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CONFESSIONS OF A COURT JESTER

TREAT glamorous and gilded gladiator, Major-General Harry Vaughan, is quoted by reliable journals as having told leaders of Washington veterans organizations this week that:

"I'm considered in very many circles unethical. I'm sure. It continues to be unethical. There are only two ways to please Mr. Vaughan. One is to please him. As long as I please them, I've made various suggestions as to what the other people can do."

The General's candor is refreshing in this day of pretension and perfidy. And, in a way, we rather enjoy after him. It's a good relief from the job most of us have in this troubled world, jobs which bring us rewards considerably less bountiful than those which the luncheon in his honor, and will pass them along for what they're worth.

First, the measure of obsequence and hypocrisy of those who depend upon the Washington apple polishing to curry special dispensations has never been more

DOGGING THE CONSTITUTION

THE Supreme Court upholds Judge Robinson's ruling on the rural police fund, it will throw County finances into a pretty tangle. That's unfortunate. But it would be more unfortunate to continue levying taxes in an illegal fashion.

County Governments are limited by the Constitution to a tax levy of 15 cents on the \$100 valuation for general fund expenditures, presumably to hold them in check and protect the people against excessive taxation.

Past General Assemblies have, however, evaded this limitation by authorizing and school bond funds. Some of them are obviously for special purposes, such as the Mecklenburg poor fund, sanatorium fund, library fund, welfare administration fund, and others.

The 15-cent limitation is patently unrealistic in this day of increasing costs of government and decreasing value of

DOOMED TO FAILURE

GOVERNOR SCOTT'S session with local law enforcement officers yesterday went off as expected. He showed them figures on the enormous amount of bootlegging in dry counties, cited the power and arrogance of those who ply the trade, and called on the officers to do their utmost to stamp out the illegal traffic.

The meeting may do some good. We hope so. Every county in North Carolina that decides via the ballot to retain the dry law stands under a cloud. It is aWFul Thinking has the right to expect some semblance of conformity to the law. When all's said and done, however, no amount of needling from Governor Scott or other State officials is going to stir local officers to action against the bootleggers unless the people of their home communities demand, and co-operate with, full enforcement.

From The Raleigh News & Observer

CURIOS REASONING

THE action of the State Utilities Commission in delaying approval of a request by railroads to reduce freight rates on petroleum products is a strange action.

The commission cited the precedent of similar action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but did not state what reasoning moved the federal commission. In explaining its own action, however, the State regulatory body resorted to reasoning as curious as the action itself.

This reasoning implies that there is something sacred about a high rate, against which "benefit to the public" is a negligible matter scarcely worth considering. The railroads, in recent years, have flocked to state and federal commissions with a request for higher rates. Most of these requests have been granted promptly.

Now the railroads present their first important request for a decrease in a long time. They are not tentatively, at least, that they must keep their rates higher than truck rates, no matter how high those rates may be.

There is certainly nothing sacred about a "balance" based on rates which even those charging them say are too high. If the "balance" is so important, it can be maintained by the trucks meeting any decrease made by the railroads.

The request of the railroads should be granted and if the new rates are out of line with those charged on other commodities, those rates should be lowered also.

creasingly displayed than in the introduction of General Vaughan as a man "who as a member of the House of Representatives, a great man." Author for that overstatement, which will surely go on the year's price, was Harold Keas, past national commander of the American Veterans of World War II.

Secondly, General Vaughan's insistence that he hadn't been a bad boy at all but was merely interested in staying to the west through Washington red tape was interesting.

"I've encountered it not with the head of a Government department or the No. 2 of a large business but with the fellow down below who renests what he calls 'outside interference.'"

If we read that right, we gather that the higher-ups are aghast enough to submit to General Vaughan's advances and that it's down in the lower echelons that you find people with the naive idea that governmental processes shouldn't be subverted by influential outsiders, not even when the splendid aura marks their proximity to the throne.

The General has restored our faith in small-bore government bootleggers. His own disdain for the ethics of a democracy.

The Battle Of Washington Issue Of The Atomic Blitz

By HANSON W. BALDWIN (In The New York Times)

A GREAT drama is being played these days to stand as a monument to the House of Representatives. In the crowded hearing room of the House Armed Services Committee, where hearings into the B-36 and ancillary matters have been resumed, the Navy feels it is fighting for its life.

But the heart of the issue, now being officially debated for the first time in open form, is of far greater concern than any one phase or any one service. It is perhaps the greatest issue of the atomic age — one that will profoundly influence, no matter how decided, the lives of this and of succeeding generations.

That issue is whether or not we should deliberately plan and prepare to engage in the atomic bombardment of enemy cities in case of war. The big problem you have to determine, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Committee Chairman of the Pacific Fleet, told the committee last week, "is whether or not you approve of the strategic-bombing atomic bill." And he added: "I gave a answer to a question."

THE two points are not unrelated. The strength of the Navy's arm and the capabilities and number of B-36 bombers are factors, obviously of importance in the determination of strategy. They are, however, not the factors of the weapons we develop and acquire during peacetime. This will help to set the strategic pattern for any war.

For this reason the B-36, although it has figured and will figure in the testimony of nearly every witness, is but symbolic of the broader issues. What kind of war shall we fight? What kind of strategy will give us maximum security? What are our national objectives? In other words, what kind of world do we want after any future war we may have to fight?

These are the basic issues, the terrible issues which the committee is faced, issues in which the Navy is actually interested. For it is always the public, the common man, who will have to do the suffering and the dying if war comes.

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Unhappy Admiral

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What Do You Think, Coach?



Marquis Childs Self-Interest Forward

THE immediate results of the devaluation of the British pound and the consequent rise in the price of goods in Europe can be seen in the department of advertising. The British government has announced price reductions on china, gloves, woollens — the specialties that are advertised in the U.S. — and has sent into this country in order to earn more dollars.

But the specialties are also made in this country in the manufacturing industry. The new competition in price may be a blessing in disguise. It will force the American market. It is easy — too easy — to assume that the British atomic explosion has swept away all this opposition and that now the British will stand up and do their duty in the face of the threat to civilization.

Self-interest is not so readily set aside even in the case of the specialists of overwhelming logic. And the same thing is true of prejudice. A reasonable man can be expected to have come to me commenting on the British position. He is confident whatever the British paid to maintain their royal family it was no business of ours. Incidentally, in another column we have given the British royal family on the cost of British royalty. While it is true that the government in London is not the government in London, and various members of the royal family are not the government in London, it is true that the government in London is not the government in London, and various members of the royal family are not the government in London.

One correspondent, who took pains to point out his Irishness, expressed a similar case of self-interest. He said that he was an American and should presume to question the cost of Britain's royal family.

In many Americans, even though we don't do it, there is a small, but not insignificant, percentage every day for the pomp and circumstance of the British royal family. In the opinion of the author, the British royal family is a splendid thing to have in London.

In a time of swift and kaleidoscopic change, the ancient symbols of the British royal family are much of the old meaning, give a sense of continuity to the nation, and go into the British treasury. This includes the income returned by the Duchy of Cornwall, which usually goes to the Prince of Wales, and the income of the Duke of Wales, which is "vested in the monarch." In the fiscal year 1947-48 the government got from the crown

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UNCLE TOM CONNALLY stepped into the Air Force-Navy squabble with the plea for a public airing of the feud between the two services. The public airing of the feud between the two services is a public airing of the feud between the two services.

Oh, no, the quote always runs. We mustn't talk about it or discuss it. It's a matter of national security. We mustn't talk about it or discuss it. It's a matter of national security.

I've been hearing this one ever since I was a child. It's a matter of national security. We mustn't talk about it or discuss it. It's a matter of national security.

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Senae Leader Lucas Blasts Barkley

Since then, some admirals have tried to cold-shoulder Denfeld, accused him of transferring Adm. Arthur Radford to the Pacific because he had been a contender for the post of Chief of Naval Operations.

Rows like the present flare-up are not unusual in the Navy. At the situation between Admiral Radford and Denfeld is not a case of limited competence, but as many headlines back in the Hoover Administration, it is a case of limited competence.

It was that time, the admirals, who always worship big guns, were bent on building a lot of 10,000-ton, eight-inch-gun cruisers, and related to go along with Secretary of State Acheson's plan for a fleet of 10,000-ton, eight-inch-gun cruisers against Stimson was salty Adm. Hillyar Jones.

But siding with Stimson, and holding the same chief of naval operations job which Admiral Denfeld occupies today, was Adm. William V. Pratt. Pratt was a big gun cruiser with six-inch guns, and was more effective at close range or at night.

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