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TRUMAN AND LINCOLN—A PARALLEL

THERE is a parallel in the careers of Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman close enough for application to the current Affairs MacArthur.

From early 1861 to July, 1862, Abraham Lincoln, like Harry Truman in 1950-51, was the center of indecision.

Following his ultimatum on slavery in the territories, which led to the formation of the Southern Confederacy, Lincoln went about securing the country that there was no article but an "artificial" one—just as Mr. Truman has made more than once that the prospects for peace were improving.

After Mr. Sumner was fired upon on April 11, 1861, Lincoln moved a group of headstrong Senators to force his hand, with dire results to the forces of Gen. Irvin McDowell. Mr. Truman, also, has seemed to let Congress run away with the conduct of the current world against Communism.

Lincoln, a Republican, had difficulties with his Democratic appointee, George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, and permitted the formation of various boards with ill-defined and conflicting authority. The tug of war between Democrat Truman and Republican MacArthur, and the resulting confusion in the national capital today is not unlike that of 1861.

First that Lincoln moved toward peace, Lincoln drew the strength and decision to take matters in his own hand and exercise his constitutional powers. He fought off the Senators who had formed the Committee on the Conduct of the War. He moved forward because of the latter's rash action in freeing slaves in Missouri. He overrode Commander Wilkes when that officer boarded a neutral ship and took off Confederate envoys, thus narrowly averting war with England.

Lincoln came to realize that the control of military forces in a democracy, in war or in peace, must be kept in civilian hands, and he never relinquished control once he conquered his indecision.

When all the irrelevances are stripped away, that same problem is facing President

Truman today. General Douglas MacArthur, standing squarely on his brilliant military career, is deliberately using his friends in the Republican Party in an effort to take over political control of the struggle against Communism.

Elsewhere on today's editorial page is a perceptive article by Wallace Carroll, executive editor of the Winston-Salem newspapers and a specialist in psychological warfare. Mr. Carroll's point is that General MacArthur has taken advantage of the unprecedented freedom of action given him to make repeated statements that have shaken our foreign alliances, and created doubt and confusion at home, and to modify in domestic politics and engage in maneuvers against his Commander-in-Chief.

Even if MacArthur were right in his appraisal of the international situation, we would object to his headstrong disregard of Presidential directives telling him to stick to military affairs. It so happens that most thinking Americans believe MacArthur is wrong, that Europe is the main arena in the coming fight. It will add fuel to the outcry from the Far East should he avoid further commitment of arms and men until the battle for Europe is won.

President Truman is facing a difficult task in intelligently directing the MacArthur stampede into a full-scale war in the Pacific, grievous injury will be done to the defense of Europe. If he cracks down hard on MacArthur, perhaps relieving him of his command, he will add fuel to the outcry from the Far East should he avoid further commitment of arms and men until the battle for Europe is won.

This is, perhaps, the gravest challenge of the Truman career. He must meet it decisively. He must reassert control of the military and diplomatic policies of this nation. If he fails to meet the challenge, the leadership may well pass by default to a vainglorious military man whose military accomplishments in no wise equip him to conduct political policies, and whose long residence in the Far East has blurred, if not obscured, his global perspective.

FIXING THE RESPONSIBILITY

SUBJECTING to close scrutiny the right-wing indignation that has poured forth following the revelations of the Kefauver and Fulbright committees, Joseph C. Harsch, chief of the Washington bureau of the Christian Science Monitor, charges voters apathy with part of the responsibility.

Comparing the American and British public attitude toward public affairs, Harsch finds that the British election of February, 1950, brought out 94 per cent of the potential electorate, whereas the American election in November, 1950, attracted no more than 43.7 per cent of the eligible voters.

Even in Presidential election years, the turnout is depressingly small. In 1936, it was 57.4 per cent; in 1940, 59 per cent; in 1944, 53.8 per cent; in 1948, 51.6 per cent. In the 1946 off-year election, only 39 per cent of the potential electorate voted.

Harsch cites two other incidents that point to public apathy toward public affairs.

DECISION BY A MINORITY

CAPTAIN Eddie Rickenbacker has promised that Eastern Air Lines will not give up its fight for direct one-carrier service between the Southeast and the West Coast areas.

Already the Civil Aeronautics Board has returned two split decisions against Eastern's application. The first, some weeks ago, denied the original petition. The second, a few days ago, rejected Eastern's plea for a reconsideration.

But Captain Rickenbacker is hanging on, says Eastern will file a second petition for reconsideration. In a bristling statement, he attacked the second CAB ruling as a "minority" report.

This is the most important domestic route case to come before the Board in many years; yet a vote of only two members of the five-man board would deny to the entire Southeast, South, Gulf Coast, and West Coast the greatly-needed Southern Transcontinental Route which has been so long and earnestly sought by these communities. Certainly

half of the nation is entitled to one direct transcontinental route when the North has four.

The decision in this case, now confirmed by a minority of only two of the five members of the Board, would discriminate against the Southern half of the nation, and would foster and perpetuate a monopoly in the hands of American Airlines, which now controls all of the transcontinental flights throughout the Southeast, South, Gulf Coast, Southwest, and West Coast areas. The public is entitled to the mature and carefully considered judgment of all five members of the Board before a decision is reached for such far-reaching issues.

Virtually every accepted statistical index shows that the Southeast and the West Coast are the areas of greatest economic development in the United States. Direct one-carrier air service between these two booming regions will be of mutual benefit, and will also aid the development of the larger national economy. Eastern's commendable battle deserves the full support of every Southeastern state.

From The Asheville Citizen

THEY CAN'T BE PRESIDENT

NAMES of politicians who behave like statesmen come and go in the popular fancy just as they fleet through the headlines. Two names in both places just now are those of Fulbright and Kefauver. It is no surprise to hear that in the few weeks the faint thumps of a Presidential boomlet for either man or for both.

Would either man be eligible for the nation's highest office? Yes, Sen. William Fulbright of Arkansas is of American age and nativity to qualify. So is Sen. J. William Kefauver of Tennessee. Fulbright's searching and studious probe of the EEC, conducted without fear or favor, has drawn much attention to this former university president. The public eye is riveted upon him as he delivers stirring declamations on moral corruption in politics and in the whole social structure.

By the same token, Kefauver has raised himself high in the public's estimation as a champion of honest government. He was literally in every eye during the televised proceedings of the new famous

Kefauver Committee. But there is a fly in this Presidential ointment—supposing that save appeals to either man. For both are Southerners. Both are from "safe" Democratic states.

So are in 1952, when Tennessee (like North Carolina) followed the trail of Prohibition and prejudice into the Hoover camp, the Volunteer State has never gone Republican in modern times.

Sure in 1972, when modern times began with the Grant-Greeley campaign, Arkansas has never gone Republican. Indeed, this state has never seen a close contest since it rejected Democrat Greeley by less than 4,000 votes. It has voted consistently for Democratic—the more radical the candidate, the better.

No true Southern statesman (and we are not speaking of Dixiecrats) will ever have a shot at the Presidency as long as the Republicans are the Republican National Committee. The Democratic Party takes the South for granted, as well it might.

'Do You Have Much Trouble With Him?'



A Review And Analysis

Cues To The MacArthur Riddle

By WALLACE CARROLL

Executive News Editor

Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel

ALL around the world people are joining in the guessing—or guessing—game which John Gunther has called "the Riddle of MacArthur."

There are a number of clues to this riddle which have largely escaped the correspondents in Washington. They have been gathered by The Journal and Sentinel over a period of weeks, and they come from men in high places who should know the facts.

1. When General MacArthur met President Truman on Wake Island last October 15, the Chinese Communists were massing in Manchuria along the Korean border.

2. Shortly before the Chinese Communist attack in November, MacArthur's headquarters sent March 7 to draft a statement in which the Chinese did not have the "logistical support," to maintain 60,000 troops in Korea.

3. The national intelligence estimate—drawn up in Washington by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department—was quite different. It concluded that the Chinese had the power to deal a severe blow to the UN forces and could prevent MacArthur from carrying out his mission.

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6. MacArthur's true offer to the Chinese on March 23 was a surprise to the U. S. Government and the members of the United Nations.

7. For weeks the State Department had been laboriously working on a peace plan. This plan was to have the 14 nations which had sent troops to Korea to join in drafting a statement in which the Chinese did not have the "logistical support," to maintain 60,000 troops in Korea.

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a converging general and demanded, in effect, that the Chinese acknowledge a humiliating defeat.

Walter Lippmann summed it up like this: "It is impossible to negotiate a compromise settlement in the middle of Korea and to have everybody, including the enemy, act as if we had won a decisive victory."

6. Now General MacArthur has endorsed a Republican leader's proposal that Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist troops, who were driven to the island of Formosa by the Chinese Communists, should be used against the Communists on the Chinese mainland.

ESTIMATES OUT OF LINE

Again General MacArthur's intelligence estimates must be out of line with the national intelligence estimates in Washington. For in Washington it is believed that a lot of pushing and pulling would be needed to get those troops to set foot on the mainland.

In his letter to the Republican leader (Representative Joseph W. Martin Jr. of Massachusetts), General MacArthur also challenged the U. S. Government's policy of giving Europe, instead of Asia, the top priority in the battle against world Communism.

"SINCERELY OBSESSED"

A general out on some distant frontier becomes sincerely obsessed with his own problems.

MacArthur, for example, sees the Chinese Reds operating with impunity from their sanctuary in Manchuria. He wants to hit back at the Chinese and the power they are doing to his men.

But back at the center of power in the capital the rulers have to keep in mind not only that general's front but other fronts as well.

In this case, America's leaders are determined not to become involved in a war with China. They fear that if we should become involved in such a war, the Russians would be encouraged to seize the oil fields of the Middle East and the great industrial riches of Western Europe. This would bring about a disastrous shift in the world balance of power.

In a World War should become inevitable, American leaders would prefer to have it come on an issue which would unite them behind us.

A war with China would not do that. It would repel most of Asia and the Middle East from our alliance. We would endanger our empire system of alliances, for even the brilliant general would join us reluctantly—if they joined us at all.

All the foregoing "clues" may suggest a partial answer to the riddle of the brilliant general whose services to the nation can never be denied.

They seem to indicate that MacArthur is not solely responsible for the problem which he now represents in international relations.

OTHER RESPONSIBLE

Part of the responsibility for the creation of that problem must be attributed to others—to President Truman, to the heads of the Defense Department, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the State Department.

All these leaders allowed unprecedented freedom of action to a general whose recent errors of judgment have carried his nation close to military disaster.

They have permitted that general to make repeated statements which shake our alliances and almost knocked the props from under the most successful parts of our foreign policy.

They have let that general, contrary to the traditions of the Republic, meddle in domestic politics and engage in maneuvers against his President.

But if this indictment can be made against the men in power, there is little in the MacArthur letters, and little in the casual remarks of the public, that would lead to a more serious reader from the special, copyrighted interviews issued by MacArthur to his friends, that his press treatment is of a nature equaled by few other public figures—certainly not by Harry Truman.

The result has been that some Truman advisers have been hurt, that the "Loyalty" of the MacArthur group has been hurt, and that the ground that he was long past retirement age and was paying more attention to politics than to Korea.

Other advisers have turned pale at the thought of a break with MacArthur, aware that it would only give general an excuse to come home and attack the Administration.

However, all groups agree that the political and military tug-of-war between Tokyo and the White House probably has been the most spectacular and difficult event to date since the end of World War II.

LABOR SMILES AGAIN

LABORERS at a recent conference between labor leaders and their old friend Harry Truman went off with

Defense Emergency Denial Plays Into Kremlin Hands

By JOSEPH ALSOP

FRANKFURT

THE PRELIMINARY impression left by a month of investigation in Europe is best summed up by the old often quoted proverb: "But at my back I always hear time's winged chariot, hurrying near."

The rather worn poetic tag is constantly brought to mind because, in this year of decision, there is not very much time, and what time we have is being wasted.

Events are moving faster and faster. Every month somewhere produces a new crisis somewhere, like the grave crisis in the Middle East which is causing the Arab to fly to Tehran. The tempo clearly indicates the approach of a showdown, or perhaps a series of showdowns, in the world struggle between the Soviet empire and the Western world.

Moreover, when this showdown comes—and it may come this year or next, and even later—there will be a war, or a surrender, or a stalemate. To frighten the Western allies into a surrender which will undercut their position is the aim of the Kremlin. To produce a stalemate, and to achieve at least a semblance of security, is the purpose of Western policy.

DANGER OF MISCALCULATION

The danger of world war lies chiefly in the possibility, which is perhaps even a probability, that the Kremlin will appear to calculate the consequences of its acts, as it did in the case of Korea.

It is very clear that the Kremlin wants the world to struggle with a war. Yet the Kremlin can all too easily take a position of strategic, which none the less will force the Western allies to fight. Here in Europe, the Western allies are the most sensitive points, where the Kremlin is most likely to go for it.

Time is precious in these circumstances, for the very simple reason that the weakness of the Western allies is in their divisions, and it is in their divisions that the Kremlin is most likely to go for it.

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