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JACKALS AND WOLVES

A TERM that you may be tired of — is "calculated risk." Not only have we grown weary of hearing the same two words applied to practically every international decision, but our displeasure is heightened by the fact that we live in a time when "calculated risks" are necessary.

But, to employ the term, we once again face a calculated risk — one of long standing. The risk is Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia.

We stand to gain a valuable ally against Russia's might if we butter-up the rather repugnant Balkan (this is the largest, best trained army in Europe).

We stand to lose our total investment in Yugoslavia if Tito proves treacherous and, at the same time, expose Greece, Turkey, Italy and Austria to Yugoslav pressure.

The reason given for "trusting" Tito is that he needs us as badly — if not worse — than we need him. Relations between Uncle Joe in Moscow and Nephew Tito in Belgrade are sorely strained. Tito believes that Stalin

is ready to send the armies of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. He must have news from the West to withstand that triple threat.

The reason given for distrusting Tito is that, despite the family quarrel, Tito is still a Marxist (a particularly aggressive one at that) and Yugoslavia is still a Communist nation; it might take only a word from Moscow — via the Cominform — to bring about a reunion of the Yugoslav dictator with the Soviet bloc.

This week Tito's foreign minister, Edward Kardelj, told the joint foreign affairs committee of the Yugoslav Parliament that the chief of staff of the Yugoslav army is in the U. S. "buying" arms. The U. S. State Department's attitude seems to be that we will have to let Tito have what we can; the American people can only recognize the logic of that position and realize that sometimes it's necessary to tolerate the jackals to discourage the wolves.

'SEPARATE BUT EQUAL' SINCE 1849

FEW other than students of legal history realize that the "separate but equal" doctrine argued most recently before a three-judge Federal Court in the *Clarendon, S. C.* County school case has stood for more than 100 years.

The doctrine was promulgated in 1849 by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in ruling that segregation of whites and Negroes in the Boston schools was within the power of the school committee. The case was that of *Roberts v. City of Boston*.

The case was brought by Benjamin Roberts, a Boston Negro leader, for his daughter who was refused admission to any primary white schools in Boston. He was told that his daughter might be admitted at any time to the Negro school.

The issue, he said, was one of power, because, if they (the committee) have the legal authority, the expediency of exercising it in any particular way is exclusively with them. This was stated as a fixed legal fact.

He proceeds to discuss the principle advanced by Sumner that by the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons were equal before the law.

"This as a broad general principle, such as ought to appear in a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound; it is not only expressed in legal, but pervades and animates the whole spirit of our Constitution and of free government. But, when this great principle comes to be applied to actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political power, and that children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights to all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law, for their maintenance and security. What these rights are, to which individuals, in the infinite variety of circumstances by which they are surrounded, are entitled, must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations and conditions."

He declared that separate schools for Negro children were not a violation of "equal rights, constitutional and political, civil and social."

Prejudice, he said, "is not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law. It is a feeling which would likely be fostered by compelling colored and white children to associate together in the same schools."

Chief Justice Shaw's opinion was cited first in 1872 by the high court of the Territory of Nevada. Two years later the California Supreme Court also concurred in the doctrine.

Lower Federal Courts twice in recent years have met with similar results. In the *Plessy vs. Ferguson* case, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld Shaw's opinion as a precedent of state legislation which required segregation of the white and Negro races "in places where they are liable to be brought into contact."

And the *Plessy* case itself is the leading authority on the constitutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine.

More than a simple reason to suspect the Kremlin's motives in raising the Atlantic Pact question as a casual afterthought in the Paris conference. Even so, an agreement to discuss whether to discuss it would commit the West to nothing except a lot of Russian talk which would undoubtedly be forthcoming anyway. The agenda has been invented that will prevent a Russian diplomat from discussing something he has been instructed to discuss. Why permit the Atlantic Pact question to be a stumbling block?

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A Report From Washington

Interest in MacArthur Inquiry Wanes

By TOM SCHLESINGER

MOST politicians here believe that the public is becoming a bit tired of the prolonged MacArthur investigation, and the lawmakers are pointing to it as one of the reasons for the lack of current legislation from the Senate side of the Hill.

Senator Hoey was among those this week who pointed up the issue. He observed that the regular work of important committees — the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations which are jointly hearing the testimony — was, in effect, at a standstill. He added that many members of both groups also were unable to meet with their other committees to help draw up legislation.

Despite the increasing pressure for a return to the usual round of business, MacArthur hearings don't appear in the office as yet.

The senior North Carolina Senator, incidentally, isn't entirely sold on the hearings.

He says that they have given the public a better understanding of the whole Korean situation, "but I don't think it is a good policy to exploit our global strategy and our reasons for adjusting international affairs, before the world."

As to the results of the inquiry, Senator Hoey feels that it has been demonstrated that the Administration's policy in Korea meets with the approval of the responsible government military and civilian chiefs.

June 30 with 410 billion as compared with last year's 353 billion bill.

SENATOR SMITH may again find himself lined up with Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.) in another of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee's tangles with the Administration.

Last February, McCarran named Senators Homer Ferguson (R-Mich.), Harley M. Kilgore (D-W.Va.) and Smith to a subcommittee to look into the self-incrimination and immunity problems of witnesses appearing before Congressional committees.

They have as yet to take official action, but one result of their work may have been the bill introduced by McCarran which would grant a blanket immunity only to committee witnesses once they claimed the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

The Senate Crime Committee and the Justice Dept. have been working on an Administration-sponsored bill which would permit the Attorney General at his own discretion to grant immunity from prosecution in Federal courts to important witnesses before Congress committees, courts or Federal grand jury.

McCarran is reported ready to oppose the Administration measure because the Attorney General has an executive officer — rather than a legislative one — has the say-so on Congressional witnesses.

PAUL GREEN unveiled his drastically redesigned "Faith of Our Fathers" last week-end before spectators which filled about half the 4,056 seats of the open-air Carter Barron Memorial Amphitheater here.

The historical pageant received a kid-glove approval from critics of the four papers who agreed to review the production. The critics said that the script, the pageant drama bids every one to forget the laws and vicissitudes of last year's abbreviated run.

"Whether the bill will be accepted, of course, remains to be seen but the odds in favor of it are improved."

A Star editorial commented "the new show is more dramatic, less pompously propagandistic."

The Times-Herald lamented that Washington citizens showed "too little faith in 'Faith of Our Fathers'." His only reaction was that the play itself was termed "an impressive spectacle."

McMormick To Nominate Own Candidate

McMormick, potent publisher of The Chicago Tribune, was waging on some secret strategy which he hopes will throw the Presidency of the United States into his lap in 1952.

On the surface McMormick gives all signs of backing his good friend, Sen. Bob Taft. Actually, however, McMormick favors his able, up-and-coming protégé, Sen. Everett Dirksen, the recently-elected senator from Pekin, Ill.

At the Chicago convention in 32, he will work for a deadlock between the two leading candidates — probably Taft and Eisenhower. Once he's maneuvered the convention into a stalemate, he will pass out word that the only way to break the deadlock is to nominate Senator Dirksen.

If this deadlock does develop, Dirksen might have a chance of securing nomination. He's a well-known and well-liked figure in top Republican circles. And since the convention will be in Chicago, there's bound to be a lot of Dirksen supporters in the galleries.

NOTE — The irony is that Dirksen by himself would be a good President; Dirksen bogged down by Chicago Tribune policies would not.

Drew Pearson's Merry-Go-Round

WHEN Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon asked Secretary of State Acheson about the China lobby during one of the closed-door sessions of the MacArthur hearings, he had a chin a pin drop.

For the China lobby has become at the same time one of the most sacrosanct and most powerful in Washington. It is sacrosanct because so many Senators have been influenced by it, have close friends in it, or have received actual campaign contributions from it.

It is powerful because it has the millions of Chiang Kai-shek's brothers-in-law behind it, plus some of the most potent political figures in Washington. It is powerful because its Secretary of Defense, for instance, has been the personal attorney for Chiang's millionaire brother-in-law, Dr. H. H. Kung.

As a result of its powers, many observers believe that a lot of the agitation over Formosa, aid to Chiang, etc., stems originally from the China lobby. Yet few people on Capitol Hill say much about the lobby, and it has never been investigated.

That was why there was a long silence when Senator

Morse popped his question. That was also why the silence was broken by a surprised whistle from Sen. Brian McMahon of Connecticut. And that may or may not have been Chairman Russell of Georgia tapped his gavel and said:

"The Senator has exceeded his time, and will have to ask the question tomorrow if he wishes."

He Lectured Peron

NOT many people have told President Peron of Argentina what they thought of him face to face. However, this was what William J. Kennedy, chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board, did during a recent visit to Argentina as a U. S. delegate to the Inter-American Conference on Social Security.

Kennedy, a wiry, gray-haired man who likes to speak his mind, collided Peron at an official dinner and in the presence of one other person — an interpreter — proceeded to give him a brisk lecture on freedom of the press. He was in mind, of course, Peron's closing of the great opposition newspaper, La Prensa.

"Don't you realize that a little opposition is a good thing?" Kennedy asked Peron. "Don't you realize that Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President of the United States not once, twice or three times, but four times, even though he was opposed by the great majority of our newspapers?"

"Constructive criticism from the press or any other source has never harmed anyone," continued the American official.

Kennedy was sincerely trying to find out what defense, if any, Peron would offer for closing La Prensa, other than the newspaper's criticism of his totalitarian policies. However, Peron didn't attempt to defend himself.

Though Kennedy's two-fold remarks were carefully translated by the interpreter, President Peron made no reply. His only reaction was an enigmatic smile, even when Kennedy taunted him.

"The trouble with you, Mr. President, is that you've got a Nolan chin."

— On returning to the United States, Kennedy told a friend: "Peron's government does a lot of boasting about how the 'dignity of man' must be protected. However, the difficulty in the world today is that we fail to realize that there can be no dignity where there is no freedom."

Just What Was So Necessary About Concessions At Yalta?

By ROBERT C. RUARK

ONE OF THE salient points of Dean Acheson's recent testimony before the House subcommittee on the Yalta conference, which gave the Russians a firm foothold in Asia, were mandatory, or even necessary.

Secretary Acheson has testified that we offered up the concessions because we thought Russian intervention in the war against Japan was vital to our welfare; that we did not even know at that time whether the atom bomb would work. So we hauled off and sold out a flock of interests to allow a slow of poor relations to crowd in on the bill.

At the time of the Yalta conference the United States owned full title to the greatest land-and-sea force ever compiled. The Germans had blown. Apart from the polish-off, the Japs had had it too. Their navy was wrecked, and so was their service of supply. Their air force was down to semi-obsolete planes, inexperienced pilots, and last-moment bravado born of desperation.

Their elite troops were either dead or hyped up to semiautism. And it didn't matter, really, whether we knew the A-bomb would work or wouldn't. We had the alternate machinery, which we proceeded to use, to fry Japan into submission.

NO ACTUAL NECESSITY

We were not faced with the actual necessity of invasion, finally. We could beat Japan to death from the air, and we could blockade it into starvation, and wreck it coastwise with gunfire, and murder what little industry it had left. Believe me when I say that after the late fall of 1944 the Japs had so little shipping that they were cruising around on the surface, firing deck guns at sampans, for fun.

We Americans were huffy as bulls. Considering the millions of men under arms, we had lost but a handful. We had suffered no direct attack on our continent. Our economy was in much stronger shape than today. There was maximum work going on in the home. Russia had been cruelly punished by the Germans. How many millions of their best manhood was

lost never will be accurately known. Its civilian population had fought as rough a war as its military. Its earth was scorched and it had been kept alive, mechanically, by the aid of the convoys first through the North Atlantic and then through the Persian Gulf.

Add it up for yourself: a depleted ally in Russia. Two whipped enemies. Maximum mobilization and maximum production plus minimum casualties for us, with the A-bomb up the sleeve like a derrier.

Yet we back off from Berlin to let them in. And we give them footholds in Asia which they don't deserve, and which they turn into weapons later on. It doesn't make sense. Any more than the crack about we didn't know the A-bomb would work. We didn't need the bomb and we knew bloody well it would work. Science was too far along with it at that point for complete conjecture.

A heavyweight champion does not need to sell a pair of his pants proceeds to a midget, unless business is being done that is not based on the champion's performance. And at the time of Yalta we were the champs, with the opponents groggy, and Russia was just about as groggy as the opponents. Ergo: business was done.

DON'T BE INSULTING

My intelligence stands not so high as a hub but I hate to have it insulted. As a minor naval officer, even I knew the war was won as early as autumn, 1944. I knew it, it is a cinch the top dogs knew it. And at no time after Normandy did the Russians figure too heavily into our practical scheme.

I would never call the Secretary of State a liar but I can call him awful dumb if he believes what he is saying or believed what he was being told at the time of Yalta. Because even the average G. I. would tell you real quick that you don't pay a dangerous premium for what you already got. Stashed away in your hip pocket, unless you are shooting a cute angle. And we've given the world away at Yalta, somebody in there was shooting a cute angle.

GRIN 'N' BEAR IT



"The hours I spent slaving over our first dinner... and all you do is sit there and eat it!"

Johnston Vs. Wilson

AFTER Defense Mobilizer Charles E. Wilson and Economic Stabilizer Eric Johnston issued their denial of a columnist's report that they were feuding, Newsweek wrote the following:

"Despite repeated denials, official relations between Wilson and Johnston have been strained for some time. And although both men have tried to smooth things over, their approach to some mobilization problems differs sufficiently to threaten an open break at any time. . . .

"When labor walked out on the mobilization program, Johnston got the job as peacekeeper. During the negotiations which followed, the suspicion arose among Wilson's staff that Johnston was trying to promote himself into the No. 1 mobilization post. During the negotiations, Johnston visited the White House several times to confer with Charles S. Murphy, a Presidential assistant assigned to the labor case. Then, on March 15, Johnston flew to New West for a discussion on the whole problem with the President. On his return, Johnston found Wilson upset over the continuing reports that the former was trying to 'knife' him.

"The showdown came in Wilson's old State Dept. building offices, at which time Johnston assured the mobilization boss that he had no designs on his job. Both agreed to forget the reports.

"But shortly thereafter, another pressure point — the removal of Wall Street's Sidney Rosenberg (Wilson's closest adviser) will help to heal relations between the mobilizer and the stabilizer. But insiders who work with both fear that they eventually will split completely on some specific issue. At that point, one or the other might be forced to quit.

NOTE — It's significant that the above was written one week after the vigorous Wilson-Johnston denial that they were feuding.

THE DIPLOMACY OF RELUCTANCE

A DREAMLIKE quality has marked Big Four negotiations for a foreign ministers' conference ever since they started last Winter.

At the outset, Soviet Russia was urgently demanding a conference, and the Western powers were cool. Today the West is demanding a conference, and Soviet Russia is cool.

For nearly three months deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Britain, France and the United States have been meeting in Paris to arrange a list of subjects for the foreign ministers to discuss. They have agreed on all but two questions: how to phrase the subject of disarmament, and whether to discuss the Atlantic Pact.

As to disarmament, the deputies finally agreed. The Western powers proposed, and Russia at length consented, to report that the deputies were unable to agree on the phrasing of this subject. Both versions were to be transmitted to the foreign ministers for them to thrash out when they met.

The Kremlin, however, attached a rider. In return for this agreement to disagree, the Russians asked for another. They urged that the deputies also agree to report that they were unable to agree whether the Atlantic Pact should be discussed, and that this, too, should be checked up to the big conference. Mr. Gromyko well knew, of course, that if the Western ministers started talking about the Atlantic Pact, they would be discussing the Atlantic Pact, they

THE DIPLOMACY OF RELUCTANCE

would therupon be discussing the Atlantic Pact.

So the West balked. Mr. Gromyko refused to sign the agreement, and the matter stalled. In an effort to bring things to a head, the Western powers have now sent notes to Moscow urging a conference on the basis of any of three agendas, none of which mentions the Atlantic Pact.

The simplest reason to suspect the Kremlin's motives in raising the Atlantic Pact question as a casual afterthought in the Paris conference. Even so, an agreement to discuss whether to discuss it would commit the West to nothing except a lot of Russian talk which would undoubtedly be forthcoming anyway. The agenda has been invented that will prevent a Russian diplomat from discussing something he has been instructed to discuss. Why permit the Atlantic Pact question to be a stumbling block?

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