing. The Board would have to use its own judgment if the time would come when assignment of a legally qualified black applicant to a school would pose the probability that its patrons would close that school under the state's Pupil Assignment Law. The Board had only the power of discretion to determine what might be achieved where and when, in an effort to bridge the gap between a new and unpopular decision and a contrary custom rooted in the centuries. The Board would use its discretion, hoping that the community would trust it and that the courts, if the Board should be forced into them, would understand the necessity of local discretion. The editors note at the head of the piece that the Board had been charged with being "segregationist" and with being "integrationist", when, in fact, it was neither, its concern being with the education of Charlotte children and the operation of the Charlotte public schools within the framework of Brown and in keeping with community attitudes. It notes that members of the Board were Dr. Herbert Spaugh, chairman, Ben Horack, R. H. Brown, A. L. Bechtold, J. P. Hobson, G. Douglas Aitken and Ben F. Huntley.
On the editorial page, "One Day Soon: A Puppetless Theatre" finds that "in the dank and musty cellar of our China policy, not a fresh wind has stirred in years", that it had hoped for one in the President's address the prior Thursday regarding the offshore islands, one to succeed "containment" or even the "mania about territorial balance of power", but instead there had been "the same weary, windy bromides and slogans which have lulled us for years."
It posits that only the rigid lawyer's mind of Secretary of State Dulles, "staggering under its pact-happy load," could have conceived the address given by the President, who was following the lead of Mr. Dulles and the Pentagon brass on that issue, though not alleviating his responsibility in the matter. Now, the President and everyone else had come around to the fact that Mr. Dulles had the country dangerously "entangled" with Chiang Kai-shek, such that any concession would lose face, strength and prestige in Asia. It would be "appeasement" in the President's conception of the crisis, "which has beaten out of the bush dark and hateful creatures of pre-World War II Europe." The President had asked whether the country remembered Munich as symbolizing a vain hope of appeasing dictators. The piece indicates that indeed it did, but that the world of the ICBM was not the world of Neville Chamberlain or the Nazi Blitzkrieg; nor was Mao Tse-tung Hitler or President Eisenhower Neville Chamberlain.
"The curtains have risen and fallen on catastrophic changes in the power and strategic picture a thousand times since 1938, when the European democracies submitted to the partition of Czechoslovakia." It finds the Communist blitzkrieg against which the U.S. had assumed the international role of St. George to be infinitely more subtle than the strongest military force which Hitler had ever committed to the field. It indicates that its method lay closer to Chinese water-torture, pounding away at minds submerged by hunger, insecurity and hatred of white overlords and that spraying nuclear weapons all over the Formosa Strait would not halt it.
Despite the military posturings, there were clear signs of Chiang's forthcoming fall and any intelligent policy would have long since taken note of what was to happen at that point. But never had the U.S. made a single public utterance on the topic. Broadcast appeals from the Communists went every day to the Chinese on Formosa urging them to return on favorable terms to the mainland, and Nationalist Army plots against Chiang had been hinted. One day the Nationalist leader would go, one way or another, and the puppet of the U.S. would be out of the theatre. "What will we do then?"
The country could continue with its fantastic pretense that by pouring matériel and perhaps American lives into Chiang's arsenal, it would "save" Asia from Communism. It could go on believing that Chiang, who reportedly had slaughtered between 40,000 and 60,000 Formosans to set up the Nationalist regime, was a one-man "Republic of China". It could go on making believe that Formosa, which had been taken from the Japanese, was part of the mainland of China. It could go on making believe that because the Communist Chinese wanted the tiny islands, far from Formosa, which blocked and harassed their ports, they were the "aggressors". "This dead-end cellar is not only without air, it is without hope of light."
The President had at least hinted at negotiations. In 1955, when the same crisis had finally passed, the country was promised negotiations, but the fact was that the U.S. did not want to give up anything and the Administration had not come to the basic realization that in the era of nuclear deterrence, a few territorial concessions did not make any difference in the big picture.
Rowland Evans, Jr., indicates that Vice-President Nixon was the Republican who stood to lose most by the political decline of the Eisenhower Administration and was thus deliberately staking out a program of his own in a way which was unprecedented for a Vice-President. He would likely be offered and would accept important new executive assignments from the President during the final two years of the Administration, the very least which Mr. Nixon could do in an effort to reverse the Administration's falling fortunes while at the same time projecting a fresh and separate image of his own program.
Even Adlai Stevenson, who never held a job in the Truman Administration, had been hard put in 1952 to defend himself against Republican charges of "that mess in Washington."
As Republican heir-apparent who had already been given great responsibilities, Mr. Nixon would find it even more difficult to avoid getting caught in the folds of a tattered Eisenhower mantle, and had to show that if he were minding the store, things would be better. Although the job would be very difficult, several imminent events would make it easier for him both to impress his own political ideas on the Administration and to advertise a strictly made-by-Nixon program, whether acceptable to the Administration or not.
The first such event was the departure, virtually certain, of White House chief of staff Sherman Adams. With him gone from the White House, the President would be more exposed to the practical politics of the Vice-President and would also be less protected from political pressures of top Republicans around the country, almost all of whom, as of the present, were betting on Mr. Nixon to be the party nominee in 1960.
A second such imminent event was, paradoxically, the November midterm elections, in which the Democrats were practically certain to run their margins in Congress close to the spectacular majorities enjoyed during the mid-1930's. Republicans would place the major part of the blame on the President and his policies and would demand that Mr. Nixon, whose political judgment most Republicans respected, should be given a broader policy role. That was likely to occur even if the Republican Party in California, Mr. Nixon's home state, was sunk without a trace in the midterms—as it would be, with both Governor Goodwin Knight losing in the Senate race to Congressman Clair Engle and Senator William Knowland losing in the gubernatorial race to State Attorney General Pat Brown. That result was being accepted as probable by well-informed Republicans and while Mr. Nixon's part in a losing campaign would not help him politically, the President was also going to campaign for the party during the fall and he, rather than the Vice-President, would suffer most from the defeat.
Mr. Nixon had made no effort to conceal his unhappiness with some of the Eisenhower policies during the previous year. He had been the only Republican at the top who recognized the immense military and political significance of the Soviet Sputniks the previous October and had said as much. He had been the only top Republican who pressed for the release of key portions of the Gaither Report so that the frightening picture of the growth of Soviet military and industrial power would become known to the entire country. He was the only senior member of the "team" in the White House to suggest publicly that a large cut in taxes might be needed to remedy the recession. But those had been isolated, ad hoc sentiments.
The planned campaign to put forward a Nixon program had not really begun until recently, when the Vice-President had laid out his economic program before the Harvard Business School, "not as Administration policy" but as Nixon doctrine.
It was apparent that the President had given Mr. Nixon a clear signal to proceed at will in developing and advertising his own political philosophy and he would have little more to say on that point until after the Congressional elections and his trip to Europe late in the fall. Unveiling of his program thus would await the start of the new year and would increase in tempo as the presidential election year of 1960 approached. Regarding executive assignments from the President, the Vice-President's jobs would depend on what new troubles and difficulties the Administration encountered. By every sign, his talents would be used with increasing frequency as the President neared the end of his term of office.
As we have fallen behind, there will be no further notes on the front page or editorial page of this date, as the notes will be sporadic until we catch up.
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