

## THE CHARLOTTE NEWS

And Evening Chronicle

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## A Creed

## Pope Sees Peace In The Flames Of War

General Mark Clark, a sincere and dignified fighting man for the cause of freedom, must have been conscious of history's drama, as he was closely with Pope Pius XII in a letter to Rome. It is likely that the Holy See and the commander of the tough American conquerors came to a quick and complete understanding, and that their hopes for the future of the conflict were in complete agreement. The man of war did not talk as a stranger. The Pope saw in the march of the Fifth Army a means for peace. He said as much to reporters, shortly thereafter:

"This war should be only a means to a peace. Write for a peace that can meet the approval of all. It will mean people that can assure one and all those conditions necessary so that they may live in a manner befitting the dignity of a human being."

Those words should go with the men who fight and die before the end and to the table where other men meet to write the peace they have won.

## Refugees

## Free Ports In Sight For Them In U. S.

By joint action, a bloc of Congressmen have instituted bills providing for the establishment of free ports for refugees in this country. This is the Samuel Grafton plan, which has been the hope of the columnist has expressed. It is to be welcomed, particularly at this stage of the war in Europe. If it is too late even now for the United States to give temporary shelter to European refugees from Hitler's empire, it is not too late to hold forth the example to other nations.

These free ports, as suggested, do not interfere with present immigration laws and provide nothing more than a resting place for migratory peoples who have been driven from their homes by war—and who want nothing more than to return when peace comes. Congress has already been told, we have the opportunity to save a great many lives by this simple step, and if President Roosevelt does proclaim certain limited areas in this country as temporary refugee ports, it will have given ourselves to the cause of freedom in fuller measure.

## Good-Timers

## Night Club Taxes Cut; Debt Limit Is Raised

In solemn assembly, as befits the legislative branch of government with the demands of a world-wide offensive upon it, Congress sanctioned the boosting of the national debt from \$210 billion to \$250 billion. There was little resistance, and a marked sentiment in favor of providing for heavier war costs, whatever the result. The higher limit went on June prior to the opening of the Fifth War Loan Drive.

As solemnly, as befits the message of an austere body of representatives of a free people, the bill was dispatched to the White House. The debt limit was cut out of the way, action having been demanded by providing events and the necessities of sky-high finance. But when the pie was opened, strange birds began to fly. A debt increase, yes, but accompanied by a ludicrous rider—Congress also suggested, casually, that cabaret taxes be cut by 10 per cent.

When the night clubs were suffering, or imagined they were, in the midst of the greatest rush of business they have ever known on this continent. Somehow the pressure was applied to the system for the reduction of taxes, liberty and equality and especially fraternity.

War is horrible, at home and

abroad. The load is too great for some of us, and there are crises from several quarters. And the sensitive ears of Congress, registering the cries of agony, heard about all else the voice of café society. By all means, in company with the legal jackals of the national debt, let us do out justice to those who are unduly burdened. That, after all, is why we're fighting this war. The boys down in Normandy and Italy and New Guinea would be proud of courageous Congress, at this moment.

## A Victory

## Badoglio Fails; Italy Turns To Its Leaders

The leaders of Italy, though they have shouted no complaint of King Umberto through the curtain of Allied censorship, have at least unhorsed the incredible Badoglio. When that worthy was instructed by the new king to form a cabinet of his own, he failed. It seems likely that he received a slow shaking of the head wherever he went, and that no representative leaders could be persuaded to join with him.

And, upon his failure, the mantle falls on one Ivoone Bonomi, with a clean record as a non-collaborator with Fascists. As a former socialist leader and a liberal, he lived in obscurity through the dark years, and now emerges as the natural leader of anti-Fascist Italy.

Here is genuine progress, at least so far as it can be determined from the invasion front. The step was taken after the new king's first wish had perished, and he had conferred with the leaders of the liberated people. There is promise in Italy today; promise that the people, after almost 25 years, will raise their voice again, and become masters of their own destiny. If this endures, it will set a helpful precedent for all of Europe.

## Margarine

## It Fights For Equity Against A Big Lobby

The present high tax rate imposed on margarine, inflating its price to a ridiculous level, is a prime example of the power of the tax effect of pressure groups upon the lives of the ordinary American citizen. The dairy industry, though actually selling all the butter it can possibly produce, and swamped with public demand, has imposed the margarine tax through lobby pressure and a propaganda campaign.

Margarine, which may be produced at a fraction of the cost of butter, is about the same as butter in taste and texture. Present laws it cannot be labeled as margarine, but only as "oleomargarine," shouting its vegetable origin. It is taxed at the rate of ten cents per pound, if colored—and so is commonly sold uncolored, complete with a small package of coloring for home use. That coloring is described as identical to that used by butter manufacturers themselves.

Thus the margarine tax is a protective tariff, a discrimination, in favor of the dairymen. It hits hardest at the lower income families, who are often unable to buy butter and who suffer most from lack of food of this type. Nor is that the end of it. Now the cotton industry, which sells 13 per cent of its cotton seed oil for the manufacture of margarine, is carrying on the stiffest battle against high margarine taxes. Cotton Ed Smith, though he speaks in all selflessness for the cotton industry, carries the fight in his bill to eliminate this discrimination. It proposes tax reduction, removal of labeling laws as they now stand, and abolition of the special levy on margarine. The bill is not only to the interest of the cotton industry that this bill be passed. It is in the interest of all Americans who wish to preserve a free market in margarine and to end economic suppression and discrimination by established interests.

## The Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON NOW that the greatest invasion in the history of modern warfare has started, some of the inside story regarding this, the most controversial question that has confronted the Allies, can be reviewed. It is no secret that the second front has been the subject of debate between the British and Russians and, at times, even between U. S. and British military leaders, since the war began.

At one time, when the Russians were hard-pressed and fighting for their lives at Stalingrad and in the Winter of 1942-1943, it was feared by some U. S. military observers that Stalin might even withdraw from the war because of bitterness over the fact that the "second front" was not started. The controversial question first arose in the early Summer of 1942, a few months after Pearl Harbor, when Foreign Minister Molotov came to London, then to Washington, for important political-military conferences. Although Poland and the Baltic States were on his list of subjects to be discussed, at the very top of the list was the second front.

At that time, the American Army was relatively small and not too well prepared. Molotov's thesis was that we should persuade our British ally, with a million-man army in England, to hit Germany from the West. President Roosevelt had to say that we could not high-pressure an ally.

However, General Marshall did work out a plan for a landing across the Channel in the Fall of 1942. His plan was based on the fact that the Nazis had thrown the cream of their entire army into Russia and had their lines extended as far as Stalingrad, leaving France and Western Europe relatively undefended.

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