But it would carry with it defeat of the position taken by the Southern railroads who had wanted to maintain the rate differential for their own sustenance.

It would not disadvantage other sections of the country, for the whole of it would benefit from a prosperous South.

The American system was deemed superior in programming to the government-run BBC, as well as the radio in other countries where it was controlled by the government. Despite the nuisance of commercials, the piece opts for the American system.

Part of the beneficence was motivated simply by human generosity, but another part, among the wealthy, was from the simple desire to avoid the taxes within the higher brackets. Corporations were therefore donating generously to charitable causes.

In its early wars, the Revolution and the War of 1812, Americans had gambled and often lost. It was so also for the Union in the first two years of the Civil War.

The setback in Belgium thus would not deter the fighting spirit of the American soldier and, predicts the piece, he would eventually turn back the tide and prevail, just as the Allied forces had in March and April of 1943 after the disaster at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.

Presently, the President appeared following the same strategy with respect to the proposed Big Three meeting, desired by Prime Minister Churchill for early December, but being put off by the President until after the inauguration, January 20.

The President appeared to be waiting for public opinion to be galvanized before taking any solid stand or agreeing to participate in a conference, one needing to address the Greek situation with respect to the British action, and the Polish territorial situation with respect to Russia. Newspapers, which a fortnight earlier were condemning Churchill for the action in Greece, Stalin for the demand for territory to the Curzon Line in Poland, and Roosevelt for not condemning both, were now demonstrating more even temperament. Thus, concludes Mr. Grafton, the President's strategy appeared to be working.

Army intelligence, G-2, he says, had underrated German strength since the fall of France in June, 1940. While much of the movement was likely performed in darkness, reconnaissance photographs disclosed considerable displacement of men and materiel day to day.

The Germans had become aware of how thin the American lines were in that section, deemed by the Allies not valuable enough to warrant strong defenses, waffling German agents, appearing as loyal Belgians, having regularly provided troop strength of the Allies to the Germans.

Moreover, the ruggedness of the terrain through which the Germans traversed in the offensive was deemed so unlikely to accommodate such a drive that American commanders simply did not reckon it a likely point of counter-attack.

Military commanders, nevertheless, were not overly concerned, believed that the offensive could be arrested, if not completely shoved back for the harsh terrain. The objective in war was not to gain territory, but to destroy the enemy's capability of waging war. That could be accomplished as easily against these German forces in Belgium as in Germany.

Mr. Pearson finds no reason to doubt the wisdom of that decision, even if such ramming operations tended to tire the men, troops who had been on the front lines since Normandy, replenished only by replacements.

The Germans, by contrast, had removed their best troops into reserve capacity after Normandy, leaving young boys and old men as cannon fodder on the front lines. It appeared thereby to the Allies that the German Army was kaput.

The War Department had released information to the public that some 800,000 German troops had been killed or taken prisoner in France, but in fact half that number were from Russian-Ukrainian labor battalions. The public was therefore led erroneously to believe that a large segment of the German Army was out of commission.

The German Royal Tiger tank was superior to anything in the Allied armory and this fact had been known by the Allies since its advent. The belief that the war would soon end, however, had stunted any plans for development of an American tank which could directly counter the Tiger.

V-1's and V-2's could fly in any weather, if without precision, while bombers could not. Moreover, the V-weapons required no men to fly them.

In the end, though with knowledge of the gathering of troops in the area for about a week prior to the attack, it was believed that these troops were for the purpose of defense and not counter-offensive measures. That was so despite one of General Eisenhower's friends having forewarned that a favorite German tactic when cornered was to turn and fight.

Mr. Pearson includes a note on First Army commander General Courtney Hodges, against whose forces the Bulge was launched, stating him to be regarded as only an average general, one who had not made the grade at West Point, dropped out and entered the regular Army, working his way up through the ranks to a command position.

He concludes by relating a story of the flight of the House Military Affairs Committee to Europe, with Puerto Rico's Commissioner Bolivar Pagan aboard. They were slated to land for a layover in Newfoundland and so had packed heavy winter clothing. Instead, while Mr. Pagan slept soundly, the pilot altered course to Bermuda. As they prepared to land, oblivious to the change of route, Mr. Pagan began putting on his winter clothing, stepped from the plane, to be amazed by the warmth of Newfoundland, all to the delight of his companions who had not deemed it necessary to apprise him of the changed climate.