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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1942

Stalin Declares Unity Russia Counts Herself In The Middle

By Dorothy Thompson

THE Stalin speech, coinciding by chance, with the electrifying twin victory in Africa, is an sensational political event as the turn in Africa is a military event. For Stalin's speech is the clearest and most positive declaration of the solidarity of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition which has yet come out of Russia.

Note that Stalin repeatedly refers to it as the "Anglo-Soviet-American" coalition, not the "Anglo-American," the "Soviet-American," or the "Soviet-Anglo-American." He puts Russia in the middle. This is globally correct. But it is more. By side Stalin states a political attitude, namely, that Russia is not an outsider; that it is not Russia plus the Anglo-American world, or vice-versa, but is one solid block whose name alone being in the order in which he names it.

It is an open secret that there have been rifts in this coalition for some months past. . . rifts upon which the Axis has done its best to play. . . rifts which came into the open after Churchill's visit to Moscow. Churchill at that time admitted that Russia had her own viewpoint about the conduct of the war, but expressed the hope that the misunderstandings might have been overcome by his trip. Subsequent statements from Russia, and especially the Stalin letter to the Associated Press, reproached the Allies on the second front issue.

So it is of the highest importance that Stalin should say in his speech: "Lastly, one should mention so important a fact as the visit to Moscow of . . . Mr. Churchill, which established a complete mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries."

It is true that Stalin, retroactively, deplores the fact that a second front has not been opened earlier. He could not do otherwise. He is a realist. He knows that the Axis is better real-estate bargains to be had. What good are the French colonies? They can't even supply themselves. We have been sending them food and oil.

The first man about who is to own a stretch of desert. It is to determine who holds Suez, who holds Alexandria, who has the transportation routes and the jumping-off places, the springboards from which to strike at Italy, Greece, and any other place on the soft side of the Axis, reaching always toward Germany.

We are out to clear the Mediterranean so it can be used by our side as a short-cut railroad track, a water track, from where we are to where we want to send our men, planes, tanks and ammunition. We are out to set springboards of attack and lines over which we can send forces through the air, on the water and on land.

Whoever holds Suez and the protecting land around it controls the traffic over the Middle East, bridge which connects three continents, the shortest highway from Europe and America to the south door of Russia, to India and China, to the rich oil of Iraq and Iran, and to Turkey's chrome, which we must have for making our high-alloy steel. Alexandria is a harbor base, equipped to take care of the warships necessary to protect Suez and the waters that lead to it.

Suez has been useless of late because we have not been able to keep enemy airplanes far enough away from the Suez Canal. Enemy out of Crete and ourselves strike on into the Balkans. Suez also has not been useful because we had not been able to keep the western end of the Mediterranean open—the western part of the sea. So we struck to clear the air bases along the western shore of the Mediterranean. That is one reason we have gone after French North African points. Also, as the sunny side of Europe is the soft side of the Axis, we want to plant ourselves on the south shore of the Mediterranean, where we will have springboards for jumping across to attack Italy and Sicily, and to protect Malta as a base of air operations.

Also potential line of Axis force runs down along the west coast of Africa to Dakar, the nearest point to South America. We attack Casablanca and support it with encircling blows at Saffi, Fedala and Rabat. That will cut the threatened line to Dakar at a point a few hundred miles to the north. Also Casablanca is the western head of the rail line along the North African coast, so it serves a double purpose.

Once we are firmly established along the North African coast from Casablanca to Suez, and once we have enough air and naval facilities for air and gasoline to England expand rapidly so that we can work a pinners this Winter against the Axis—by air over Europe and by land of blows from the Mediterranean and North Africa. If Russia also striking from the East, the iron grip will begin to be felt in Germany by Spring.

Stalin's acceptance of "democratic liberties," at the end of the first quarter century of the October revolution on a nation-wide broadcast, to the whole Russian people is a promise to them as well as to the world, and recalls Litvinov's speech in New York last Spring, in which he said that the south outflanking Moscow from the east, instead of by frontal attack, with the Caucasian oil fields as only an auxiliary aim. In the light of the dates given, according to the capture of a German officer and by analysis of German troop dispositions, the German Summer campaign, like last Summer's is an egregious failure.

The more important part of the speech, that contains the coalition, is the second part. For, in the form of simple slogans, Stalin affirms the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter, including "the restoration of democratic liberties, and supports the full President Roosevelt's recent statement, which has had enormous effect in Germany, that the Hitlerite clique will be punished for this war, and not the German people."

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There is one point in Stalin's speech which is new, and

does not conform with anything previously said by Churchill or the President. Answering Hitler's announced purpose to destroy Russia as a state and all Russian military and civilian life, Stalin remarks with humor that this is "clear and Hitlerite," and then says: "It is not our aim to destroy Germany," for, "it is important to destroy Germany," and, "It is not our aim to destroy all military forces in Germany . . . it is inadvisable . . . but Hitler's Army can, and should be destroyed."

This division between German military force and Hitler's Army is unexplained. Obviously, there is no other military force in Germany at present but Hitler's Army. Apparently he is trying to split the military mind in Germany, and offset the German fear that either Germany will be permanently occupied or the German people turned over, helpless, to the revenge of their enemies.

It also might be interpreted as a concession to the fear that Russia, with her immense military land power, would dominate the whole Eurasian continent after this war. The concession is apparently accompanied with a warning, for he again tells the Allies that unless their armies establish themselves on European soil, things may "end badly for all freedom-loving countries."

This point needs further clarification.

Finally, Stalin made as clear a contrast of the difference between the Hitler new order and war aims as has been made by any responsible statesman. In his statement of contrasting aims, he revealed for any man in the street why this coalition between nations with various ideologies is possible, and should give hospitality to no element of mistrust. He avoids everything that might cause further rifts. For instance, there is no reference to the future of the British Empire. "It is hoped that our left-wingers, with their motto of 'agitation as usual,' will take note of this."

Wrong Number

African Invasion Changes War, But Our Reasons Were Weak

Observe how the American occupation of the North African coast has completely changed your own picture of the war. The flaming attacks at Stalingrad and even on Guadalcanal have been suddenly robbed of their tremendous importance (though not to the Marines and soldiers on Guadalcanal). The center of the swirling conflict has suddenly shifted thousands of miles. Strategically, the move was brilliant and forceful; President Roosevelt's explanation of its necessity, however, was poor politics, poor propaganda.

We no more moved in on the French possessions to stave off an Axis thrust at America than to irrigate the Sahara's dust bowl. It is obvious to the people of any land that Americans are in Africa that they may jump at Hitler's throat at the first opportunity. The sudden coming of our offensive marked a change we should proudly proclaim. To cover it up under such weak excuses must sound a good deal like some of Hitler's talk to the conquered countries.

They were not slow to voice their own thoughts of change in the war. No sooner had the blow been struck than many capitals were on the air with their views, acclaiming or belittling. Friendly nations seemed to take it for granted that the step meant Allied victory—and on the basis of the President's words, they had to wonder if that victory was not meant to return to isolationism in America. The President's picture of a U. S. blow in self-defense gave them a picture of a rich democracy, anxious only to hold and return soon to normal life.

The changed war was as evident in other parts of the world as at home, but in a vastly different light. Our inconspicuously expressed motives were questioned. There was one despicable answer—from Tokyo. The Jap criminals who ordered the peace-time attack on Pearl Harbor branded the African move as another "long series of illegal violations of neutrality by Americans. That wasn't worth a thought, but the reactions of Moscow, Chungking, New Delhi, even Paris were worth our attention.

Because most of the world was electrified by the news, and knew it at once for what it really meant, we should waste no time with devious explanations. This is our first chance to shout to the globe that our first aim is the crushing of Hitler, and that that is the job we're about now. That alone should justify our presence in Africa. We're wasting time and breath on that invasion-threat ally.

Spirited State

South Carolina Harks Back To "Nullification"

All good South Carolinians who remember their history can tell you about "Nullification." It happened, we believe, in 1832, and was an open defiance of the Federal authority.

South Carolina, selling its cotton to England and liking to get return value in English merchandise, was finding it so much pestered by the protective tariff which Congress was enacting at the behest of Yankee industrialists. The Tariff Act of 1828, "the tariff of abominations," was the straw that broke South Carolina's back and set its argument John C. Calhoun to arguing that the states, having delegated power to the Union, were entitled to interpret it and revoke it. On this theory, a South Carolina convention proceeded to adopt an ordinance declaring the U. S. tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 null and void and of no effect in the port of Charleston.

Andy Jackson was President, and he showed a surprising spirit of conciliation. He issued a proclamation, and there was introduced in Congress a "force bill" to compel the doubtful South Carolinians, by the use of the whole power of the United States Government, if necessary, to observe the tariff laws. The ugly controversy was finally compromised by modification of the tariff laws, and South Carolina repealed, for the time being, her ordinance of nullification and secession.

That same spirit of State supremacy, tempered somewhat by ultimate recog-

What Of Africa?

The Springboard

By Raymond Clapper

I FIND it helps to think of this African business, not in terms of territory, but in terms of springboards and lines of force.

What is Egypt? Aside from the Nile Valley and some long-snap cotton, Egypt is nothing but a waste of sand, some interesting pyramids and the Sphinx. If you are fighting for square miles of desert, there are better real-estate bargains to be had. What good are the French colonies? They can't even supply themselves. We have been sending them food and oil.

The first man about who is to own a stretch of desert. It is to determine who holds Suez, who holds Alexandria, who has the transportation routes and the jumping-off places, the springboards from which to strike at Italy, Greece, and any other place on the soft side of the Axis, reaching always toward Germany.

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Why And How

Censor's Code

This is one in a series of articles setting forth the provisions of the U. S. censorship code. The New York Times, which is the only newspaper to have been granted a special license to publish news from the Office of Censorship. We feel that it will answer virtually all questions asked by readers about news in wartime.—Editors, The News.

1. Why is Certain News Withheld?
SOME of the news is not published in newspapers in these critical times. The reason is that editors are co-operating with the Government to deprive the enemy of certain information which would help him to kill Americans.

2. The Basis of Co-operation
The Wartime Code under which editors co-operate with the Government rests on an assumption that certain kinds of information should be withheld from the public. No one wants to tell the enemy that certain troop transports are on the high seas, or to advise him that tank or air force units are concentrated in a certain place.

Editors are asked to recognize that "business as usual" will not be in order during the war, but are assured at the same time that they will be no more or editorial blarney because official sources themselves will be making completely privileged disclosures as often as they will be made safely.

The specific requests in the Code and the reasons behind them:

3. Troop Movements
The voluntary censorship Code requests that there be no unauthorized disclosure of the size, location, movements, or weapons of our fighting forces.

Newspapers naturally learn a great deal about troop movements and the identity of regiments overseas. The reasons for withholding this news are, in the main, obvious. No one wants to tell the enemy that certain troop transports are on the high seas, or to advise him that tank or air force units are concentrated in a certain place.

Enemy spies like to report exactly what fighting men are where and what equipment they have.

At first thought it might seem harmless to say that Willie Jones was with the Nin First in Australia. But by picking up such items here and there an enemy agent could piece together the whole story of General MacArthur's manpower, his equipment, and what special training his troops have had.

4. Ships
The voluntary censorship Code asks that the movements, identities and services of naval and merchant ships be not reported, and that details of construction and prospective launchings be withheld except as officially announced.

Enemy spies try their lives in attempts to report shipping information.

If we tell the enemy where our ships are, he will know where to attack them. If we tell him what cargo they are carrying, he will know what ships will be his most valuable prizes. If we tell him that we know where his own ships are, he is likely to move them to our disadvantage.

Need, it is a costly business for information about conveying methods, new shipping routes, how shipments of strategic materials can be cut off, and technical details of our busy shipyards.

Forward-Right-Left-Face-to-the-Rear-March!

—By Herblock



Men For War

Under Voluntary Control

By Paul Mallon

WASHINGTON
A NEW try at voluntary management of the manpower problem—instead of compulsion—has been in the making among increased officials the past several days. The election result is publishing along. Compulsion is not likely to be tried until next year, and only if the new method fails. Labor is supposed to have a promise to that effect.

In its advance stages, the new program would call for a single-handed Government control of both Army drafting and industrial manpower. The new program would be a new commission or Manpower Council. One agency would decide who is to go into the Army and who is to work. "Enlistments would be stopped."

The control would function on a system which has been tried in the aircraft industry. Workers would be placed in ten classifications. That, and shifted the needs of industry are made known. A vast training system to bring new workers into the field (particularly women) would be sponsored. The reason for trying this approach are set forth officially in the survey of current business of the Commerce Department for October.

The Government figures the Army and industry will need 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 more men before the end of next year. The military may need 5,000,000 more to reach peak strength. War manufacturing will require a maximum of 4,000,000 by December, 1943.

About 4,000,000 women are considered available and trained. Declining activity in military building may release 2,500,000 men. Unemployed men number over 2,000,000 and about half of them will be available. The other half being unemployed. There are also 15,000,000 farm women without small children, and 2,000,000 women who are available for work in the farm work.

The survey concludes that manpower is a localized difficulty in war industry centers and on farms. It is a main problem. It is to get the above-mentioned available workers to those points and provide proper housing.

The Big Drive At Last
The turn of the tide of the war in Africa and Europe these past few days is plain on its face, but the inner content of the war is going further and brings the end within sight for the first time.

The British-American drive to roll up Rommel was no surprise. The crafty Nazi general well knew of the accumulation of British superiority in planes, tanks and men. His scouts had ob-

served it for weeks. That was why he was in Berlin just before the attack broke. He was trying to get reinforcements, and these were not to be obtained.

Since the end of June, Rommel has known he would be faced with heavy superiority in the air. He has been trying to get along without planes superior before, by desert use of his tanks, but this time his oil supplies were low. His gasoline dumps were thoroughly destroyed. He made just north of the Gattara Depression. This was regarded as the battle center. There his major forces were massed.

They had the time to make himself ready, on the shortest, easiest defense line available in that desert, but he could not get the withdrawal. The only surprise was the spot at which the British hit him. His September attack had been made just north of the Gattara Depression. This was regarded as the battle center. There his major forces were massed.

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