



## THE CHARLOTTE NEWS

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MONDAY, JANUARY 13, 1958

### The Task Of A Legislative Strong Man

THE image of "Johnson For President" banners loom large in the crystal balls of assorted political seers these days.

The senator from Texas surely is not displeased, for consciously or not he has helped himself with speculation as to his ambitions. His address to the Democratic caucus as Congress opened was in effect his own state of the union message. It preceded the President's and in some areas of the nation won as much newspaper space as if not as much attention, as did the President's message.

This bid for public recognition of the decisive role the Senate majority leader plays in Congress is a promising reminder of the fact that the President does not solely determine the destiny of the nation. While it is true that the nation cannot go forward without a strong President, it also is true that the nation cannot go forward without a strong Congress.

### An Agenda For An Idle Commission

THE Civil Rights Commission, which is still having trouble getting cranked up, might profitably consult with Illinois Sen. Paul Douglas.

The commission, needing a staff director now that it has a chairman, can't find one. The Congress, not wanting a renewed national debate on civil rights, is about to be offered one by Sen. Douglas in a new civil rights bill. Perhaps if the commission and the senator got together and discussed his bill the desire of both to do something could be satisfied.

A suitable discussion topic would be the question of the effectiveness of civil rights legislation. There is no doubt that the passage of legislation designed to secure civil rights to all individuals satisfies the demands both of politics and of conscience in the Congress. But many instances of proof to the contrary, that such legislation is effective when passed in periods of animosity and unrest. Timing is important to the success of any legislation, and particularly to social legislation.

The aftermath of Little Rock, as the Congress and even the Justice Department seem to agree, is no time to pour new salt over a still raw wound. That agreement exists is the basis for the long-time advocates of integration whose beliefs have been articulated, as have the senator's, over a long span of years.

One such advocate is Mrs. Ames E. Meyer, wife of the publisher of the Washington Post who complains in the current ATLANTIC MONTHLY of the New

York Board of Education's plan to make every school contain one-third whites, one-third Negroes and one-third Puerto Ricans. Said Mrs. Meyer:

"If considered, hasty attempts at integration, especially when carried out in impoverished and overcrowded schools, instead of furthering the education of the Negro will surely result in the retardation of all students, white and Negro, and in the rather than alleviating racial tensions. Before our emotions become overwrought, we were committed to the expansion and improvement of our public schools as educational institutions where the young can learn to live together not as blacks and whites but as Americans citizens. This is still our first objective. The education of the white child must not be sacrificed for the Negro, nor that of the Negro for the white, or both races will lose and the future of our nation will be imperiled."

When it comes to the Negro, we must not allow the process of desegregation to wreck our public school system."

Mrs. Meyer, in other words, sees clearly that action in volatile areas of social affairs is not always preferable nor even more conscientious than inaction. Apparently she is rather to temper her convictions with common sense.

When it does find a staff director the Civil Rights Commission will be looking about for witnesses and testimony. A nomination of Mrs. Meyer for the witness chair seems in order.

But there was no lasting satisfaction in this rather ridiculous episode for Gen. Gavin, the Army or the public. The Army has lost, besides a fair measure of its dignity, a valuable and brilliant officer whose talents seemed attuned to the missile as the armed services are now entering. As chief of Army research and development since 1955, Gavin had won

a reputation for driving dedication to work and for daring and creative thinking. These attitudes had made him popular in the Army even with some officers who were rattled by his tendency toward blunt talk.

Precisely these same attitudes now seem to have made his exit from the Pentagon hierarchy inevitable, and it is just as well. The Army can hardly remain in the position of bargaining in public with this or that generalship put up as a prize.

But if Washington really values Gen. Gavin's abilities, it ought to be able to find a way to use them. Much of the defense effort is presided over by civilians. Ultimately the state of readiness of U. S. defenses will be decided by civilians. An important civilian named Gavin might, it is to be feared, be frustrated by the unwieldy Pentagon bureaucracy as was the general named Gavin.

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By STEWART ALSOP

WASHINGTON

WHEN that tactless fellow, former Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, was asked whether he considered a defense budget of \$40 billion too high, he replied: "I wouldn't think so. That would hardly cover the increased cost of inflation."

Charles Wilson's words are worth bearing in mind, in trying to get the reality that lies behind the fine words of the President's state of the union message. Budgets are boring, at least to people. But the defense budget does provide a fairly accurate measuring stick of the national response to the Soviet challenge.

The President's supplemental response for this fiscal year raises the current defense budget some \$1.3 billion above the previous, or Wilson, level. The neighborhood of \$40 billion is the target of the defense budget for the next fiscal year will also be close to the \$40 billion mark. How much of a step-up in the national defense effort does a \$40 billion defense budget really represent? The answer seems to be that the new level does not really represent any sharp increase in the

overall defense effort at all, but only a shift of emphasis. Take the projected 1959 defense spending budget. It is expected to include about \$700 million more for personnel. The will involve some needed extra butter for those who get the raise. But it will provide no new guns.

Thus the real increase in expenditures for actual hardware over the Wilson level will be under \$1 billion in fiscal 1959. As Wilson so tactlessly said, this will "hardly cover the increased cost of inflation." The fact is that, instead of buying a lot more defense, the administration means to buy a somewhat different kind of defense.

PLANES CUT BACK

Take the Air Force as an example. The Air Force share of the new budget will be about \$19 billion, a proportion now long sanctified by tradition. Included in this share are big increases for such Air Force missiles as Atlas and Thor. But these increases will be balanced by sharp cutbacks in spending for manned aircraft, notably the B-34 strategic bomber, the basic weapon of the Strategic Air Command. An arbitrary upper limit of about 600 planes has been set for SAC's B-32s. This will mean that further

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CHARLES E. WILSON  
Words Worth Remembering

purchases of B-52s will end in the coming fiscal year. The increased missile effort will also be financed out of our already depleted conventional forces. Still another cut of 100,000 in military personnel is contemplated. At the same time, the cut will doubtless be largely at the expense of the Army ground

forces, which partly explains the despair of such Army men as Gen. James Gavin. For our ability to fight limited wars will be further reduced, at a time when our nuclear missiles are beginning to make unlimited nuclear war a suicidal alternative.

COSTLY BASES

Even the increased emphasis on missiles does not really represent an all-out effort. For example, Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas has predicted that we will be producing operational Atlas missiles before 1960. His forecast may have been optimistic, but it was perfectly serious — the schedule calls for test-firing an Atlas over the full 5000 mile course this year. But a missile like Atlas is of little use unless it is supported by an enormously complex base system which takes years to build.

Each base costs about \$100 million. Because the prospects for the Atlas were thought to be so good, it was proposed by the Air Force to start work immediately on six more bases. For economy reasons, serious work is to be started on only one base. It looks like the Air Force will fairly near future we will be producing many more ICBMs than we shall have bases from

which to fire them — which is an odd sort of economy.

PARTIAL EFFORT

In this and other ways, the effort even in the newly fashionable missile field is far less than total. It will be said — correctly — that \$40 billion is a lot of money. But power is a relative matter, and the only realistic way to measure our defense effort is in terms of the power of our potential enemy. The Rockefeller Fund panel, which measured our defense in those terms, asked for an immediate increase in the order of \$3 billion. The Gaither Committee, which did a similar job, reached a similar conclusion, asking for graduated increases up to \$8 billion over the current level. Both groups also urged a major effort to ensure our ability to fight limited wars.

Perhaps it is too early to judge, particularly now that defense has become what it would have been, but for the timidity of most Democrats, years ago a major national political issue. But as of today, our "bold, new" defense program looks neither very bold nor very new. It looks like a slightly the same old product, but somewhat redesigned, and put into a bright new package.

FINE HOUR

He even interjected the word "delicious" into his opening remarks, a word always easy for speakers who have not had a vascular spasm with attendant trouble over some other place. He spoke with a vigor clearly designed to be reassuring, and it was, though he lagged somewhat as he spoke, a fine hour.

It was a very fine hour. Whatever it may mean politically, if anything, it still speaks well for the country.

THE CHEERS

It seems to be that he has got to give and when he walked up the aisle of the House to give it, the whole Congress broke into a cheering chorus. His members may not follow him as in the past — their post mortems on the speech were not as glowing as they had been for 45 minutes they did not let him down.

When he coughed, they cheered so he could catch his breath. They

noise bothered their hangovers and they knocked off.

The time for evacuation came, and most of us could be flown out. There was an overflow. So Master Harry Murdock of Nevada, Master George Dixon of King Features, me for United Features, and Missus Bessie Felm for the ride, took off with the American military attaché at the helm for an overnight motor trip. The military attaché promptly took off his gold hat. He had been shot at before.

COLD COPY

All I remember of the trip was a series of roadblocks, during which some harrowed Indian with a nervous trigger finger always seemed to point his musket at Mr. Dixon's ample middle, making Mr. Dixon a touch nervous and, of course, that we stopped at an inn and had a very pleasant lunch and sang a great many revolutionary-type songs.

But when we arrived in Caracas, everybody had a flock of "Hose" cables, as our various offices screamed for hot copy. There wasn't any hot copy, but it was warm down there and cold back home, we made up some amazing stuff.

BIG BAR BILL

My contribution was the invention of a casualty. Concepcion Gonzales, aged 18, daughter of a barber, who was shot in the foot. I believe Concepcion made the front page of the good, gray New York Times. The bar bill mounted on so did the fictional content of the file.

Eventually we all left, laden with honor and little gold flowers with peaks in them, and to leave such a pleasant revolution, but happy to have prevented bloodshed. These days, when the Conception Gonzales award is one of the Sons of the Venezuelan Revolution meets, it is difficult to separate truth from fiction. It was pretty difficult to years ago, too.

Quote, Unquote

"It is far easier to write ten passably effective sonnets, good enough to take in the not too inquisitive, than to write one effective advertisement that will take in a few thousand of the uncritical buying public!" — Aldous Huxley.

### U.S. Can Use Gavin In Civilian Dress

DESPITE his forebodings over the future of the shrinking Army, Gen. James M. Gavin must have found just a little bit of personal satisfaction in his prolonged and dramatic leave-taking last week.

Over a period of four days he told off his superiors, aroused the outspoken sympathy of Congress, proved the loyalty of a four-star generalship, refused it and went away with praise ringing in his ears. This was no mean feat for a former private. It seemed like a Walter Mitty dream come true.

But there was no lasting satisfaction in this rather ridiculous episode for Gen. Gavin, the Army or the public. The Army has lost, besides a fair measure of its dignity, a valuable and brilliant officer whose talents seemed attuned to the missile as the armed services are now entering. As chief of Army research and development since 1955, Gavin had won

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Precisely these same attitudes now seem to have made his exit from the Pentagon hierarchy inevitable, and it is just as well. The Army can hardly remain in the position of bargaining in public with this or that generalship put up as a prize.

But if Washington really values Gen. Gavin's abilities, it ought to be able to find a way to use them. Much of the defense effort is presided over by civilians. Ultimately the state of readiness of U. S. defenses will be decided by civilians. An important civilian named Gavin might, it is to be feared, be frustrated by the unwieldy Pentagon bureaucracy as was the general named Gavin.

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But if Washington really values Gen. Gavin's abilities, it ought to be able to find a way to use them. Much of the defense effort is presided over by civilians. Ultimately the state of readiness of U. S. defenses will be decided by civilians. An important civilian named Gavin might, it is to be feared, be frustrated by the unwieldy Pentagon bureaucracy as was the general named Gavin.

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