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A BREAK WITH TRADITION

THE University of North Carolina took the only honorable course, and the only course consistent with a recent resolution of the Board of Trustees, when it accepted into the University Medical College a Negro premedical student now enrolled at Greensboro A. & T. College.

The decision broke a 162-year-old tradition of segregation at the State university. It was also the first time a Southern university has voluntarily admitted a Negro graduate or professional student without being forced to by a Federal Court ruling.

The most significant aspect of the incident is the speed with which the University conformed to the Trustees' resolution, adopted just three weeks ago. That resolution said:

"In all cases of application for admission by members of racial groups, other than the white race, to the professional or graduate schools where such schools are not provided by and in the State of North Carolina for such racial groups, the applications will be processed without regard to color or race, and the applicant accepted or rejected in accordance with the approved rules and standards of admission for the particular school."

At the time the resolution was adopted, there was some speculation in State papers that it may have been designed as a weapon to combat admission suits. It was hinted that the State attorney-general would be able to argue that Negroes were being rejected only because they were not qualified.

Fortunately the lie has been given to such speculation. The integrity of the University of North Carolina was at stake in this issue. That integrity remains unblemished.

The student—30-year-old Edward O. Diggs—appears to be eminently qualified. His scholastic record is good. His war service was good. And his enterprise in carrying a full-time job with the Greensboro Railway Post Office Terminal to pay for his education at A. & T. and support his wife and three children is highly commendable.

Diggs had already been accepted by the University of Chicago and Meharry Medical College at Nashville, Tenn. He preferred to study at UNC "because North Carolina is my home", a statement that points up one more reason why the Trustees' decision was a wise one, i. e., the need for training Negro leaders of the future and keeping them at home.

THE MIDDLE WAY

ALTHOUGH it has been said that "grey is the free man's color," Americans customarily prefer black or white. With us, the middle way is sadly wanting in popular (and so in political) appeal.

In other words, we go to extremes. On issues of domestic and foreign policy, public sentiment polarizes at the extremities. Thus our great debates are invariably acrimonious, tumultuous. If often they end in our adoption of the middle course, it is usually because opposing forces shout each other down.

This American proneness to extremes explains, in some measure, why our postwar policy vis-a-vis Russia has failed to fire the imagination of the country, why it lacks ardent, impassioned advocates, why it gets from us at best grumbling acquiescence.

For this policy is in essence compromise. It derives from realistic recognition of the fact that at times the half loaf must be taken, that we are sometimes truly victorious if we escape disastrous defeat. It attempts to strike some workable balance between our tasks in the world and our present power.

Now this policy is doubtless wise. If their reason alone be appealed to, most Americans would probably approve its premises, albeit with reluctance. But the American, like other men, rarely bases decisions on reason alone. Emotion usually dictates his first—and sometimes, his last—position.

This is especially true of American attitudes about the Korean imbroglio, the emotional reactions to which are heightened by the fact that American boys are dying there. "Let's either lick 'em, or get the hell out of there," the average American says. The paradox that there are positive values in the "negative war" we have lately been fighting, that stalemate may in the larger sense be victory, bounces off his mind like sleet off the windowpane.

Leaving out of account for the moment the unhappy contrast between the personalities involved, this American characteristic largely explains the apotheosis of General MacArthur. It may very well be true, as Elmer Davis says, that the difference between President Truman and General MacArthur is that, where the former seeks to wage a 50 per cent war, the latter favors a 75 per cent war. But such nice distinctions are lost sight of—are perhaps purposely obscured by the General, who is not above demagogy—in the giant ovation greeting his words before the Congress. "War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision." That is dynamic: that is what the American, victorious in every war since 1812, wants to hear.

Yet the orgy of hysterico-religious adulation attending MacArthur's return and his appearance before Congress does not alter the hard fact that, if the free world is to be finally victorious in the struggle with Communist imperialism, it must just now pursue some middle course between all-out war and abject appeasement.

But in free nations the effectiveness of policy is directly proportionate to the popular support it enjoys.

Thus the question arises: can this middle way be made dynamic enough to enlist the emotional, as well as the intellectual, support of the people?

In *Peace Can Be Won*, Paul G. Hoffman, successful business leader whose outstanding work as administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration gave the free world its greatest single victory over Russia so far, says emphatically that it can. The book is reviewed elsewhere on this page. It merits a careful and thoughtful reading.

SCRATCH ONE BOTTLENECK

FOR MORE than a century, there has been talk, talk, talk about eliminating some of the railroad bottlenecks that choke Charlotte's business district on the east and west. But the talk brought no action—until the people were given a chance to vote on a bond issue for that purpose last year. They approved it enthusiastically.

It has taken Engineer Frank Miller many months to complete the plans for the Stonewall project. And it will be many more months until the contract let yesterday is completed.

Even so, it is a source of real gratification that a start has been made, and that the city's No. 1 bottleneck was selected to initiate the broader program. Extension of Stonewall St. from Independence Boulevard to the business district will give the city a new artery of large traffic-carrying ability. It should substantially eliminate the present congestion on Morehead, 4th and Trade Sts.

Commendations to the City Council for pushing this project are in order. We would suggest, however, as we have suggested so often in the past, that the elimination of grade crossings, if it is to accomplish the desired results, must be accompanied by an aggressive off-street parking program. After all, what is the use of opening up new thoroughfares to the business district if there is no place for the motorist to park after he gets there?

ODE TO '52

WASHINGTON — (AP) — Gov. W. Kerr Scott of North Carolina said today that President Truman would "suit" him as a candidate for re-election next year, and indicated that he wouldn't mind running for Vice-President, himself. (News Item).

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The Governor from North Carolina
Thought nothing could ever be fina
Than to put Harry back
In that little white shack
To keep us from conflict with China.

But the Guv'ner from North Carolina
Could find not a single co-signa
So when asked "Who'll V-P.?"
He responded "Why me!"
With a smile that could not be benigna.

POLITICS TAKES A BACK SEAT

IN REFRESHING contrast to some recent appointments, the City Council yesterday put politics aside in naming five outstanding men to the new auditorium-coliseum authority.

The Council accepted suggestions from interested individuals and organizations, instead of rewarding personal and political friends.

Voting was done by open voice ballot, instead of secret written ballot.

To fix the terms of the top five men, the eminently fair method of drawing by lot was used.

As a result, Claude A. Cochran was selected for a five-year term, James P. McMillan for a four-year term, Thomas A. Little for a three-year term, George F. Stratton for a two-year term, and Arthur R. Newcombe for a one-year term.

All five men meet the three basic requirements for appointment to a semi-autonomous city commission—ability, interest, and adequate time. The building of the $3 million structure will be a major undertaking, but its operation on a sound business basis will offer an even greater challenge, especially during the first few years.

The Council set a high standard in making these appointments. Let us hope that standard will never be lowered.

Having successfully mediated the Indonesian dispute and the Alaskan labor squabble, Dr. Frank Graham is about to try his hand in Kashmir. That's fine, but isn't there a job for him closer home, say, getting the Democrats and Republicans together on foreign policy?

A Democrat, Martin H. Kennelly, has been re-elected mayor of Chicago, and we haven't heard a single Republican say what this indicates.—*Lexington (Ky.) Herald.*

The Price Has Increased Since Early Days Of 1946

By JOSEPH ALSOP

TEHERAN

HERE IN Teheran, where every incident of the current crisis is pregnant with menace of future disaster, this reporter is constantly reminded of a scene long past. The time was during the Iranian crisis of 1941. The place, the gloomy Secretary of State's chamber in the British Foreign Office; the speaker, old Ernest Bevin.

First Bevin disclosed that the British cabinet had just decided to occupy southern Iran if necessary, rather than let the Soviets seize the British oil resources through a puppet government — a fact worth remembering today. Then, haltingly, roughly, yet convincingly, he expounded a great scheme of social reform and economic improvement, to halt the progressive deterioration of the whole Middle Eastern structure.

But Bevin, with an air of deep discouragement, he abruptly dismissed the subject, saying, "the trouble is it would all cost money and I have no money to spend."

SECRET OF FAILURE

One suspects that this has been the real secret of the failure of British Middle Eastern policy in these last years — that the root cause has been the cruelly narrow margin of resources and power on which the British have had to operate since the war. At any rate, the British have certainly failed. Until the harsh shock of the Iranian vote for oil nationalization, the Foreign Office, despite Bevin's imaginative vision of the situation, permitted itself to be bullied by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Until the same rude awakening, the officials of the Anglo-Iranian company talked smugly about the Iranians "coming to heel when they began to feel a pinch for cash." And so the match was lighted in the powder magazine.

But meanwhile, what of the United States, which has the margin of resources and power that Britain lacks? What is at stake here is not just a British oil company, but the whole Middle Eastern oil resource, the West's vital strategic position in the Middle East, and the world balance of power. An explosion here can defeat the whole policy which has already caused the American Government to lay out so many billions in other parts of the world. Why then has American policy done nothing to guard against this Middle Eastern danger?

Since 1945-46, when Iranians and most other Middle Easterners regarded America as their great hope and reliance, it is not too much to say that we have committed every error in this region that was possible to commit.

We have raised false hopes. Here in Iran, for example, former Ambassador George Allen spoke airily, during the 1946 crisis, of an American aid program of $250,000,000. Again, when the unfortunate Shah visited the United States, he seems to have been encouraged to suspect that he could arrange large American credits. Even the arrival of the present Ambassador, Henry Grady, with the record of Greece behind him, aroused great expectations. But while billions have been poured out in Europe, no serious sums have been made available to safeguard this vital Middle Eastern flank of the West.

PICTURE OF DISUNITY

We have not developed an independent policy, but we have not really worked with the British either. All our Ambassadors in the Middle East are instructed that the area is primarily a British interest. But while this instruction has controlled the broad lines of our action, we have managed to create a damaging impression of Anglo-American disunity. For instance, instead of coming crushingly to grips with the oil problem in London and keeping our mouths shut in Teheran, we have not insisted on our view in London, while American officials here have made a bad business worse by publicly criticizing the British attitude.

It would all be very different today, if in 1946, we had seized upon Ernest Bevin's imaginative scheme, which was independently originated at the State Dept. at that time by George Allen and others. It would also be very different if the slightest attention had been paid to the anguished warning of our successive Consuls, down to and conspicuously including Ambassador Grady. Until very recently, a very small American investment, plus an intelligent, determined and united application of American and British influence, would have been enough to reverse the whole trend here.

Instead, a course of feckless folly has brought us to a situation where the price to be paid will be considerable, and the risks to be run will be great, if serious action is to be taken to escape inevitable disaster.

Our Dignified Lawmakers Are Being Dignified Again

By ROBERT C. RUARK

NEW YORK

WE NOTE that there is ineffectuffing in the Senate Offices Building again, with the usual box score of unbloodied noses and unmoused eyes, which leads us to the suspicion that nothing is quite so pathetic as a grown man playing tiger. So few people know how to fight.

Next to legislators, baseball players are the worst freehand fist throwers all the world. I expect I have seen two-score fracases in or around baseball meetowns, and the only really effective violence I can remember was the time Lippy Durocher beat up a heckler with a blackjack while somebody else held him. This, however, could scarcely be called a contest of skill.

The movies and the books are always full of outraged citizens who fell other citizens with one punch — generally a looping right to the whiskers — but in real life it is very difficult to chill an enemy with one or a dozen solid smacks, even if you know your business. If you get onto the chin it generally hurts the hand worse than it hurts the target.

Grown men who abandon the insult for the clenched fist generally seem all fat and clumsy. They miss with the first haymaker, and the contest resolves into a pushing match, where Contestant A seems to get some odd satisfaction from shoving Contestant B. Women usually battle more effectively than men.

The recent Senatorial brawl, instigated by a Truman-MacArthur argument, was a three-way pattycake between Sens. Homer Capehart, Herbert Lehman and Hubert Humphrey. Mr. Capehart, a chubby 250-pounder, in his middle 50's, pushed Mr. Humphrey, who is younger and lighter. Mr. Lehman, in his 70's, grabbed Mr. Capehart by the coat collar. Mr. Blair Moody, a newsman since appointed U. S. Senator from Michigan, broke up the horrid carnage before death — from hardened arteries — overtook the warriors.

This nearly approximates the average battle on the baseball field. I have never understood how trained athletes, with sharp spikes and bulging muscles, contrive to do so little damage to each other, but I have watched a five-minute brawl between two full teams in which no single scratch or bruise was administered by anyone to anyone. There were bats in it, too, but nobody got maimed by the brandished Louisville Sluggers.

Thinking hard, and going away back in the Washington battlefields, the closest thing to a standup scrap I can remember was a brief encounter between the venerable Jesse Jones and the equally venerable Eugene Meyer, owner of The Washington Post. They exchanged words in the Mayflower Hotel, as I recall, and Meyer, a former amateur boxer, got in one punch before they smothered the blaze. I saw Mr. Jones the other day, and the damage does not appear to have lasted.

The middle-aged gentleman who decides to proclaim his manhood with his fists courts nothing much but embarrassment. He throws his blows after the fashion of a maiden decking the Spring sward with daisies, and the arthritic upercuts resemble a futile chase after butterflies. The best he can expect is to stumble, fall, and run out of breath and cuss words.

I am in favor of the horsewhip as a vindicator of adult honor. You can generally get in at least one swishy cut with it before you throw a knee out of joint or wrench your back.

People's Platform

Letters should be brief, written on one side of the paper. The writer's name must be signed, but may be withheld from publication in the discretion of the Editor. The News reserves the right to condense.

Straddling The Issue

PINEHURST

Editor, The News:

AT Burlington the other day, Senator Willis Smith spoke to the State chapter of the National Order of Trench Rats, honor society of disabled American Veterans. Three statements made by Smith, according to a newspaper report, are quoted:

"Smith said he received over 500 letters and telegrams protesting MacArthur's removal . . . that many people think MacArthur . . . should have been treated with more consideration." Had he been an officer of lesser stature he would have been removed immediately after he first disobeyed his instructions, whereas MacArthur disregarded several orders to clear "policy" statements with Washington, before final action was taken. What more consideration could have been given him? As a military man he must have known the result that would follow continued disobedience to higher authority.

"Smith brought up the possibility that the fired Far Eastern Commander might be sacrificing himself in order to get his point of view before the Nation." If that is what he believed that he was right, surely he would have been in a much better position had he resigned and then campaigned for his policies. At least his statements would be made in a more peaceful and reasonable atmosphere than has existed since he spoke to Congress.

"Smith said he was against American intervention in Korea." At last Smith has made up his mind about Korea. His statement means, very simply, that he does not believe in opposing aggression whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. Whose to God the National Administration of that time had the courage to follow then Secretary of State Stimson's plan to oppose Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1930. Had we done that it is possible, even probable, that the history of the years since then would have been different from what it has been.

In light of the quoted statements, one cannot be accused of injustice if he believes that Smith agrees with his Republican colleagues in condemning the President for removing MacArthur. Now read and study the following statement by Smith, which is quoted in the mentioned news report:

"Under our system the civilian power of our government must always be over and above control of the military. This is unique, because in the history of the world many nations have been brought to their ruin by the military taking complete control and pursuing the policy that led to the destruction of the nation."

Comparing the first three statements with this last quotation, it seems that Mr. Smith has not yet made up his mind which side of the discussion to join. At the moment he seems to be straddling the issue.

—ELMER M. SIMKINS.

A Book Review

Blueprint For Lasting Peace

PEACE CAN BE WON. By Paul G. Hoffman. Doubleday & Co. Garden City, N. Y. 188 pp. $2.50.

PAUL HOFFMAN'S blueprint for lasting peace, which his publishers rightfully call "hopeful and adventurous," is summed up in these words: "I contend that we still have the opportunity to avoid a general war if we begin at once to wage the peace with imagination, boldness and a sense of dedication."

The key to that sentence is the verb wage. For wage is an active verb, usually coupled with that most violent of man's activities, war. Mr. Hoffman, like his beloved mentor Bernard Baruch, wants us to go about the business of winning peace as aggressively as we go about the business of winning wars. His approach is positive, rather than negative, offensive rather than defensive. His program is dynamic, not static. In rare degree, it combines realism with optimism, hard common sense with idealism.

PAUL G. HOFFMAN

At the very outset, the former ECA administrator makes it clear that where, with most Americans, he once believed postwar Russia would "live and let live," he has now faced the "rough-edged reality" that "the masters of the Kremlin have decided that it is the manifest destiny of the Soviet state to dominate the earth." Its "unremitting war against the free world" is being fought on four fronts, the military, economic, political and psychological, which Lenin called the interlocking parts of "a most determined and ruthless war. . .against the forces and traditions of the old society."

How then to counter effectively the global, many-faceted Soviet onslaught? How to wage, and win, the peace?

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AT ONCE, Mr. Hoffman dismisses two courses much in the public prints. Appeasement is out: in the words of the late Senator Vandenberg, to whom the book is lovingly dedicated, "Appeasement is surrender on the installment plan." A preventive war is equally impossible: it would "miss the objective, like the bull that charges the cape instead of the matador"; it would "substitute emotion for intelligence, panic for resourcefulness"; it would be no matter what the provocation, an act of aggression, and "if aggression is morally wrong for everybody else, it is also morally wrong for us"; and, since our starting the war would cost us important support abroad, no quick victory could be expected.

So Mr. Hoffman proposes to wage the peace along the same four fronts the Kremlin has chosen to wage its war — the military, the economic, the political, the psychological.

In this, he says, we must of course have allies. "Enlightened self-interest, which is common sense with a college degree," requires that "it would be majestic folly to try to build a Fortress America and let the rest of the world go by." Were we to face Russia single-handed, the cost would perhaps come to "$125,000,000 a year for ourselves alone in contrast to our current expenditures of some $25,000,000 a year for ourselves and our allies." And since as Stalin likes to say, "Production wins wars," abandonment of our actual or potential allies to Stalin would mean that in many respects Russia would equal or outmatch us in industrial potential.

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ABOVE ALL, Mr. Hoffman says, we must ourselves be united. "We cannot afford to indulge in the luxury of blaming a political party or groups of individuals for our present troubles. We should be too busy to search for scapegoats. If we do, we may lose our future by looking at the past."

In waging the peace on the military front, Mr. Hoffman agrees, we must of course remember that the defense of the United States is the paramount aim of our foreign policy. But we must also remember that "the best defense of the American Midwest might be in Berlin, Tokyo or Spitsbergen." For "our own security rests on the security of others." Thus we must beef up the United Nations, now that the Russian veto can no longer hamstring it. We must get our backs into NATO and into other emergent institutions of European unity, since in Europe "nationalism has reached a historic height and is now on the decline," and so many Europeans will fight more willingly "under the banner of a United West than under their own flags." For Europe, says Mr. Hoffman with conviction, will fight for its freedom.

On the economic front, we must continue to help the free world help itself back to good health. We have done much, Mr. Hoffman says, and the results are heartening. We must not stop now. It may well be we can in future spend less: he thinks we can. But the program—in which "we must expect our allies to spend their dollars" —must go on, preferably, Mr. Hoffman thinks, under one "Overseas Economic Administration" to "administer all aid and technical assistance programs abroad." including ECA, Point Four, the economic side of spending for European rearmament, American participation in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the like.

On the political front, Mr. Hoffman says, we must recognize that history has brought us to the point that (in the late Henry L. Stimson's words) "foreign policy has become our primary domestic concern," and we rid ourselves of our old suspicion of the State Department, whose recent accomplishments he highly praises. We must combine, rationally, to seek a clear, well-defined creative policy that can bring into balance our objectives and our resources."

And on the psychological (or information) front, Mr. Hoffman urges that we formulate "a free world doctrine which reflects the ideals and strivings of free men around the globe"— a doctrine to cover four major fields, religious, political, economic and social—and then "find words with which to express this doctrine, words that will, as Kipling put it, 'walk up and down in the hearts of men.'" For our own part, Mr. Hoffman believes that an independent agency of cabinet rank can do the job better than the State Department; and he defends this point of view ably. But it is not enough for the United States alone to propagate the cause of freedom: in this, as in the field of arms, we must seek allies abroad. And in doing it we must not pinch pennies: his thesis implicitly condemns Congressional short-sightedness in denying funds for information activities.

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AND WHAT WILL all this cost —over and above our military expenditures? Perhaps optimistically, Mr. Hoffman puts the figure at $5 billion. But $5 billion, which includes $300 million for information activities, twice last year's expenditures, plus another $300 million for "unforeseen economic activities" is simply not the figure is ultimately above that, the expenditure is worthwhile. For as Mr. Hoffman points out, half of one of the fifty billions we will spend on military bullets could finance 200,000 one-year scholarships at leading universities.

To review Mr. Hoffman's book, even at this considerable length, in some measure does it disservice. The bare outline may leave the impression that much of it has been said before—which it has, if not so well. Inevitably the cogency, the coherence of Mr. Hoffman's argument is lost: because the various parts of his program are so carefully articulated into the interrelated whole, the impact of the book is total rather than piecemeal.

It is Mr. Hoffman's accomplishment that he makes dynamic what has been kinetic, positive what has been negative, forceful what has been passive, the counsel of hope what has been largely the counsel of despair. And this, no review can convey.

Many books have helped shape history. Plato's Republic and the New Testament and the writings of Machiavelli and Karl Marx (to name four of scores) have, for good and ill, worked powerfully to alter the course of events. Mr. Hoffman's book, if fickle public favor dictates wide readership for it, may be another such book. That is the highest tribute this reviewer can pay it.

—JOHN P. McKNIGHT

Drew Pearson's Merry-Go-Round

War Papers Can Prove About Anything

WASHINGTON

WHEN the Senate Armed Services Committee starts sorting out all the memos and telecom messages exchanged between the Pentagon and General MacArthur this public may become more confused than ever about who is right in the big debate.

For several documents and memos prepared during various phases of the Korean campaign—if set aside from others—seem to prove almost any point.

Furthermore, it was once a paradoxical fact that Secretary of State Acheson was much closer to General MacArthur's position re China than the joint chiefs of staff. The wolfpack that always howls at Acheson's heels has been claiming he was responsible for MacArthur's ouster. However, the record shows first that this was not the case; second, that following MacArthur's disastrous retreat from North Korea in early December, Acheson favored severe punitive measures against China as an aggressor nation.

It was the joint chiefs of staff at that time which vigorously disagreed both with Acheson and MacArthur. In fact, they favored pulling out of Korea altogether.

MacArthur's Proposals

IN order to get as clear a picture as possible regarding the working of the joint chiefs of staff and their policy toward MacArthur, here is a breakdown on how the joint chiefs reacted to various of MacArthur's proposals:

Bombing Chinese bases—The nearest the joint chiefs ever came to okaying MacArthur's proposed bombing of Chinese bases was on Feb. 28. Just before that date, MacArthur had sent a long report on enemy air strength now massed south of the Yalu. The report cited strength building up in certain areas and in effect asked permission to bomb these bases.

Replying on Feb. 28, the joint chiefs gave MacArthur a set of five alternatives to counter the Chinese moves. Since these would be of value to the enemy, they cannot be described here. But in each of the five alternatives, MacArthur was instructed to take no action on the Chinese side of the Yalu River without reporting back to the joint chiefs for further instructions.

Naval blockade—Another question at issue in the Korean war has been a naval blockade of Chinese ports. On this, there was agreement. Both the joint chiefs and the State Dept. okayed a naval blockade but it was vetoed by our allies in the United Nations. This was one of the proposals for which Secretary Acheson fought hardest when Prime Minister Attlee visited Washington. However, Attlee flatly refused to approve any naval blockade of China.

Hot pursuit—Another point of agreement between MacArthur and the joint chiefs was the right of American planes to pursue Communist planes beyond the Chinese border when engaged in a running battle. This did not include the bombing of Chinese bases. Though the joint chiefs agreed to this, either the State Dept. or the National Security Council disapproved—I have not been able to ascertain which.

Chiang Kai-shek's troops—This is the issue which MacArthur emphasized in his letter to ex-Speaker Joe Martin, the letter which culminated in MacArthur's dismissal. However, use of Chiang's troops never has been seriously considered by the joint chiefs.

General Bradley, chairman of the joint chiefs, has argued that Chiang should use his troops chiefly for the purpose of getting them equipped—which would be terrifically expensive. Furthermore, Adm. Forrest Sherman has pointed out that it would take an armada of American vessels to transport them to China.

Finally, the joint chiefs' study of Chiang's combat strength does not jibe with published claims of 600,000 men. According to Pentagon estimates it is nearer 250,000 men. It is also recalled that much of the military equipment we furnished Chiang during the war ended up in the hands of the Communists.

Note—Pentagon observers believe MacArthur may have some of the tentative directives which are sent to different theater commanders in advance for their comment. These do not become approved directives, however, until the joint chiefs have all the comment, can study them in the light of the over-all picture and then issue them officially. There is a big difference between the studies of the joint chiefs and their final approved directives.