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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1958

Integration Just Can't Be Manufactured

AN effort by thirteen senators to breathe new fire into the great civil rights dragon probably will be drowned in a sea of congressional indifference. Their proposal, more than most, deserves that fate.

The plan, in sum, is to aid with federal money those communities wishing to proceed with integration, and to bring legal action against those that decline either to develop their own integration program or to accept one designed by the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The Cabinet official would be empowered to draw integration plans for local communities which fail to initiate their own.

Some of the proposal's defects are striking. Two of them can be established by a moment's contemplation of a Cabinet official prescribing enrollment procedures of a local school system. The image invites the wrath not only of segregationists opposing federal aid but also of citizens opposing any sort of federal intervention in school affairs. But if these faults, coupled with public weariness with emotional frenzy over the issue, are enough to dispose of the bill, they do not dispose of the fuzzy thinking that frames it.

The thinking is that somehow there can be established by law a federal engine to engage in the manufacture of integrated school districts. This marvelous machine could quickly transform tradition, custom, prejudice, conviction and all the other factors opposing integration into a contrary state. And best of all, it could be created by a majority vote of Congress. If this is an exaggeration, it is not much of one.

There has been, in the less than four years since the Supreme Court decision, a substantial amount of desegregation in the 17-state southern area and the District of Columbia. Some 761 of the 2,980 districts having pupils of both races have been desegregated. Most of this desegregation occurred voluntarily—in the sense that no compulsion was

required other than respect for the Supreme Court or for the place it occupies in the constitutional system. In a few instances desegregation occurred as a result of litigation involving pupils and school boards. A great deal of litigation of this type still is pending, each case of it involving on the defendant's side a belief that the source of his grievance is an unwise, if not unconstitutional, Supreme Court decision. Still it is a legal matter and the amenities are maintained.

But there is a point at which defendant communities could come to feel the law is a tyrant, rather than as an institution that must be respected regardless of individual desires. This point would be reached, we think, when the executive department, sensitive to political winds, began to initiate lawsuits at a wholesale rate. A belief that the South has been singled out as the target of a force bill would be engendered quickly. Increased resistance, rather than submission, would be the result.

And indeed there would be a significant difference between litigation involving pupils vs. school boards, and the federal government vs. school boards. Negro pupils now seeking admission to white schools do so as individuals alleging denial of their rights. What the thirteen senators apparently seek is authority for the executive to seek to force admission of children, not as individuals, but as members of a race.

The executive department has experimented once with forced integration. It has spent well over \$3 million in troops at Little Rock, and is afraid to withdraw them for fear of the consequences. The thirteen senators, of course, are thinking of legal force, but in the present situation the distinction is not worth making. The process of desegregation thus far has involved the courts, pupils and school boards. Its further progress can only be obstructed by the addition to that group of political appointees in the executive department.

Leadership: Less Profile, More Courage

AT the very mention of the words "foreign aid," two thirds of the membership of Congress is apparently gripped by an awful compulsion to bolt for the exits.

For a man who considers himself theointed of the gods, the typical congressman does indeed exhibit a disturbing lack of righteous resolution on the issue. It may be that the ointment is so thick during congressional election years that a certain slipperiness is unavoidable. But the time is rapidly approaching when some simple, everyday courage is going to have to be exhibited in Washington on this question and a few others.

Foreign aid was never a vote-getter. It is somewhat less than hysterically popular in the hinterlands today. But it is one of the icier realities of survival in the space age that a certain amount of technical and economic assistance is going to have to be allotted to friends and allies abroad if the Western bloc is to enjoy even a minimum of security.

Yet trying asking a congressman for a firm commitment on the subject. You are likely to receive for your trouble a more elaborate run-around than a carrousel in the Tuileries. There is fine fever summoned up as time as time, addresses and the Soviet Union but any discernible positive convictions are reserved for God, motherhood and the flag.

Just when we were beginning to despair, along came Sen. Thomas C. Hennings Jr. (D-Mo.) as time as time demonstration of affirmative courage as we have seen in some time. He has resolved to stake out his convictions for the people of his state in a particularly plain-spoken letter, one that is a model of courage and candor.

"To be blunt," he writes, "it is my intention to support a substantial program of foreign aid—or mutual security, as it is more accurately called—with emphasis on economic rather than strictly military aid. This aid should go not only to our present allies in the free world, but

also to the vastly important uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa. I want you to know why I am going to support this costly program."

Sen. Hennings lays his reasons on the line with all the aplomb and confidence of a George Norriss or a Herbert H. La Follette. He also gives the public a quick lesson in political honesty. "This is a time for hard truths," he says. "It is a time when we must call a spade a spade, no matter how unpleasant the process may be. The foreign aid program involves a lot of money. It involves sharing some of our resources with less fortunate countries; in fact, it has often been called a 'give-away.' I cannot agree with this terminology. The communist threat cannot be met by rockets and missiles alone. We can ready our defenses and arm our allies but still lose the struggle."

This is the kind of plain talk and raw political courage the nation needs today. There have been far, far too many soft-pedaling in Washington of late, too many peddling of lightweights with peculiar gifts for snuffling cowardice and second-best choices. "The American statesman is apt to be timid in advocacy as well as in his AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH. Never has this calculated sure been closer to the truth. With the spirit of the Norrises, the La Follettes and the Tafts of American politics becoming little more than a historical memory, timidity has become a way of life on the banks of the Potomac.

Of course, as Allan Nevins says before there can be much character and courage in Congress there must be a great deal of it in the American people. We shall look in vain for these treasures in Washington unless they are scattered widely everywhere from Charlotte to San Diego. We can only hope the American people will have the good sense to nurture courage in their own psyches and to encourage it in those among the appointed. The chain reaction could work wonders at a time like this.

Ike Readies Three-Point Plan For Military Unification

By MARQUIS CHILDS

WASHINGTON
THE broad outlines of President Eisenhower's plan to make over the Department of Defense in order to get a greater degree of unity and cut down inter-service squabbling have now taken form and are being given serious consideration by the top-level committee named by Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy to make recommendations to the President.

While that committee is not bound by the President's thinking, the main points of the Eisenhower outline coincide with the basic views of committee members.

GREAT STRESS

Those close to the President put great stress on the importance of the following:

OFFICER ALLEGIANCE

The three principal points that have figured in the President's discussion of a new try for unification are as follows:

1. General officers of the Army and the Air Force and flag officers of the Navy would in the future be officers of the United States Armed Forces rather than of a particular service. They might continue to wear a braid or a blue uniform but, after achieving the rank of general or admiral, they would cease to have a service connection.

In arguing the need for this change the President points to the practice prevailing among the services in which he served, and the commanders were therefore seriously handicapped in getting unity of action. As Chief of Staff

of the Army General George C. Marshall abolished the separate chiefs, and Eisenhower regards the detachment of flag and general officers from their services as a next step.

KEY WORD

2. The units in a unified command are to be made organic units. The commander of a unit in which all three services may be serving would have full responsibility for promotions, demotions, trial by court-martial and every other detail of service existence. Today the Army officer may be serving under a Navy commander in a unified unit, but he still looks to the Army for advancement.

The key word the President uses is organic. Cited as a horrendous example of a unified command that is not organic is the Continental Air Defense Command, known as CONAD, at Colorado Springs, Colo. The organization chart of CONAD, according to those who have taken part in the White House discussions, is a crazy quagmire that splits authority a dozen ways.

TIGHTER CONTROL

3. The administrative control of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to be greatly strengthened in the most drastic change advanced in the White House talks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have a separate planning staff independent of the services, and strategic plans would both originate and end with this staff. With such a staff the JCS chairman would bear the burden and accept the responsibility in a kind of partnership with the secretary of defense.

The President is impatient with those who argue that such an independent strategic planning staff is unnecessary since the present JCS, with Army, Navy and Air

Force representing their respective services in arriving at strategic objectives, have demonstrated that they are unanimous 80 per cent of the time. This, according to the President, simply means that they do not put the tough ones that cannot be resolved unanimously up to the JCS chief.

MIGHTY OATH

It is on this point of an independent strategic planning staff, responsible only to the chairman of the JCS and the defense secretary, that the opposition in Congress will be heaviest. It goes against the long-standing tradition of Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee and others who have sought a mighty oath to block any plan that seems to be leading in the direction of a single chief of all the services.

But those close to the President say his attitude, too, is stiffening and we can, therefore, expect a fierce struggle in the weeks ahead. On the other hand, if he simply accepts the congressional blockade, he will have to forego any further opportunity to do the job he believed he could do when he came into office.

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'What I Really Want Is A Few Jars Of Instant Science'



People's Platform

Editor, The News:

I WOULD like to ask several questions concerning the TV controversy now raging.

1. What is free TV? Certainly it is not the commercially sponsored programs whose main pitch is toward the listening public who are thereby inveigled into buying their products and who ultimately foot the bill.

2. Are present TV programs practically controlled by the interests of Mr. David Sarnoff, president of National Broadcasting Company, and also of R. C. A. also guided by Mr. Sarnoff, and if so, isn't a government trust-busting job in order to see just why Mr. Sarnoff is so opposed to paid TV sponsored by the Zenth Radio Corp., and possibly others?

3. If "free" TV prevails as it now appears, what can be done to induce the monopolists in this field to give us and our children a better type of "free" TV?

4. Is it not true that "free" TV has been tried and found wanting in that many advertisers are turning away from TV and centering their ads in the great newspapers of the country?

5. If the common people own the air, then shouldn't they be allowed to pass upon the type of air programs that enter their homes in the great competitive spirit that seeks and always finds the truth?

6. Why is it that the great broadcasting form will not permit debate pro and con over



Seen Any Trust-Busters?

their networks? Are they fearful of the verdict of the American people?

—MERCER J. BLANKENSHIP

Nobody's An Ostrich In This Controversy

Editor, The News:

A LONG last, the liberal establishment in and around Mecklenburg is coming out of its corner with its dikes up against this nasty old "reactionary." But then, when one steps on the toes of liberal deities like Truman, F. P. Graham, Roosevelt, Harry Ashmore, etc., 'taint nothin' to do but fight, or "make like the ostrich." And bravo—the liberals ain't ostriches, so I see.

—J. R. CHERRY JR.

Yankees Beginning To See The Light?

Editor, The News:

MUCH talk, much hate between the North and the South.

Let's forget the Civil War. Let's start a new one, bigger and better than the last. Better because the South will win!

Hundreds of thousands of Yankees will fight for our cause now. They are beginning to see the light.

—CHARLIE LITTLE

GOP Sings 'Dixie'

WASHINGTON

FIVE months after Little Rock, the "corps" of the Republican Party in the South is very much alive and kicking.

The obituaries written for the GOP after President Eisenhower's victory in the federal struggle to police the integration of Central High School were, it turns out, a bit premature.

Republicans are optimistic about their long-run chances in the South. This year's campaign will be essentially a holding action, designed to preserve their foothold in Dixie. But it is a holding action Republicans are confident they can win.

There are in GOP congressmen from the South, and even the Democrats concede it will be hard to dislodge them.

GOP TRADITIONS

Five of the seats are in areas with substantial Republican majorities. These are the 1st and 2nd Districts and Kentucky's 8th District—served by Republican Reps. B. Carroll Reece, Howard H. Baker and Eugene N. Sizoo.

These three are in the old-line territory where GOP traditions go back to the Civil War.

Rep. John M. Robinson Jr. (R-Ky.) comes from the Louisville district that has been Republican since 1846, and Rep. Page Belcher (R-Kla.) represents Tulsa and other Republican areas in northern Oklahoma, a district that was actually conceded to the GOP in the 1930 reapportionment.

It's worth noting that these five districts are not particularly "southern" in their viewpoint. Reece, Sizoo, Robinson and Belcher, for instance, voted for the civil rights bill last year.

DIFFERENT CATEGORY

In quite a different category are the other five Republican members from the South. They are:

Rep. Joel T. Broyhill (Va.), from the Washington suburbs; Rep. Richard H. Poff (Va.), from the Roanoke area; Charles Raper Jones (S.C.), Charleston; William C. Cramer (Fla.), from Tampa; S. Petersburg; and Bruce R. Altier (Tex.), of Dallas.

Their districts have no long tradition of Republicanism. Substantial GOP organizations were created in them for the first time in the Eisenhower campaign of 1952. The President swept all five districts from the past.

With that, he took the bill and Poff—the latter two by the narrowest of margins.

In 1954, they were reflected with heavy majorities and Cramer.

The Lively Corpse

By CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY

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After four or six years in office, Democrats concede the five are stronger than their party in their own districts. They have taken themselves with causes and projects that command broad support. Their margins of victory increased in 1956, ranging from 13,000 to 26,000 votes. They can take some defections without defeat.

3. All five have reputations as moderates in their districts. If the Democrats try to beat them with extreme segregationists, the Republicans stand to gain some middle-of-the-road or liberal Democratic votes.

Republican leaders have scant hopes for 1958 beyond holding their current seats in the South. Little Rock, they report, has made it hard to build organizations or find new candidates in segregation-conscious areas.

But for 1960 and later years, they still have big plans. Their reasoning: Aside from civil rights the Republican Party nationally is much closer to southern conservative, sales-right thinking than the national Democratic Party.

mer and Alger—building on the Eisenhower organizations—joined them.

These Republican newcomers—pl. of whom were elected in 1956—are in a vulnerable position in 1958, but officials of both parties gave Congressional Quarterly three reasons why they will be hard to beat.

1. All five have voted as southerners on the sensitive civil rights issue. They backed the jury trial amendment—offered on the House floor by Poff—and voted against the civil rights bill. All but Alger signed the Southern Manifesto in 1956. They are in a strong position to maintain that, at least as far as they are concerned, civil rights is not a partisan issue.

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